TSVANGIRAI ON MDC'S OVERSEAS OUTREACH, TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001792

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON MDC'S OVERSEAS OUTREACH, TALKS,
TRIAL

REF: HARARE 1711 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political officer Win Dayton; reason -- Section 1.5 (B)
(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 10 meeting with Ambassador
Sullivan, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai voiced continued
frustration with ZANU-PF's lack of urgency on resuming talks
and recounted efforts by MDC principals to engage with
regional SADC leaders in that regard. He sought USG support
for the opening of an MDC office in Washington and reported
that he and MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube planned to
testify at Tsvangirai's treason trial due to get underway
September 15. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On his own initiative, Tsvangirai came to the
Residence to review recent developments with the Ambassador.
At the outset, he described ongoing approaches by MDC
principals with SADC heads of state. Malawian President
Muluzi had been especially receptive in welcoming a
delegation that included Secretary General Welshman Ncube and
Chairman Isaac Matongo. Muluzi also had arranged a call by
the delegation on Tanzanian President Mkapa and offered to
facilitate other meetings. The delegation was to visit
Mozambique after meeting with Mkapa on September 9.
Tsvangirai identified Botswana, Angola, and Namibia as other

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possible MDC diplomatic whistle stops. (NOTE: We understand
that a meeting in Mozambique is being rescheduled for the
coming weeks and that the Angolans, while aware of MDC
interest in a meeting, were waiting for further word from the
MDC. END NOTE)


3. (C) According to Tsvangirai, Muluzi was skeptical of
South African reassurances that "things were moving forward"
in Zimbabwe. Muluzi had reported that Mugabe's 45 minute
ramble on land reform and neocolonialism at the SADC summit
had left other leaders frustrated and sensing that he lacked
a meaningful plan to address Zimbabwe's multi-dimensional
crisis. Tsvangirai observed that the South African High
Commissioner was becoming especially frustrated over GOZ
inaction. At the same time, he voiced doubt about the
intensity of South African pressure on Zimbabwe, and noted
that the MDC delegation had heard "nothing new" from the ANC
Secretary General when they passed through South Africa on

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their way home from Malawi.


4. (C) Tsvangirai advised that very discreet interparty
discussions on the constitution had gone well, suggesting to
him that Justice Minister Chinamasa recognized the
inevitability of a framework to support new elections. He
took recently announced internal ZANU-PF provincial elections
as an indication that the party was preparing for a
transition, although whether they had implications beyond an
internal transition remained unclear. He concluded that the
bishops' initiative had "fallen through" and claimed that
there were no other interparty channels in use. Publicly
reported channels involving ZANU-PF Chairman John Nkomo and
party spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira were only associated with
the defunct church initiative. Curiously, intermediaries for
the Italian order Santo Egidio had approached him the day
before to inquire if MDC would object to the order playing a
role in mediation/reconciliation efforts. Tsvangirai said he
told them that he had no formal objection but that the
multiplicity of potential channels and mediation efforts only
contributed to confusion and unhelpful delays. He said he
did not believe that ZANU-PF had given Santo Egidio any green
light to facilitate talks.


5. (C) Tsvangirai expressed concern about the potential
impact of speculation within the government-controlled press
on divisions within the MDC leadership, particularly between
himself and Ncube. His own rank and file were likely to know
better but diplomats might believe the reports. He confirmed
our own analysis that there were no rifts within the MDC
leadership and said that he felt "completely unchallenged."
In addition, unlike ZANU-PF, which was rife with potential
ethnic, sub-ethnic, geographic and historical divisions, MDC
was unified across ethnic and geographic lines. The
Ambassador assured him that we had not given any credence to
the reports, and had shared this assessment with diplomats
who sought our opinion on the matter.


6. (C) Referencing local media reports on A/S Boucher's
September 2 statement on Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai sought
clarification of Washington's assessment of the August 30-31
elections. He voiced concern that positive appraisals of the
elections could play into the government's hands. The
Ambassador explained that the statement had recognized some
degree of improvement over past elections but highlighted
continuing concerns about levels of violence and
intimidation, economic duress on voters, and non-transparency
associated with voter rolls. Tsvangirai conceded he had not
seen the full statement and agreed that objectivity and a
balanced assessment were important to USG credibility with
public.


7. (C) Tsvangirai reported that the MDC was interested in
opening an office in Washington and sought USG support in
that regard. Beyond Washington, he asserted that the MDC
already had adequate coverage of the EU but would pursue
additional offices in Nairobi and West Africa. The party was
in the process of getting higher level coverage of South
Africa, perhaps on a rotating, part-time basis. The
Ambassador explained that the USG was prohibited from
supporting lobbying operations in Washington but that the
Department could be helpful in facilitating access and in
other ways.


8. (C) Turning to his treason trial, which is due to get
underway on September 15, Tsvangirai reported that he was
planning to testify in his own defense. Former co-defendants
Party Secretary General Welshman Ncube and Shadow Agriculture
Minister Ransen Gasela also would testify in person.
Tsvangirai predicted that the trial would stretch out at

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least until the end of the year.


9. (C) COMMENT: The MDC leadership's efforts to stimulate
regional pressure on the GOZ reflect frustration over the
GOZ's continuing lack of urgency to come to the table.
SADC's public inaction on Zimbabwe at the recent summit in
Dar Es Salaam and MDC suspicions about SAG ambivalence
further impel the leadership's foreign relations initiative.
Although it is unclear the extent to which SADC member
leaders would be willing to engage the GOZ constructively at
the MDC's behest, for now the MDC leadership appears
encouraged by the recognition they have received. Our own
feedback from SADC diplomats here is that they are
encouraging meetings between MDC and their governments as a
means to press ZANU-PF to resolve Zimbabwe's political
crisis. (The Mozambican High Commissioner -- who comes from
a military background -- expressed frustration to us that
Zimbabwe expected African solidarity with Zimbabwe vis-a-vis
relations with the EU, while the absence of interaction was
hurting all of Africa.) Beyond the party's overseas
outreach, Tsvangirai's preoccupation with media
misinformation, treason trials and the like suggests that
ZANU-PF harassment continues to absorb MDC leadership
attention, with attendant opportunity cost to organizational
and substantive concerns.
SULLIVAN