FRG PROTEST AFTERMATH: GUATEMALA MORE FRAGMENTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001908

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2013
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM PREL PINR PHUM ASEC GT
SUBJECT: FRG PROTEST AFTERMATH: GUATEMALA MORE FRAGMENTED
THAN EVER

Classified By: A/DCM David Lindwall for reason 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Unexpected legal setbacks to the registration
of former General Rios Montt's presidential candidacy have
led to profound frustration among FRG leaders. They view
Rios Montt as the only FRG candidate who has a chance of
winning the elections, and the biggest draw for voters to
support their congressional slate. The possibility that
legal appeals could derail Rios Montt's candidacy led the FRG
to use violent street protests July 24-25 to send the signal
that they are prepared to raise the stakes in order to ensure
that Rios Montt can run. Most of the opposition, which with
civil society has formed a "Civic Front for Democracy in
Guatemala," is equally determined to keep him out of the
race, although some might be willing to accept a new
Constitutional Court decision if its magistrates were
selected in a transparent manner. Both sides are insisting
that international mediation favor their all-or-nothing
positions. Contacts in the opposition and the police believe
violence will escalate following the next ruling of the
Supreme Court (expected in the next ten days),which is not
expected to favor Rios Montt. OAS Election Observation
Mission chief Paniagua arrived in Guatemala on July 25. In a
meeting with the Ambassador on July 27, he seemed to have a
good grasp of the immediate crisis and, while cautious, he
did not rule out a de facto mediation role. It will not be
an easy task. End summary.


2. (C) Violent street protests on July 24-25 organized by the
FRG have raised the stakes significantly in the confrontation
between the ruling party and practically all organized
sectors of Guatemalan society, and have planted the flag that
the FRG is prepared to use violence to keep their candidate
from being disqualified in the upcoming elections. The
highly orchestrated protests were sparked by the FRG's
frustration over setbacks in their legal fight to register
former General Efrain Rios Montt as their presidential
candidate. The FRG viewed the decision by the Supreme Court
to hear an appeal to the Constitutional Court's decision that
Rios Montt could run not only as illegal (note: some of our
viscerally anti-FRG contacts agree that the Supreme Court's
challenge was at a minimum unprecedented, and probably
unconstitutional. End note),but also signaled that the
opposition could manipulate the courts to keep Rios Montt
out. Having been deprived of the legal recourses they
thought they had secured through painstakingly packing the
Constitutional Court, the FRG leadership chose to fall back
on violence and intimidation. Spray-painting epitaphs
against the rich and bringing the violence for the first time
to wealthy neighborhoods, the FRG has shown that they are
prepared to add class conflict to their unsteady mix of
populism.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Gutierrez told the Ambassador that
the protests were organized by the FRG (despite Rios Montt's
public denials),and that the General had assured President
Portillo that they would be peaceful. Gutierrez said that
Portillo and Minister of Government Reyes Calderon were
determined to keep order, but that sympathy by many police
officers with the FRG and orders for the police not to
provoke violence had led the police to not confront the
protesters. He speculated that the images of chaos in the
streets of the capital carried by the media would scare most
Guatemalans and in the end work against the FRG in the
upcoming elections. He argued, however, that the fight
between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court was a
standoff, and opined that the only solution at this point is
political, not juridical. Gutierrez suggested that only the
Ambassador, Archbishop Quezada and OAS Electoral Observation
Mission (EOM) head Paniagua have the credibility to mediate
an agreement between the parties which could resolve the
tension without further violence.


4. (C) GOG Ambassador to the U.S. Antonio Arenales and FRG
Congresswoman (and daughter of the FRG Presidential
candidate) Zury Rios told us separately on July 25 that the
only solution to the crisis is electoral, i.e. the opposition
needs to withdraw its appeals before the Supreme Court, Rios
Montt must be allowed to run for President, and let the
people decide. Both said that the party faithful "would not
sit back with their arms crossed" if the courts do not allow
Rios Montt to run. Both told us that on that point there is
no space for compromise. Zury Rios said that her father is
the only candidate who can secure votes for their
congressional candidates, and that for Rios Montt to be
excluded from the elections would mean the "extinction of the
party." She said "the party faithful" would never give up
Rios Montt's candidacy, and Ambassador Arenales said that the
FRG would "do what ever it takes" to ensure Rios Montt could
run. Both echoed Foreign Minister Gutierrez's call for the
Ambassador to be a mediator, but it was clear their
interpretation was for us to pressure the opposition to allow
Rios Montt to become a candidate and have the matter resolved
once and for all at the ballot box.

5. (C) The Supreme Court must resolve the appeals to Rios
Montt's registration as a candidate by August 6. The FRG and
the opposition expect the Court to uphold the appeals and
deny Rios Montt's candidacy. The FRG would then appeal the
case again to the Constitutional Court, where the FRG has
more influence, but has no ironclad guarantee of winning.
Even if the Constitutional Court did reaffirm its decision to
allow Rios Montt to run, new appeals (not contemplated in the
Constitution, but accepted by the Supreme Court as they did
the last ones) could be filed, effectively tying up his
candidacy beyond the September 9 deadline for filing. Chief
of Police Manchame told us that any further legal setback for
the FRG would likely lead to more violence, and that the
police is inadequately prepared to contain it. Opposition
leaders have also told us that they view the July 24-25
violence as only a foretaste by the FRG of greater violence
to come.


6. (C) Meanwhile, the political opposition, civil society and
the private sector have been further galvanized by the events
of July 24-25 into a "Civic Front for Democracy in Guatemala"
against the FRG (Note: A similar "National Assembly" was
formed by many of the same groups and individuals in May,
1993, in opposition to the Serrano "auto-golpe." End note).
Sensing the possibility that the legal process can be used to
keep Rios Montt from becoming a candidate, there is a growing
determination to press on. Civil Society reps told the
Ambassador that they had already engaged the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (which issued a statement
condemning the violence),and are seeking support for an OAS
Permanent Council session to invoke the democratic charter.
The opposition believes that the FRG's violent actions
greatly undermined any benefit of the doubt the international
community was prepared to extend to the ruling party, and the
opposition hopes to parlay the revulsion at the violent
protests into greater international opposition to Rios
Montt's candidacy. Similarly, the FRG recognizes that the
violence of July 24-25 may have burned a bridge with the
international community, and Zury Rios told us the FRG
believes the USG has cast its lot in with GANA candidate
Oscar Berger.


7. (C) OAS Election Observation Mission (EOM) head Valentin
Paniagua arrived in Guatemala on July 25 for a visit
scheduled to last through August 4. Foreign Minister
Gutierrez told the Ambassador he had asked Paniagua to come
straight from the airport to the MFA in order to engage him
immediately in seeking a solution to this latest crisis. By
the time the Ambassador and A/DCM met with Paniagua on July
27, he had (through facilitators) met with three top FRG
leaders (but not Rios Montt),and seemed to have a good grasp
of the psychological dynamics and legal architecture of the
candidate registration crisis. He was clearly unenthusiastic
about playing a formal mediation role, but did not rule a de
facto one out.


8. (C) Comment: The FRG is desperate, and, rather than
recognizing that its authoritarian style has deepened the
confrontation, believes its electoral ambitions are being
frustrated by a greedy private sector, a scheming political
opposition and an unforgiving international community.
Isolated and "misunderstood," the FRG has little to lose by
pushing the limits of electoral campaign conduct. It is not
clear how the courts will ultimately rule in the General's
case or what other legal strategies the FRG may be
contemplating, but it appears certain that tensions will grow
as a compromise is not expected in the short term. Letting
both sides stare into the abyss a little longer may be
necessary to induce a modicum of flexibility on both sides.
HAMILTON