DJIBOUTI: ASSISTANCE CONFUSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 001639

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013
TAGS: MARR PREL DJ EAID
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: ASSISTANCE CONFUSION

REF: DJIBOUTI 1633

Classified By: ADCM Haywood Rankin for reason 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Chief of Armed Forces Fathi conveyed to
Charge September 3 President Guelleh's confusion and vexation
-- directed mainly at Djibouti's ambassador in Washington --
about assistance from the United States. He said, perhaps
too frankly, that Guelleh was nervous because he needed to
begin his election campaign for 2005. Guelleh is supposed to
return September 5 to Djibouti, after more than a month away,
and Charge has requested an appointment. The fundamental
problem is that the Djiboutians are accustomed to the simpler
French way of handling assistance and have a steep learning
curve with the Americans (and vice versa). End Summary.


2. (C) Chief of Staff of the Djibouti Armed Forces General
Fathi Ahmed Houssein summoned Charge September 3. The final
third of the conversation, which concerned Djibouti's ongoing
expulsion of undocumented foreigners, is treated in reftel.
Prior to the meeting, the embassy learned that the subject on
Fathi's mind was a 1.7 million dollar bill for paving the
ramp at the hangar for the presidential aircraft, for which
the Djiboutian military expected to be reimbursed by the
United States.

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Presidential Plane and Olhaye
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3. (C) Fathi opened the meeting saying he had hoped to get
clarity on an issue of great importance to President Guelleh,
relating to the presidential aircraft, but he realized he
needed General Robeson and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to
be present. CJTF-HOA Djibouti desk officer Michael dell'
Amico presented General Robeson's apologies for "not being
able to attend." Fathi said that President Guelleh was keen
to get the presidential aircraft up from South Africa, where
it resided at present, and to do so it was necessary that the
work at the presidential hangar be finished.


4. (C) Fathi said that Djiboutians were having a very
difficult time, in general, understanding what was agreed and
not agreed on the part of the United States -- the
presidential ramp and hangar being one example. President
Guelleh, he said, was deeply agitated by the reporting that
had come in from Ambassador Olhaye in Washington about U.S.
assistance to Djibouti. Charge recalled the meeting which he
had earlier attended in Washington with Ambassador Olhaye,
concerning the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, and
believed that the explanation given Olhaye had been
relatively straightforward and that Olhaye had grasped it.
However, Charge explained, there was no doubt that U.S.
funding processes, whether civilian or military, were
complex. Charge offered several examples of how different
types of funding processes worked.

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We are not the French
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5. (C) Fathi said that at the military level Djiboutians
were beginning to understand how the American system worked.
He cited an example of military equipment that had been
ordered in the year 2002 but which, it now appeared, would
not arrive until 2005. USLO Major Anderson reminded Fathi
that he, Fathi, had only signed the contract for this
equipment three months ago. Fathi said, yes, now he was
beginning to understand, and in general the Djiboutian
military was beginning to get the picture. But President
Guelleh was totally confused and completely troubled.
Guelleh now told him that he understood nothing that had been
reported by Ambassador Olhaye on the subject of U.S.
assistance. Guelleh wanted to start all over. He wanted a
clear, practical, down-to-earth, simple piece of paper that
told him what Djibouti was going to get and when. The
problem was, Fathi explained, that President Guelleh would
begin next year his campaign for reelection in 2005. He
needed already, now, to expedite payment of pensions and
salaries, in preparation for that campaign. To do that he
needed to know what money he was going to have in hand and
when. When Guelleh had received the payment for the lease of
Camp Lemonier, he had immediately used a portion of that cash
to pay arrears of pensions and salaries. Djiboutians were
now being paid promptly at the end of the month and knew to
thank the United States.


6. (C) Charge said that he hoped to be seeing President
Guelleh soon and would offer as good an explanation as he
could. However, it was necessary to realize that the U.S.
had a completely different system of providing assistance
from France's. In the Charge's consultations in Paris the
previous week, he had learned that France had promised
Djibouti a total package of military and civilian expenditure
in Djibouti of 55 million dollars annually; part of that
package was an agreement that if the military component went
down, the civilian component would go up in equal measure.
It was a nice, clean system, but it bore no resemblance to
the way the United States did business.


7. (C) Fathi said he did not ask the Americans to be French.
Djibouti only asked for clarity. It did not need to know
what assistance would cost the U.S. government (which, Charge
pointed out, was what the U.S. government announces) but what
Djibouti would receive. Fathi said that it would be
preferable if the U.S. took out all expenses for overhead and
administration that would reduce the net amount of assistance
dollars realized in Djibouti, prior to giving Guelleh the
monetary value of U.S. assistance. President Guelleh would
be returning to Djibouti in a couple of days and he would
need a firm list of what Djibouti would get, how much cash,
how much in the way of projects, their value to Djibouti, and
their execution dates.


8. (C) Fathi said that Djibouti had asked for nothing from
the United States. It had gone through many lean years, and
its nomadic populace could survive off of dates and water.
It was the United States that had offered help, which was
indeed desperately needed, and Djibouti just wanted to know
what to expect. He realized that there was extremely good
will on both sides, and that these were only the unavoidable
problems of adaptation to each other's ways.

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Comment
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9. (C) Fathi enjoys a close relationship with Guelleh. He
is one of Guelleh's four or five closest qat-chewers, which
may explain why he was nominated -- or nominated himself --
to venture into the non-military assistance zone. In fact,
there should not be much "lack of clarity" about non-military
assistance. Djiboutian ministries on the receiving end of
ESF handled by USAID are not complaining about lack of
clarity. In the military field, Fathi has signed -- with
Guelleh's consent -- a letter of request that obligates
virtually all of the 25 million dollar East African
Counterterrorism Initiative projects. But there is, indeed,
a steep learning curve. Moreover, Djiboutians are tough
negotiators and not averse to crying confusion as a
negotiating ploy. Olhaye may be an impediment, as he appears
to embellish his reports to Guelleh.


10. (C) Although elections in Djibouti are far from what
they are in the west, Guelleh may well harbor election
anxieties. The advent of the Americans has raised public
expectations of American largesse. As the people do not see
much immediate evidence of this supposed largesse, they
suspect that their leader has pocketed or misspent it.
Guelleh would like to deflect these suspicions. Fathi's
other striking assertion -- that Guelleh used the lease money
in part to pay salary and pension arrearages -- raises the
question of what happened to the money budgeted for those
salaries and underlines the lack of transparency in
Djiboutian financial management.
SMITH