RE-CERTIFICATION BENCHMARKS DEMARCHE DELIVERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GUATEMALA 000781

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013
TAGS: SNAR PGOV GT
SUBJECT: RE-CERTIFICATION BENCHMARKS DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: A. SECSTATE 66351


B. GUATEMALA 770

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Hamilton. Reason 1.5 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: As requested in Ref A, the Ambassador
discussed counter-narcotics re-certification benchmarks in
detail with President Portillo on March 22. The Ambassador
gave Portillo a copy of the diplomatic note on benchmarks
(full text para 10),rebuffed a request for material
assistance to the Guatemalan military, and warned that the
use of torture against narco-traffickers is unacceptable to
the USG and would be extremely prejudicial to Guatemala's
chances for re-certification. Portillo raised no objections
to the benchmarks and promised to investigate MINUGUA's
allegations of the use of torture and to stop any further use
of torture in the war against narcotics trafficking. DCM met
separately with Vice Foreign Minister Jorge Perez and
Secretary for Strategic Analysis Arturo Montenegro to discuss

SIPDIS
the benchmarks. Perez proposed a follow-up meeting on
benchmarks between GOG vice ministers and the DCM and NAS on
March 26. We anticipate that the GOG will formally agree to
the benchmarks. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador's meeting with Portillo was reported
in Ref B. MINUGUA chief Koenigs had told the Ambassador on
March 21 that there was strong evidence of the use of torture
and illegal detention (for at least eight hours) against
three narco-trafficking suspects on March 6, in Zacapa
province. MINUGUA's conclusions in this case were based on a
joint investigation by its regional office in Zacapa in
conjunction with the Human Rights Ombudsman's representative.
To compile its report, MINUGUA interviewed the
suspects/victims, police and anti-narcotics (SAIA) police
sources. We have been unable to corroborate MINUGUA's report
with official sources in the SAIA or the military, who deny
any involvement with torture in this case. Nevertheless,
based on discussions with unofficial sources, MINUGUA's
allegations appear credible.


3. (U) DCM met with Perez and Montenegro on March 19,
accompanied by Acting NAS Chief and PolOff. He provided
Spanish and English versions of the benchmarks received from
the Department, commenting that these benchmarks are not
substantially different from what had previously been under
discussion.


4. (SBU) The two GOG officials made the following comments
in response to specific benchmarks:

-- SAIA Institution Building: Montenegro provided a copy of
a general order from the National Civil Police establishing
the Guatemalan Narcotics Police (SAIA) which outlined basic
selection requirements for entry into the unit. Montenegro
asked if this order satisfied the benchmark requirements.
Acting NAS chief noted that the order was a partial document
of a larger regulation and that the requirement for periodic
urinalysis and polygraph testing would be contained in
another part of the regulation which was not presented.
Perez distinguished between "formal versus real" compliance,
noting that issuing an order may satisfy the formal
requirement, but real compliance would involve verification
of implementation. Montenegro acknowledged this point, and
added that the order indicated the GOG's intention to comply.

-- Extradition: Perez asked what time frame is implied in
the phase "over the coming year." DCM replied that it was
the next 12 months.

-- Precursor Chemicals: Montenegro confirmed that the
regulations have already been passed.


5. (SBU) Perez noted that the benchmarks now total nine vs.
the ten previously discussed, since the issues of seizures
and prosecutions have been combined in the current document.
Montenegro said the order of the benchmarks has apparently
changed. Previously, the first benchmarks under discussion
were those under the direct responsibility of the Executive.
Now they are mixed. Perez said that is not a problem; the
benchmarks are a GOG, not solely Executive responsibility.
He said he has not discussed this yet with the Foreign
Minister, but he will propose that the GOG assign primary
responsibility for completion of each benchmark to the
responsible ministry, and name an individual responsible,
thereby creating a matrix of goals and accountable
institutions and individuals.


6. (SBU) Perez said the Portillo Administration has "a
mountain" of demands on it in its last year, but wants to
make substantial progress meeting the benchmarks by
September, 2003. Re-certification is important to the GOG's
bilateral relationship with the U.S., the GOG's financial
interests (Comment: this is a reference to stalled efforts
to float Eurobonds. End Comment.),and also a national
interest in combating narco-trafficking and related
corruption.

7. (SBU) Perez acknowledged that the recertification effort
will require coordinated action by the Executive, the Public
Ministry and the judiciary. Given shortage of prosecutors
and resources, progress will be difficult, and will require
shifting prosecutorial assets to this task in the next
semester. DCM asked if the Public Ministry and judiciary are
willing to do so. Perez said yes. He said FM Gutierrez has
two priority areas for transition to the next government:
the Peace Accord Agenda and the Counter-narcotics Matrix. He
asked if the USG would object to the GOG sharing the matrix
with other countries who might be able to provide support (he
mentioned Japan in the context of better port management, and
Spain to train police). The DCM said we would have no
objection to the GOG doing this once we have a formal
agreement on benchmarks. Perez proposed, and the DCM
accepted, a meeting between GOG vice ministers, the DCM and
NAS on March 26 to discuss the benchmarks further.


8. (SBU) Secretary Montenegro concluded by saying the new
benchmarks offered "no surprises" and indicated general
agreement on the substantive issues. Montenegro said that he
hopes to develop a national counter-narcotics strategy for
Cabinet approval, to coordinate GOG policy and create a
policy framework useful to this and the next government. He
is aware of the Government of Mexico's strategy document, and
was told of the USG strategies. He asked for NAS
collaboration in this effort, which we to.

Comment
--------------


9. (SBU) We anticipate no major roadblocks to formal
Guatemalan agreement to these benchmarks. End Comment.


10. (U) Text of Diplomatic Note on Benchmarks provided to
GOG:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala
and has the honor to refer to conversations between our two
governments on the matter of counter-narcotics cooperation.

To comply with current United States law establishing the
certification mechanism and to respond to calls for a more
transparent process, the Embassy of the United States takes
advantage of this opportunity to advise the Government of
Guatemala of U.S. law governing the certification process and
both generic and specific certification standards.

The Embassy wishes to establish at the outset that the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) and
other U.S. policy documents on drug control underscore U.S.
efforts to curb its own drug consumption problems. Illegal
drugs exact an enormous toll on U.S. society: 52,000 lives
annually and some $160 billion dollars a year in economic
costs. Sixteen million Americans use drugs on a current
basis, and 5.6 million meet the criteria for needing drug
treatment. United States National Drug Control Policy
commits unprecedented resources to the treatment of drug
abuse and the reduction of demand: some $5.2 billion in
Fiscal Year 2002. President Bush has announced the United
States goal of reducing drug use by 10 percent in two years
and 25 percent in five years. Recent data from the
University of Michigan's "Monitoring the Future" survey show
the first significant downturn in youth drug use in nearly a
decade, with reduced drug use noted among 8th, 10th, and 12th
graders.

No domestic policy of demand reductions can succeed, however,
while the supply of drugs into the United States continues
unrestrained. For that reason, we also place enormous
importance on cooperation with other countries. The United
States Government's aim in approaching the Government of
Guatemala now is to establish a dialogue regarding the United
States and Guatemala counter-narcotics objectives for the
near term and to present clear objectives that, if met, will
be given due consideration by the U.S. in evaluating
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
convention and the United States and Guatemala bilateral
counter-narcotics program. The Embassy of the United States
is pleased with the exchanges held to date and will continue
to dialogue with the Government of Guatemala on this subject
throughout the year. The United States Government is
prepared to review the original decision regarding
Guatemala's counter-narcotics cooperation in response to
significant progress in all areas of the shared
counter-narcotics agenda. The benchmarks outlined in this
diplomatic note are not "all or nothing" mandates but,
rather, represent a series of concrete steps toward a
definite target. Significant progress on taking these steps
would demonstrate the will of the Government of Guatemala to
meet its international counter-narcotics obligations.

The United States Government's assessment of a country's
counter-narcotics performance is independent of levels of
U.S. bilateral counter-narcotics assistance to that country.
However, within budgetary limitations, the United States
Government will seek to be as responsive as possible to the
Government of Guatemala's requests for drug control
assistance.

Under U.S. law, each country identified by the President as a
major illicit drug producing or drug- transit country is
subject to the annual certification process. Under this
process, the President determines, based upon overall
counter-narcotics performance, whether the country has
"failed demonstrably" during the previous 12 months to make
substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under
international counter-narcotics agreements and take the
counter-narcotics measures specified in U.S. law. The
certification decisions are made by the President upon the
recommendations of the Secretary of State, with input from
other concerned United States Government agencies.

In order not to be found as having "failed demonstrably," a
country must take meaningful and committed actions against
narcotics trafficking and related criminal activity. Key
criteria considered in the certification process include:

(1) Performance in areas identified in the 1988 UN drug
convention: namely, cultivation/manufacturing;
consumption/demand reduction; trafficking; illicit crop
eradication/substitution; interdiction and law enforcement
cooperation; asset seizure; extradition and mutual legal
assistance; drug treatment; control of precursor/essential
chemicals; and money laundering.

(2) Performance in accomplishing goals described in any
applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the United
States, or a multilateral narcotics agreement;

(3) Performance in preventing and punishing public
corruption, especially by senior government officials that
facilitates the production, processing, or shipment of drugs
and other controlled substances, or that discourages the
investigation or prosecution of such acts; and

(4) The United States Government is very interested in
efforts to improve regional cooperation and regional
activities to support the goals of the 1988 UN drug
convention. The Government of the United States will consider
such activities and initiatives as we evaluate performance.

While the President makes his certification determinations
based on a country's compliance with all aspects of the 1988
UN drug convention, bilateral agreements, other multilateral
agreements, and the elimination of corruption, there are
specific areas of interest that we will highlight during the
certification process. The United States believes the
following actions could be taken:


1. SAIA Institutional Building: Adopt formal regulations to
govern SAIA activities and operations based on the
regulations and policies used by the National Civilian
Police. Policies should include regular polygraphs and
urinalysis, as well as mechanisms to promote greater
cooperation between the SAIA and the Anti-Narcotics
Prosecutors.


2. Significant Increase in Seizures, Arrests and
Prosecutions: Increased development and prosecution of cases
against those involved in narco-trafficking and other types
of organized crime. Guatemala should increase security
measures to protect judges and prosecutors. Cocaine seizures
should return to CY2000 levels, which averaged 800 kilos or
more per month, with a significant seizure at ports of entry
at least every two months.


3. Inventory and Destroy All Drugs Seized before 1999 and
Increase Warehouse Security: Destroy all seized drugs not
needed for evidence by April 30th, and develop and implement
security measures for drug warehouses. Establish clear
procedures for chain of custody, evidence handling, and drug
destruction.


4. Sign the Counter-narcotics Bilateral Maritime Agreement
with the U.S.: Guatemala should negotiate and sign a
counter-narcotics bilateral maritime agreement with the USG.


5. Search Warrants: Guatemala should develop a mechanism
that ensures that narcotics search warrants are issued in a
timely and secure fashion.


6. Successful Completion of Extradition Requests: Guatemala
should fully process all pending U.S. extradition requests.
Over the coming year, the Government of Guatemala should
cooperate in identifying procedures to expedite extradition
requests.


7. Successful Promulgation and Implementation of
Regulations on Precursor Chemicals: Guatemala should
promulgate the implementing regulations that are required by
the precursor chemical law of 1999.


8. Seized Assets and Forfeited/Undeclared Cash: Guatemala
should adopt and implement legislative and/or procedural
reforms for seizing and utilizing in an efficient manner all
assets of criminals acquired through criminal activity, and
assign these assets to strengthen the Judiciary, the Public
Ministry, and the Police, who are battling narco-trafficking
and organized crime. Special emphasis should be placed on
transferring seized cash into law-enforcement programs.


9. Money Laundering Efforts: Guatemala's money laundering
legislation is the best weapon in the fight against
corruption and organized crime. Guatemala should assign
sufficient personnel who are qualified to the Money
Laundering Prosecutor's Office and will make every effort to
take cases to trial. The Financial Investigations Unit
(IVE),that is part of the Superintendent of Banks (SIB),
should share information with the Prosecutor's office in
conformance with the Guatemalan money laundering law. These
efforts will contribute to Guatemala coming off the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) list of non-cooperating countries in
anti-money laundering efforts. Guatemala should take all
necessary steps to improve inter-institutional cooperation
that will allow for more effective compliance with the money
laundering law.

The efforts of U.S. and Guatemalan governments can do much to
reduce the threat of drug addiction to the youth of the two
countries. The Government of the United States looks forward
to continued discussions with the Government of Guatemala on
strengthening counter-narcotics cooperation.

The Embassy of the United States of America takes the
opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Government of Guatemala the assurances of its highest
consideration.

Embassy of the United States of America, Guatemala City,
March 21, 2003.
HAMILTON