Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03HARARE1185
2003-06-11 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

ASSISTING ZIMBABWE AFTER DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Tags:  EAID PGOV ECON EFIN KDEM PHUM PREL SENV SOCI ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001185 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/S, DRL, EB/IFD
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER
STATE PASS USAID
STATE PASS EXIM/OPIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2005
TAGS: EAID PGOV ECON EFIN KDEM PHUM PREL SENV SOCI ZI
SUBJECT: ASSISTING ZIMBABWE AFTER DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

REF: HARARE 1130

Classified By: Econchief William Weissman. Reason: 1.5 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001185

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/S, DRL, EB/IFD
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER
STATE PASS USAID
STATE PASS EXIM/OPIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2005
TAGS: EAID PGOV ECON EFIN KDEM PHUM PREL SENV SOCI ZI
SUBJECT: ASSISTING ZIMBABWE AFTER DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

REF: HARARE 1130

Classified By: Econchief William Weissman. Reason: 1.5 (b/d).


1. (c) Summary: This message provides recommendations for
U.S. assistance to a reformist, democratically-elected
government. These recommendations go well beyond the
assistance we recommended for a transition government in
reftel. End summary.


2. (c) Reftel outlined programs and activities we think
should be put in place quickly if a genuinely reformist
transition government takes office. We also highlighted
obstacles to be cleared before offering assistance during the
transition. Today's message takes the process a step
further, providing a more complete list of assistance
programs and activities to help consolidate a democratic
government committed to reform. We envision that most
programs would be implemented only after a
democratically-elected government takes office, but believe
this supplemental list might also become important for
planning purposes during the transition phase. Moreover, it
is useful for the USG to begin to consider what will be
required during the entire democratic and economic
reconstruction process.


3. (c) Key elements of the supplementary programs and
activities include:

-- Democracy
o Seek presidential finding on Zimbabwe return to
rule-of-law/democracy
o Increase funding for parliamentary spending ($1 million)
o Seek appropriation of Zimbabwe Democracy Act (ZDERA)
authorized funds to rebuild democratic institutions ($5
million)
o Fund church and civil society dialogue and reconciliation
programs ($3 million)
o Provide judicial training, including arbitration and
mediation ($2.5 million/yr)
o Expand current pilot programs for local governance
nationwide ($2.5 million/yr)

o Continue civil society strengthening ($2 million/yr)

-- Humanitarian/Agriculture/Land Reform
o Expand food assistance, shifting to food-for-work and/or
food-for-peace as market conditions permit. ($80 million)
o Support private sector food importation with foreign
exchange facility or in-kind contributions ($20 million)
o Expand funding for additional larger-sized drip irrigation
kits ($3 million)
o Provide technical assistance support for land reform
rationalization activities such as audit, policy reform and
reallocation from ZDERA authorized, but not appropriated,
funds. ($15 million)

-- Health Sector
o Provide additional HIV/AIDS funding for prevention of
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT),voluntary counseling
and testing (VCT) and anti-retroviral therapy (ARV)
interventions ($25 million/yr)
o Add Zimbabwe to 14 core countries targeted for presidential
initiative in HIV/AIDS
o Provide support to National AIDS Council ($3 million)
o Support Ministry of Health national AIDS and TB Unit ($5
million)
o Explore access to enhanced USG and Global Fund HIV/AIDS
resources
o Provide assistance for Zimbabwe to bring immunizations up
to World Health Organization standards

-- Trade/Energy
o Fund independent macroeconomic reform program to create
environment conducive to growth, privatization and
investment, including transformation of parastatals NOCZIM
and ZESA into regulatory bodies ($50 million over 5 years)
o Grant full AGOA access to Zimbabwe
o Provide full ExIm Bank and OPIC cover for Zimbabwe while
encouraging loans for new hydroelectric projects
o Organize an OPIC investment mission
o Advocate for Zimbabwean participation in the Southern
African Customs Union
o Expand microenterprise assistance ($2.5 million)
o Resume USCS-sponsored trade delegations and participation
in Zimbabwean trade fairs
-- Multilateral Outreach
o Coordinate international financing for a bridge loan,
through the Treasury Department's Economic Stabilization Fund
or other means on the U.S. side, to enable the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank to reengage Zimbabwe.
o Enact full Paris Club rescheduling
o Explore debt relief for Zimbabwe as stipulated in ZDERA,
possibly through heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPC)
funding
o Encourage prompt EU and international financial
institutions (IFI) reengagement

-- Bilateral Outreach
o Lift targeted travel and financial sanctions
o Engage in high-level visits in both directions
o Resume Peace Corps program
o Include Zimbabwe in Regional Center for Southern Africa
(RCSA) and other pertinent USG-funded regional initiatives

-- Military/Security
(Note: Assitance only directed toward those without
histories of human rights violations.)
o Restore full International Military Exchange Training
(IMET) complement ($200,000)
o Resume Zimbabwe's Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)
participation
o Grant Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds for spares,
equipment and training ($500,000) and deliver biodiversity
small boats
o Provide support to restart Southern African Development
Community Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) training center in
Harare ($1 million)
o Invite Zimbabwe to participate in International Law
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) and other USG law enforcement
training
o Allocate Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) Funds ($100,000)
o Facilitate visit of EUCOM general/flag officer


4. (c) Comment: Until the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe was Sub-Sahara
Africa's second most industrial country (after the Republic
of South Africa). Since then, it has become one of the
poorest nation by many measures, a textbook case of
misgovernance and its consequences. We broker no illusions
that Zimbabwe can rapidly regain past prowess. However, we
believe the country -- with abundant mineral resources,
arable land, high-end tourist destinations and manufacturing
know-how -- still holds great potential. Through the
programs and activities outlined above, the U.S. could help
Zimbabwe reemerge one day as an important regional player.

SULLIVAN