In response to PM's latest letter, Tigers do

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000960

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, EAP/J; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-04-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: In response to PM's latest letter, Tigers do
not budge from their demand for an interim structure

Refs: (A) Colombo-Ops Center 06/04/03 telecon

- (B) Colombo-SA/INS 06/04/03 class e-mail
- (C) Tokyo 3490 (Notal)
- (D) Colombo 949, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In their June 4 reply to the prime
minister's latest letter, the Tigers have not budged
from their demand that an interim administration be
created for the north/east. The group says it is
willing to discuss the issue, but only if the GSL takes
steps toward meeting this demand first. While the Tiger
reply did not explicitly mention the upcoming Tokyo
donors conference, it seems that the group does not plan
to reconsider its prior decision not/not to attend. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) TIGER RESPONSE: The Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have responded to Sri Lankan Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's June 1 letter to the
group. (Note: In his June 1 letter, the PM reviewed
the GSL's latest proposal regarding assistance delivery
to the north/east, inviting the group to hold a "clear
the air"-type of meeting on the subject. The PM's
letter, and that of the Tigers' today, is part of a long
skein of communications focused on ways to get the
Tigers to return to the peace talks and to attend the
June 9-10 Tokyo donors conference -- See Reftels.) In
their response, which was posted on the pro-LTTE website
"TamilNet" on June 4, LTTE chief negotiator Anton
Balasingham told the PM that the Tigers had no intention
of backing down from their demand for the creation of a
Tiger-controlled interim administration in the
north/east. (Note: Ref B contains the text of
Balasingham's letter to the PM. The text did not
mention the Tokyo conference -- See Para 8.) The
London-based Balasingham said the group was willing to
discuss these matters, but only if the GSL took steps
toward meeting the LTTE's demands first.


3. (U) Explaining the LTTE's stance, Balasingham hit
out hard against the government's recent proposal
regarding assistance delivery, essentially telling the
government that it was missing the point. Making clear
that the LTTE wants an interim arrangement with
political responsibilities (not only involving
assistance),Balasingham states:

"At the outset, we wish to point out that we seriously
differ in perception with what the LTTE leadership
proposes and what your government offers. While our
leadership has proposed an interim administrative
framework, a politico-administrative structure for the
northeast with wider participation of the LTTE, your
government has offered a council with a structure and
mechanism for development of the region."


4. (U) Regarding the details of the GSL's proposal,
Balasingham criticizes it as being overly complex,
stating:

"This is not the end of this strange evolutionary
history of your government's committees and structures.
You are now suggesting a new and comprehensive and
substantial dialogue to clarify and expand the new
structure and to specify and situate the role of the
LTTE in the envisaged model. We could only speculate as
to how many rounds of negotiations the parties would
have to undergo to arrive at a final formulation of this
new bureaucratic institution." (Note: Observers have
also commented on the almost absurd complexity of the
GSL's proposal, which involves an "apex body," a
"special commissioner," and a "management board," among
many other wedding cake layers.)


5. (U) Balasingham goes on to get in a solid lick at
the expense of the international community (Read: the
U.S., India, etc.),asserting that even if the GSL
proposal is agreed to by the LTTE, it is quite possible
it would be blocked. He states: "The new structure
would require the endorsement of the international
community in order to mobilize adequate resources for
the reconstruction of the northeast. This endorsement
may not be forthcoming since some of the powerful
international and regional players are prejudiced
against us and continue to deny our hard-earned status
as the true representatives of the people."


6. (U) Wrapping up, Balasingham starkly underscores
that the government's proposals are "unsatisfactory and
therefore unacceptable." Balasingham stresses that the
only way forward is to form an interim structure in the
north/east with heavy LTTE involvement, given the fact
that the government is not strong enough in the south to
bring about a final political settlement at this time.
He closes:

"In conclusion, we wish to assure you that we are
prepared to resume negotiations if you reconsider your
position and offer us, for our consideration, a draft
framework for an interim administrative structure along
the lines proposed by our leadership. We hope that you
will consider our suggestion favorably."


7. (C) REACTION: Because the Tiger letter just came
out, there has been precious little local reaction to it
as of yet. (Note: Visiting Deputy USAID administrator
Frederick W. Schieck and Ambassador Wills are meeting
with PM Wickremesinghe late June 4 afternoon. If the PM
has any comments on the situation in the aftermath of
Balasingham's letter, we will pass them on to the
Department.) Before the letter was posted on the web,
however, there were widespread rumblings that the Tigers
were not going to sign on to the government's assistance
proposal re the north/east, nor agree to a "clear the
air" meeting. Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE Tamil
National Alliance MP, told us early June 4 (before the
letter came out) that the LTTE remained very angry
because the government did not seem to be taking the
LTTE's proposal for an interim structure in the
north/east "very seriously." Under the circumstances,
Pararajasingham said he did not think the group was in
the mood to be cooperative and meet with the GSL.
Polchief stressed to Pararajasingham that the LTTE's
current approach was not helpful, and if the group had
real substantive concerns it made much more sense to
discuss them face-to-face with the government.


8. (C) NO MENTION OF TOKYO: As with the LTTE's most
recent communications, Balasingham's letter did not
mention the Tokyo donors conference in any way, shape,
or form. Again, before the letter came out,
Pararajasingham told polchief that he saw "little
chance" that the LTTE would be represented in Tokyo. In
a conversation also held before the Tiger letter came
out, Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke of the Peace
Secretariat told us that he doubted that it was

SIPDIS
"programmatically possible" for the LTTE to attend at
this point. While the GSL hoped the Tigers changed
their minds, Goonetilleke said it seemed that the LTTE
was letting the timeframe "slip away" when practical
arrangements could be made for sending a delegation to
Tokyo.


9. (C) COMMENT: Balasingham's letter was not rude per
se, but it was pointed and he certainly made clear where
the LTTE stands, i.e., progress must be made on the
LTTE's demands before the group will cooperate. Given
the hard-line edginess of the LTTE at this point, it
makes it tough for the GSL to respond favorably, even
though the government does not reject eventual formation
of an interim structure in the north/east per se.
Whatever happens, the whole issue almost certainly needs
weeks/months to work out and not mere days, as the
Tigers appear to think.


10. (C) All that said, it is interesting that there was
no mention of Tokyo. The letter gave no/no hint that
the LTTE will reconsider its plan not/not to attend,
however, and there really does not seem to be a silver
lining in the fact that Tokyo went unmentioned. After
weeks of feverish GSL, Norwegian, and Japanese efforts
to get the Tigers to Tokyo, it appears that the string
is running out -- per the LTTE's choice. END COMMENT.

11. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS