Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO838
2003-05-20 11:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Mission recommendation regarding Tokyo donors

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000838 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EAP/J, EUR/NB

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-20-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: Mission recommendation regarding Tokyo donors
conference: Proceed as planned

Refs: (A) Colombo 829, and previous

- (B) SA/INS-Colombo 05-17-03 class e-mail

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills:
Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000838

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EAP/J, EUR/NB

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05-20-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT: Mission recommendation regarding Tokyo donors
conference: Proceed as planned

Refs: (A) Colombo 829, and previous

- (B) SA/INS-Colombo 05-17-03 class e-mail

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills:
Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: As matters now stand, it seems
probable that the Tamil Tigers will not participate in
the Tokyo donors conference in June, raising the
question of whether the event should go forward. After
much reflection, we argue that it should proceed as
planned whether or not the Tigers attend. Even without
their presence, the conference could very usefully
underline international support for the peace process
writ large, which the GSL is desperate to do. At the
same time, moving forward with Tokyo could have a
salutary impact on the Tigers, perhaps by convincing the
group to attend, or by making it clear that the donors
will not hold the Tamil community hostage to their
druthers. For these reasons, we urge Department to
press the Japanese government to hold the conference,
and not postpone or cancel it. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) IMPASSE WITH THE TIGERS: Since the group
announced its decision to pull out of the peace talks
and not to participate in the Tokyo donors conference on
April 21, the Norwegians and the Japanese have worked
feverishly to change the mind of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As reviewed in Ref A, the
Norwegian facilitators have not given up hope yet, as
they await the LTTE's response to proposals meant to
assuage Tiger concerns regarding the distribution of
assistance. Nonetheless, with the rapid approach of the
conference, scheduled for June 9-10, it appears probable
the LTTE will not be there unless it gets on board soon.
As reviewed in Reftels, this strong possibility has
given rise to concerns, most particularly among the
Japanese hosts and the Sri Lankan government, as to how
to proceed from here.


3. (C) MISSION'S RECOMMENDATION RE TOKYO: After much
reflection, we conclude that the Tokyo conference
should proceed as planned whether or not the Tigers
attend. To be a success, the Tigers' presence is not
necessary, as the conference could very usefully
underscore international support for the peace process
writ large without them. Although the GSL-LTTE
negotiations are stalled for now, the peace process is
much larger than the talks alone and the international
community should acknowledge that the situation in Sri
Lanka remains a very hopeful one. The process, for
example, encompasses a ceasefire, which remains largely
intact, enhanced people-to-people "track two" contacts,
and plans that are underway for humanitarian/development
assistance for both the war-torn north/east and the
south. It would be a mistake to subsume these very
important aspects of the entire process simply because
"track one" contacts are temporarily in abeyance. With
or without the LTTE, the donors could utilize Tokyo to
highlight these positive aspects, while also possibly
issuing their "Statement of Principles" document setting
out milestones re assistance delivery and human rights.
Overall, a "Tiger-less" Tokyo, somewhat recast from its
original GSL-LTTE focus, could signal support for this
overall process in a very constructive way. It would
also, in our estimation, be worth the participation of
high-level donor country representatives, including the
Deputy Secretary.


4. (C) GSL ANXIETY: In coming to the conclusion that
the conference should go forward, Mission has received
significant input from a very worried GSL. Simply put,
government representatives, including Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe and Minister Milinda Moragoda, are
apoplectic over the possibility that the conference
could be subject to postponement or cancellation (see
Para 7),and are arguing that it must go forward. Way
beyond what the conference was originally envisaged as
representing (i.e., a major "public relations" event
highlighting the success of the peace process),the GSL
has made it a very, very big deal, with its ego heavily
invested in its success. (Note: The gradual change in
local perception that the conference is central to the
peace process and not simply one key event among others
has been propelled, in part, by the Japanese
government's handling of the leadup to Tokyo. In a
clear mistake by Special Envoy Akashi, for example, the
GoJ has almost made it seem that the conference is make-
or-break for the process, even to the extent of setting
public "deadlines" for the Tigers to reconsider their
decision not to participate. The GoJ's grandstanding
has had the affect of panicking the GSL and others.
This has been much to the chagrin of the Norwegians, who
see Japan's involvement in the process as largely clumsy
and inflexible.)


5. (C) The government has also made clear that if the
conference does not take place as planned, it could come
under heavy domestic criticism. The president and her
party are clearly positioning themselves to make hay of
any change in plans by accusing the government of
mismanaging the peace process. (Note: The president
and the PM, in any case, share a very, very uneasy
cohabitation relationship.) Although the GSL has been
criticized for its management of the economy, in fact
growth is at 4 percent and rising. Nonetheless, the
peace process remains its key achievement. If that
achievement is tarnished, it could prove a major
liability for the GSL. Given this sensitive situation,
we think that a change in plans re Tokyo could hurt a
(basically pro-U.S.) government and possibly undermine
cohabitation ties to the detriment of the peace process.
These points, of course, argue for the conference to
proceed as planned.


6. (C) IMPACT ON THE LTTE OF MOVING FORWARD: At the
same time, moving forward with plans could have a
salutary impact on the Tigers. There are roughly three
weeks remaining before the conference starts on June 9,
and the LTTE could decide to get on board when it
realizes that the train will leave with or without it.
Even if that does not happen and the Tigers do not
change their mind, holding the conference could be
instructive for the Tigers in making clear that the
donors will not hold the Tamil community hostage to
their druthers. The U.S. -- and other members of the
international community -- have long emphasized that the
LTTE is not the "sole representative of the Tamil
community" as the group would have it. Tokyo thus
provides an opportunity to make this point in neon. All
that said, we are not suggesting that a conference held
without the LTTE should be confrontational toward the
group. In fact, we believe that conference participants
should reach out to the group, urging it to return to
the peace talks, and making it clear that the LTTE is a
welcome partner in the peace process.


7. (C) OPTION OF POSTPONING OR CANCELING: There has
been some talk of postponing or even canceling Tokyo if
the Tigers decide not to go. We do not think either of
these alternatives is good. They both give the LTTE way
too much power over the whole process, essentially
rewarding the group for its intransigence. (Note: Many
people argue that postponing or canceling are really the
same thing in any case because Sri Lanka may not have as
positive an opportunity to showcase itself as Tokyo
presents in a very long time.) By holding the
conference, the international community will be making
the point that it will not cave into the unreasonable
demands of a terrorist group. While it may seem silly
to hold a wedding with only one spouse present, that's
the LTTE's decision. In making this very point re the
group's stance on Tokyo, Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Helgesen has related that he has told the LTTE
that "it may be able to mess with the Sri Lankan
government or Norway, but it cannot mess with the
international community." With respect to the argument
that holding Tokyo without the group may anger the LTTE
and hurt chances for peace in the long-term, that is a
risk. When asked about this, however, Helgesen -- a
representative of the government with the closet
relations with the LTTE -- has said there is no reason
that Tokyo should have such a negative impact if it is
managed with proper care.


8. (C) COMMENT: For the reasons set out above, we urge
the Department to press the Japanese government to hold
the Tokyo conference as scheduled. Even without the
LTTE in attendance, we believe that the conference
should take place at the same high-level originally
planned. In particular, given the USG's important
position in underpinning support for the whole process,
we urge the Deputy Secretary to continue with his plans
to participate. END COMMENT.


9. (C) LATE COMMENT: Mr. Akashi called the Ambassador
from Tokyo late May 20 to discuss "to Tokyo or not to
Tokyo." Although he was initially inclined toward
postponing, Akashi seemed to accept the points we have
reviewed above.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS