Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03DJIBOUTI1644
2003-09-04 17:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

DJIBOUTI: TERRORIST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, BUT

Tags:  PTER ASEC MOPS DJ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001644 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013
TAGS: PTER ASEC MOPS DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: TERRORIST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, BUT
DRILL SUGGESTS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT EMBASSY
COOPERATION WITH OTHER USG ELEMENTS

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Tim Smith for reason 1.5 (b,d).

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001644

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013
TAGS: PTER ASEC MOPS DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: TERRORIST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, BUT
DRILL SUGGESTS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT EMBASSY
COOPERATION WITH OTHER USG ELEMENTS

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Tim Smith for reason 1.5 (b,d).


1. (SBU) Because of the request for an immediate report, we
have been unable to reach non-State offices for clearance.
For this reason, this cable is less detailed and shorter than
a full report would be.


2. (S) Summary: Thursday, September 4, Combined Joint Task
Force/Horn of Africa (CJTF/HOA),housed at Camp Lemonier on
the southern end of Djibouti's Ambouli International Airport,
prepared for the possible apprehension of one of East
Africa's most prominent terrorists, the Al Qaeda leader
associated with the Embassy bombings in 1998 and Mombassa
attack of 2002, CJTF actions included an evacuation drill
which removed most of the camp's personnel to areas outside the
compound in order to lower the potential death toll of a
September 11-type suicide plane attack on the base. Special
Forces units mobilized to assist Djiboutian authorities in
the possible orderly capture of a high-level Al Qaeda
operative, or to deal with a hostage situation or prolonged
standoff. AmEmbassy Djibouti assisted CJTF by obtaining
President Ismail Omar Guelleh's permission for the proposed
operations and the President's instruction to Djiboutian
security forces to follow the directions of CTFJ and the
Embassy Regional Affair officer in case of an operation at
the airport.(End Summary)


3. (S) Intelligence received by CJTF at 11:45 suggested that
Kenyan citizen Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the Al Qaeda leader
believed to have had direct links with all three successful
terrorist attacks in Kenya, would be departing on a
commercial flight from Mogadishu. Because of the
possibility that Nabhan might be planning a suicide bombing
attempt on the approximately 1700 American military personnel
stationed at Lemonier, CJTF/HOA Commander Brigadier General
Mastin Robeson ordered an evacuation drill to take all but a
skeleton crew out of the danger zone of a direct hit during
the scheduled arrival times for the three commercial flights
(3:00 to 4:30 pm).


4. (S) While the Station Chief and CJTF worked with
Djiboutian security forces to prepare for Nabhan's
apprehension or hostage standoff, American Embassy officers
worked through the President's Qat-impaired aides to obtain
Guelleh's personal approval of the arrest of Nabhan and his
order to Djiboutian security forces to support the American
plan. However, Nabhan did not arrive on any of the flights,
and the operation stood down at approximately 5:30 pm.


5. (S) Conclusion: CJTF forced were able to respond quickly
to implement their plan. Despite some initial difficulties
with communications, we were equally effective in getting
Presidential permission for the operation. While permission
probably would have been possible after the fact, Post
believes that our effort was important for maintaining
Guelleh's complete support for the Global War on Terrorism.
Tomorrow's (September 5) after-action meeting will prepare a
report and allow all parties the opportunity to work off some
of the rougher edges.
SMITH