Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO481
2003-03-24 05:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

D'S MEETING WITH G L PERIIS

Tags:  PREL PINR PGOV CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000481 

SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND SA A/S ROCCA FROM ASHLEY WILLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2013
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: D'S MEETING WITH G L PERIIS


Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. Reasons 1.5 b, d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000481

SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND SA A/S ROCCA FROM ASHLEY WILLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2013
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: D'S MEETING WITH G L PERIIS


Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. Reasons 1.5 b, d.


1. (C) You have met with GL before and will thus recall that
he is a man of spectral gauntness, extraordinary intellect
and unfailing optimism. It is this latter quality that I
want to draw your attention to prior to your meeting. By all
accounts, and despite having been wounded himself in an LTTE
bomb attack, GL is soft and inordinately forgiving in the
talks with the Tigers. He avoids confrontation with
Balasingham and tends to engage in discourses on political
science rather than focusing on the issues at hand. We have
the impression, in other words, that the Tigers consider
Milinda as the more formidable negotiating opponent and GL as
a pleasant but not pivotal figure.


2. (C) This view of GL may by a little ungenerous but it
squares with my experience with him since the talks began.
He tends to see this process as leading ineluctably toward a
happy outcome and takes the sunniest possible view of Tiger
intentions and behavior. I bring this to your attention
because, while we all like bracing splashes of optimism from
time to time, you may nevertheless wish to discount somewhat
GL's version of the negotiations.


3. (C) One final note about him. He loathes President
Kumaratunga, his contempt for her exceeding ours for Saddam
Hussein. He will thus not share our view that she needs to
be involved somehow for this negotiation to end happily. You
may wish to draw him out a bit on why he thinks she can and
should be ignored. You may also wish to ask him what effect
a PA-JVP alliance (which is looking liklier) will have on the
UNF government.
WILLS