In meeting with Ambassador, President

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001984

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-17-13
TAGS: PTER PGOV PINS PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: In meeting with Ambassador, President
Kumaratunga shows little flexibility

Refs: Colombo 1982, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga showed little
flexibility in a discussion with Ambassador on November

17. She indicated she wanted to keep the Defense
portfolio in a National Unity Government. She promised
to uphold the peace process, support the role of the
Norwegians and the SLMM, and to make clear to investors
that Sri Lanka was a safe place. She showed little
interest in fresh elections. She showed a possible hint
of compromise at the end of the conversation. She
praised the U.S. role and U.S. statements. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador met with President Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (CBK) on November 17 for two
hours. The first hour and a quarter was a non-stop
disquisition by CBK on the evils of UNP rule since 1977,
and the part in that played by Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe. When she got down to business, CBK made
the following points:

-- She took the actions she did in the national interest
because the UNP Government and PM Wickremesinghe refused
to allow her her constitutional role.

-- Her preferred solution is the formation of a National
Unity Government, which, she says, the PM had proposed
when he first came into office. However, she will
insist on a proper role for herself (not a "rubber
stamp") in such a government.

-- She intends to keep the Defense Ministry portfolio,
although she has proposed to the PM that they agree on a
Deputy Defense Minister.

-- She is not in favor of new elections, although she
believes that the SLFP and the JVP together could "eke
out" a majority.

-- She agrees that the situation needs to be resolved
quickly.


3. (C) Ambassador made the point that we were not
interested in intruding in Sri Lankan internal affairs
and did not want to get in between the PM and the
President. However, we were concerned about the effect
of the situation on the peace process and on economic
growth, and it was important that it be clear that she
supported the peace process and that her actions were
not intended to create instability. He also suggested
that she make clear that she supported the roles of the
Norwegians and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
CBK agreed with all of the above. She blamed
sensationalist media reporting on the influence of the
local AFP correspondent who is, she said, a relative of
the PM's, and who wanted to create an impression of
chaos.


4. (C) Ambassador asked CBK if reports in newspapers
that the establishment of some type of "Peace
Commission" could settle the issue were true. CBK
stated that no one had discussed the idea with her.
"Maybe the PM will propose it to me when we meet
tomorrow," she said. (Her statement may have been
carefully phrased, as press reports say that one of her
close advisers is discussing this idea with the UNP.)
Finally, CBK dropped a hint of possible flexibility by
stating that "if the Prime Minister wants to make some
arrangement, we can settle this -- if he drops some of
the conditions he is insisting on."


5. (C) CBK closed by saying that she appreciated the
statements the U.S. made after her actions. She also
noted, as she frequently does, that she has never had a
chance to meet President Bush, and she hoped that could
be arranged some time. Ambassador noted that with
elections approaching, the President's schedule was very
tight.


6. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD