Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO468
2003-03-20 07:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

TFIZ01: Low-key reaction in Sri

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER KPAO ASEC CE MV IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

200727Z Mar 03
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000468 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT, NEA/NGA,
DS/DSS/ITA, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-20-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAO ASEC CE MV IZ
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: Low-key reaction in Sri
Lanka/Maldives to start of military operations

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 200727Z Mar 03

- (B) State 72921
- (C) State 72913
- (D) Colombo 463
- (E) Colombo 460, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (B,D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000468

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT, NEA/NGA,
DS/DSS/ITA, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-20-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAO ASEC CE MV IZ
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: Low-key reaction in Sri
Lanka/Maldives to start of military operations

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 200727Z Mar 03

- (B) State 72921
- (C) State 72913
- (D) Colombo 463
- (E) Colombo 460, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (B,D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: General reaction in Sri Lanka and the
Maldives to the start of military operations against
Iraq has been low-key, so far. The PM has asked to see
the Ambassador late today. Sri Lanka's envoy to the
U.S. called the Ambassador earlier, and said the GSL
plans to issue a "helpful" statement re the situation.
Latest demarche re Iraqi intel officials has been
conveyed to the GSL. Media coverage continues to be
heavy. A test of local reaction will come after Muslim
prayers on March 21. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) INTERACTIONS WITH GSL: Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe has invited Ambassador Wills to see him
late today. The PM almost certainly wants to discuss
the developing situation. We will brief Department
after the meeting.


3. (C) In the meantime, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the
U.S. Devinda Subasinghe called Ambassador Wills early
March 20 (before the actual commencement of military
operations) and said the GSL was planning on issuing a
"helpful" statement re the Iraq situation. (Note: The
PM had also told the Ambassador this on March 19 -- See
Ref E.) Subasinghe said domestic political (e.g.,
Muslim) sensitivities and other complexities
(specifically President Kumraratunga's likely
objections) would prevent the GSL from actually coming
out and publicly joining the U.S.-led coalition of the
willing.


4. (S) Per Ref B, Mission has conveyed the latest
demarche pressing for the expulsion of Iraqi officials
and the closure of the regime's embassy to the GSL. We
will continue to press government interlocutors re this
high-priority matter.


5. (C) SRI LANKA REACTION: The news that military
operations had commenced broke in Sri Lanka just before

9:00 am, March 20. Most Sri Lankans were already at
work at this point and traffic continued to proceed
normally in Colombo. There have been no reports of
disturbances. Mission has been in touch with contacts
in mainly Muslim areas of the east and Puttalam District
north of Colombo, and they report that the situation is
quiet. There was a demonstration by Muslims north of
Batticaloa town early March 20, but it reportedly ended
peacefully. Per Ref D, an anti-U.S. rally is slated to
take place in Colombo after Muslim prayers on Friday,
March 21, and we have heard of some other rallies at
other sites in country. (Note: Mission held an EAC on
March 20 -- see Septel. The police have contacted RSO
and promised unequivocal cooperation. DCM is also
scheduled to attend a briefing for the diplomatic corps
given by the Interior Minister late March 20. The
briefing will focus on the local security situation.)
(Note: Mission has just received a report attributed to
AFP that someone in the Opposition People's Alliance
called President Bush a "war criminal." We are looking
into the report, which is contained in Ref A.)


6. (C) MALDIVES REACTION: In a conversation focused on
other subjects, Polchief asked Dr. Shaheed, the
Permanent Secretary of the Maldivian MFA, about the
situation in Male. Shaheed said all was quiet, noting
that he did not expect any rallies or demonstrations to
take place. Poloff also spoke to Minh Pham (Amcit--pls
protect),the UN coordinator for the Maldives, who
confirmed that the situation was quiet. Pham added that
many Maldivians were watching news of the developing
situation on CNN and BBC. His overall impression was
that Maldivians did not support the war, but were
"resigned" to it. The government website "Haveeru"
contained AFP wire service reports re the situation, but
no commentary.

7. (U) MEDIA COVERAGE: The front-pages of Sri Lanka's
newspapers were full of stories re the Gulf situation on
March 20, although the latest news re the ongoing Sri
Lankan peace talks was also given significant coverage.
The start of the military campaign took place after
papers were published, so most Iraq-related articles in
March 20 editions focused on the runup to war. After
the war started, TV stations were full of news re the
situation. Conforming to the general anti-U.S. slant of
many press pieces here, an editorial in the Opposition
English-language ISLAND entitled "From Satyr to Martyr?"
stated:

"This war is not only bound to bring about radical
changes in the politics of Iraq and that of the Middle
East...It will also turn the new political order that
was taking shape after the Cold War topsy turvy (as the)
the democratic idealism that gradually came to the
forefront in US foreign policy (is)...replaced with
sheer militarism and disregard for international law and
the UN. The world can only hope that what is happening
is an aberration." (Note: See Ref D for additional
text from this editorial.)


8. (C) COMMENT: At this point, our sense is that Sri
Lankans are just absorbing the news that war has begun
and are collecting their thoughts. Our best educated
guess is that the situation will remain relatively calm
here primarily for the good reason that Sri Lanka has
plenty of other fish to tandoori. A test will come
after Muslim prayers on Friday, March 21, when religious
extremists and leftists will try to bring out crowds and
test the government's commitment to keep the situation
under control. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS