BISHOP RECOUNTS STATUS OF TALKS INITIATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001599

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: BISHOP RECOUNTS STATUS OF TALKS INITIATIVE

REF: (A) HARARE 1594 (B) HARARE 1571 (C) HARARE 1532

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER WIN DAYTON; REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On behalf of the bishops' troika (reftels),
Trevor Manhanga of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe on
August 8 gave Charge a status report on the bishops'
initiative to get political talks renewed. Manhanga
dismissed criticism of the initiative by certain ZANU-PF
elements and asserted that Mugabe himself continued to be
open to the effort. Emphasizing that Mugabe personally had
encouraged the bishops to canvass the international
community, Manhanga inquired about USG views generally and
benchmarks for international re-engagement in particular. He
advised that he would seek quiet facilitation of the process
by other Africans, including the South African Government,
which had offered to be supportive. The bishops continue to
wait for ZANU-PF's overdue submission of proposed agenda
items for the talks. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At the bishops' initiative, Manhanga called on the
Charge at the Embassy August 8 to exchange views on the
bishops' effort to bring MDC and ZANU-PF to the negotiating
table. At the outset, Manhanga expressed appreciation for
USG concern and assistance in exploring options for political
reconciliation in Zimbabwe. He apologized for the absence of
his colleagues, who were unable to break away from
commitments in Mutare. He said the group was seeking to meet
separately with Ambassador Sullivan (presently on leave),the
British High Commissioner, and other international
representatives. Certain ZANU-PF elements would try to use
such contact to attack the process but Mugabe himself had
urged them to meet with the international community,
including the British and South Africans. Thus, such calls
were "discreet" but "not clandestine." He observed that, in
any event, Zimbabwe's problems could not be addressed in
isolation and that there would be stages at which advice and
assistance from the international community would be helpful.



3. (C) By way of background, Manhanga recounted that the
bishops' initiative was born several months ago, when several
began discussing what could be done about the country's
political polarization and rapid economic collapse. At that
time, they approached several ZANU-PF senior officials, among
whom was ZANU-PF Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira,
who promised to convey their interest to Mugabe. They
subsequently met further with Shamuyarira and Chairman John
Nkomo, who arranged a meeting with Mugabe. The Mugabe
meeting lasted two hours. After 45 minutes of criticizing
familiar targets, Mugabe became "very amiable" and made clear
that he supported a dialogue. Mugabe described three related
impediments to talks: the MDC election challenge, MDC views
of his legitimacy, and the MDC's "parrotting" of foreign
perspectives. He encouraged the bishops to relay his
interest to the MDC and see what might ensue.


4. (C) The following week, the bishops met with Morgan
Tsvangirai and other MDC principals. The MDC group

SIPDIS
identified familiar objectives: level playing field,
reduction of political violence, etc. They said they were
prepared to drop the issue of legitimacy and the court
challenge, although they would preserve the challenge for
now. The bishops relayed the positions to Shamuyarira and
the parties agreed to submit proposed agenda items.


5. (C) Manhanga confirmed press reports that the bishops had
intended to hold the MDC agenda letter (ref B) unopened until
ZANU-PF submitted its letter and review them for the first
time together. He reported that Tsvangirai had apologized
for the press leak of the MDC submission, which he conceded
came from an MDC source. Manhanga did not know who leaked
the document or why it had been leaked.


6. (C) Manhanga said that free and fair elections were a
long term objective for the bishops, but that atmospherics --
political arrests, disrupted rights of assembly, etc. --
would have to be addressed first. The bishops did not intend
to raise such issues, which invariably would be addressed by
the process in any event. For now, though, time was required
to get conditions ripe for an election, including
constitutional and electoral "dispensations." As to
potential power-transferring or power-sharing mechanisms,
Manhanga said these would be up to the parties.


7. (C) Referring to internal ZANU-PF divisions, Manhanga
said that Mugabe,s choice of party moderates to engage on
the initiative indicated Mugabe,s sincerity and was a good
sign. In any event, however, any ZANU-PF "roadmap" was
likely to be "fractious" at best. Emphasizing the potential
importance of affording Mugabe a "dignified exit," Manhanga
urged that interested parties not permit details on the fate
of "one man" obstruct a process that could yield benefits for
all.


8. (C) According to Manhanga, the bishops were seeking
certain African luminaries who might influence Mugabe
constructively. He opined that Kenneth Kaunda might be able
to exert a positive influence, for example. Mandela and
Mbeki would be inappropriate, although the South African
government already was being supportive. In an August 4
visit to the bishops, an Embassy counselor reported that the
South African government was pleased with developments and
urged that the bishops advise if it could be helpful.
Manhanga said that they would go to the South Africans and
other Africans for help if ZANU-PF dragged its feet past
August 13 (August 11 and 12 are local holidays) on the agenda
submission. Getting some kind of "irrevocable momentum" soon
was crucial; the longer the initiative,s status remained in
"the twilight zone," the easier it would be for opposition
efforts to gain traction.


9. (C) In concluding, Manhanga emphasized the importance of
international support for the process. At this nascent
stage, some identification of international benchmarks tying
specific events to stepped up international engagement would
offer important incentive to the players. "What has to
happen for good will and positive actions to be shown?" It
might help significantly if the bishops could convey such
information to Mugabe, Manhanga asserted. He inquired about
USG views.


10. (C) The Charge said that the USG hoped to see the
process take off. He related USG support for the bishops,
longer-term objective of free and fair elections and
concurred that establishing conditions to permit such
elections was crucial. The USG would monitor progress
carefully and do what it could to help within the constraints
of its strained relationship with the government. In view of
certain elements of ZANU-PF,s hostility to the USG and their
rejection of the bishops, role, USG posture would remain
discreet for now.


11. (C) COMMENT: Manhanga probably is right that momentum
will need to be established swiftly if the troika,s efforts
are to bear fruit. Even if they wither, Mugabe may yet
pursue other avenues of dialogue -- ones over which he feels
he maintains more control. Mugabe may indeed be prepared to
consider the possibility of stepping down, but we remain
skeptical that he and his closest supporters have abandoned
hopes of scripting a ZANU-PF succession scenario of some
kind.
WHITEHEAD