Senior GSL Minister G.L. Peiris previews

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000202

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EUR/AGS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/13
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR PARM ECON CE GM LTTE
SUBJECT: Senior GSL Minister G.L. Peiris previews
Berlin round and next steps for peace process

Refs: Colombo 194, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: In a February 3 meeting with the
Ambassador, senior Sri Lankan Minister Peiris -- like
other contacts -- set low expectations for the
February 7-8 GSL-LTTE talks in Berlin. He said he
primarily wanted to use Berlin to lay the groundwork for
future rounds, including by raising division of power
issues. He also underscored the importance of phased
disarmament/demobilization by the LTTE. He said the GSL
was newly focused on the need to show economic progress.
Peiris was as sharp as ever, but seemed a bit weary with
the weighty issues he is contending with. END SUMMARY.

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PEIRIS ON BERLIN
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2. (C/NF) The Ambassador and polchief met February 3
with G.L. Peiris, the GSL Minister of Constitutional
Affairs and Enterprise Development, and a key player on
peace process issues. As with other contacts (see
Reftels, including comments by GSL Minister Moragoda),
Peiris set low expectations for the GSL talks with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) slated to take
place in Berlin, February 7-8. (Note: The Berlin talks
will constitute the fifth round of talks held between
the two sides since September 2002. The Norwegian
government is facilitating the talks.) One of the key
reasons for low expectations, Peiris related, was that
LTTE senior negotiator Anton Balasingham will not have
been able to receive a briefing from LTTE leaders before
Berlin and, thus, would not have received a "new
mandate" from them. Given this situation, Balasingham
would probably be reluctant to make any new commitments
in Berlin. (Note: Balasingham had been scheduled to
visit the LTTE-controlled Wanni region in northern Sri
Lanka in January, but postponed the visit due to health
concerns.)


3. (C/NF) One item on the agenda for Berlin, Peiris
noted, was that of humanitarian and developmental
assistance to LTTE-controlled areas. The Tigers had
been vociferously complaining that the GSL's delivery of
such assistance was poor and plagued by bureaucracy.
Admitting to the Ambassador that the GSL was having a
problem coordinating such assistance, Peiris wanted to
use Berlin to assure the LTTE that the government was
committed to do doing a better job in this area.
(Note: In addition to assistance, human rights in LTTE-
controlled areas are another agenda item.)

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THE WAY AHEAD
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4. (C/NF) To stimulate LTTE thinking about the way
ahead, Peiris remarked that he planned to hold a
"private" meeting with Balasingham on the margins of the
Berlin talks. At that meeting and in other discussions
in the near-term, he wanted to touch on a number of
issues with the LTTE, including:

-- DIVISION OF POWERS: In his private chat with
Balasingham, he wanted to raise possible division of
power options relating to the north and east. The idea
would be for the two sides to come up with a document
that set out which powers would remain with the "center"
and which would be given to a north/east unit. This
document would represent a blueprint for a possible
final settlement down the road. It might be possible to
publicize an agreement on this issue at the March round
if Balasingham was able to vet it with his authorities
during his planned trip to the Wanni in early March.
(Note: The sixth round of talks is scheduled to take
place in Japan, March 18-21.) Re another division of
powers issue, Peiris said the Muslim demand for a
separate unit was not feasible. Muslims needed some
protections, but these would have to worked out once a
GSL-LTTE constitutional framework had been settled on --
and not before. It was unfortunate that Muslim leader
Rauf Hakeem continued to demand a unit, but he was a
weak leader trying to score points with his community.
(Note: Peiris noted that in a visit to India later this
month he planned to study how the Indian government
dealt with minority issues in Darjeeling. What the GoI
did regarding this region might be a possible model for
what the GSL did regarding the Muslims, i.e., providing
a community protections without creation of a full-blown
constitutionally-mandated entity.)

-- DISARMAMENT/DEMOBILIZATION: Peiris noted that
disarmament/demobilization issues were important and
needed to be discussed soon with the LTTE. The GSL's
strong view was that the LTTE had to take phased steps
along the road toward disarmament and demobilization.
The idea was for the LTTE's military to be eventually
brought into the Sri Lankan military structure. If all
the LTTE's troops could not fit into the GSL military,
then "productive" jobs would need to be found for those
that were demobilized. It was also possible, however,
that some LTTE units might be devolved into some sort of
police or "civil guard" for the north and east. The
Ambassador asked whether the GSL had given any thought
to the notion that the LTTE might agree to international
supervision of its long-range weapons on the Jaffna
Peninsula. (Note: The Indian High Commissioner and the
Ambassador discussed this idea in a February 3 meeting,
per Reftel.) Peiris responded that this was a very
constructive idea. (Note: At the request of the GSL,
Satish Nambiar, a retired Indian general, has been
visiting Sri Lanka the past several days. Nambiar's
brief is to review the Sri Lankan military's security
zones in Jaffna, and other matters related to possible
military drawdowns by the GSL and LTTE.)

-- LOCAL ELECTIONS IN NE: Another matter that Peiris
said he planned to raise with Balasingham involved local
elections in the north and east. These elections had
been scheduled to take place last year, but had been
postponed at the behest of the LTTE. The government was
coming under some pressure to hold the elections because
they could not be postponed indefinitely per the Sri
Lankan Constitution. He added that he thought the
holding of elections would be a good idea because it
would test the support of the pro-LTTE Tamil National
Alliance (TNA). Although the TNA would probably sweep
the board, it would have to do so in a democratic
context, with other parties -- including anti-LTTE Tamil
parties (the EPDP, EPRLF) -- allowed to participate.
Peiris said he planned to review with Balasingham the
idea of holding the elections in May 2003. He was not
sure what the LTTE's reaction would be.


5. (C/NF) Wrapping up this part of the conversation,
Peiris commented that what the government most needed
from the LTTE soon was some sort of "signal" from the
group. While it was not clear, it seemed that the group
was content as things were and it was not considering
the next steps. This was creating a problem for the
GSL, which needed to show the public in the south that
the process still had traction. Given this situation,
some sort of move by the Tigers showing that they are
intent on ending forced child recruitment or ending
taxation or starting disarmament, etc., would be most
welcome. It would show to the Sinhalese south that the
LTTE was committed to the process and wanted to make it
irreversible. He added that he intended to tell
Balasingham that positive moves would also help with
opening the pockets of donors in the run-up to the
international conference planned for Tokyo in June. The
Ambassador, underscoring U.S. support for the GSL's
peace initiative, remarked that Peiris' thinking was on
target in that it was high time that the LTTE did more
to move the peace process forward.

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ECONOMIC FOCUS
--------------


6. (C/NF) While working on the peace process, Peiris
underlined that the government was also focused on the
economy. The GSL knew that the president and the rest
of the opposition, including the radical Janantha
Vimukthi Peramuna party (JVP),were trying to make the
economy a big issue. While the government felt
relatively positive about rural areas, since the recent
harvest had been good, it was a bit worried about urban
areas where there had been price rises and other
dislocations. The Prime Minister had ordered ministers
to travel the country to show their concern about the
economy to the public. Peiris related that he had
recently visited Matara, a district in the deep south,
to highlight various government initiatives. He noted
that the United National Party (UNP) -- based on past
stints in power -- had a good reputation as a manager of
the economy, which it not want to lose. The Ambassador
commented that this renewed emphasis on the economy was
positive. That said, the U.S. would urge the government
to continue to make economic reform and liberalization
key priorities. Simply because the government felt
vulnerable on the economy, did not mean it should put
these priorities on the backburner. Peiris replied that
reform and liberalization remained on the agenda,
although plans in these areas needed careful modulation.

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COMMENT
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7. (C/NF) Peiris, one of the country's best and most
learned lawyers, is known to be extremely bright, and --
true to form -- he was as sharp as ever in the meeting.
His comments indicated that he was thinking out
complicated next steps in the peace process, including
engagement with the LTTE on division of powers and on
disarmament/demobilization issues. Whether the LTTE
wants to play ball is another question entirely, but
Peiris, at least, seemed to have a sensible-sounding
outline of a plan. As Peiris discussed these matters,
however, there was a bit of weariness about him, as if
all the weighty issues he is contending with are getting
him down. We had also noticed this seeming fatigue
during a recent meeting with Milinda Moragoda, another
key minister (see Reftel). It is as if the GSL has its
hands full and is sweating it out a bit -- which is
probably not the best frame of mind to have when
negotiating with the hedgehog-like LTTE. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS