Possible ways forward in political standoff

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001982

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-17-13
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER PINR CE NO
SUBJECT: Possible ways forward in political standoff
between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister

Refs: (A) Colombo 1974
- (B) Colombo 1971, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga and Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe continue to consult to find a
workable solution to the current political struggle.
The PM has remained focused on the peace process
throughout the crisis. Reaction from international as
well as domestic parties has been focused on possible
repercussions for the peace process. Several options
remain available to resolve the imbroglio, and attention
is now focused on which will play out. END SUMMARY.

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President remains steadfast on Defense Ministry
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2. (C) As previously reported, following her November 4
takeover of three key ministries and prorogation of
Parliament, President Kumaratunga has publicly called
for a national government of reconciliation, invited the
PM for talks, and met with Norwegian peace facilitators.
Throughout these past two weeks, the President has
repeatedly stated that she supports the peace process
and ceasefire accord. However, the President has
remained steadfast that she retain the Defense Ministry,
a key component in the peace process. While the initial
round of talks with the PM did not break the impasse
between the two, there are some signs that a workable
compromise might be possible. The President and Prime
Minister will meet again on November 18.

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PM focused on peace process
--------------


3. (C) Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, for his part,
has remained focused on the peace process throughout his
efforts to bring resolution to the current political
crisis. Avoiding direct criticism of the President, the
PM has worked to provide leadership to his United
National Front (UNF) party, to temper UNF hardliners
advocating retaliation against the President, and to
appeal to the international community for support. He
has let key party politicians, such as peace process
negotiator G.L. Peiris and chief whip Mahinda
Samarasinghe, garner domestic support and argue the
GSL's position in the public arena. He maintains that,
without control of the defense portfolio, he can not be
in charge of the peace process, and thus has offered the
President this responsibility. While the Prime Minister
publicly says he is willing to work with the President,
privately he is skeptical of such cohabitational
success.

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Concern over President's actions
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4. (C) Reaction to the President's November 4-5 actions
has centered mainly on the possible effect on the peace
process. (Septel addresses the economic ramifications.)
Support for the PM has been especially strong, with 130
MPs signing a letter expressing their full confidence,
and thousands of supporters rallying in support upon his
return. While several political parties have expressed
admiration and support for the President, she has also
come under criticism -- by segments of the Buddhist
clergy, for example -- for causing complications in the
peace process at an extremely crucial time. Members of
the international community, including the U.S., UK, EU,
India and Japan have issued statements and/or publicly
expressed concern over the situation, stressing the need
for the peace process to continue. Tamil political
parties and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
have also voiced their concern over the effects that the
President-PM wrangling might have on the peace process,
but all in all, the Tigers seem to be appraising the
situation in the south judiciously.
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Effects on Peace Process
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5. (C) Even with the Defense Ministry now under the
President, there has been no short-term impact to the
peace process vis-a-vis the military and the ceasefire.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) continues to
report a high degree of cooperation with the military,
and statements made by defense officials (see Ref B)
indicate that the military will continue to act with
prudence while civilians sort out the political
situation. Both the President and the Tigers have
stressed the importance of the ceasefire continuing.
At a November 14 press conference, however, Norwegian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen emphasized the
need for clarity in the south in order for real progress
in the peace track, and stated that until such clarity
existed, there was no space to assist the GSL and the
Tigers in peace negotiations. Helgesen has made clear
he believes the ceasefire could come undone if the
situation drags on unresolved too long.

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Ways to Go Forward
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6. (C) As the Prime Minister and President propose ways
to create a workable solution to the events of the past
two weeks, there is much speculation regarding the
ultimate way forward. Depending on the current mood of
the President or PM, several options appear likely.
They include:

-- Returning the Ministries: In this scenario, the
President would return control to the government of the
defense, interior and mass communications ministries.
The government would presumably provide some face-saving
method for the President to do so. While this would
restore the GSL's control of the peace process, the
situation would not resolve the President's cohabitation
disagreements that precipitated her November 4 actions.
There is talk she might give back Interior and Mass
Communication but keep Defense and/or that a Defense
Secretary palatable to both the PM and the President

SIPDIS
might be appointed.

-- Cohabitational Committee: According to the PM's
idea, a committee comprising representation by the GSL
and the Opposition would advise the government on the
peace process. This would formalize an arrangement for
the President to provide her input on the GSL's peace
process decisions and possibly address her contention
(which has some merit) that the PM does not "consult"
with her regarding negotiations with the Tigers. This
is also sometimes referred to as a "council of
concilitation."

-- Elections: From the President's perspective, her
hope in calling elections would be for her People's
Alliance (PA) party to increase its number of seats,
and, in coalition with other parties, regain the
majority in Parliament. This would put the President in
control of the peace process. The PM believes that
parliamentary elections would result in more seats for
his UNF coalition, serving to strengthen his mandate to
lead the peace process. Even if the UNF were to
increase its majority, a resolution to the current
crisis could still be elusive: the government would
still have to cohabitate with the President, who remains
in her position regardless of the electoral outcome.
Moreover, there is a palpable sense of dread at the
prospect of elections which historically are violent and
corrupt.

-- Standoff: If neither the PM or President agree on
the ministerial or committee option and elections are
not called, it is possible that the current standoff
could continue. The government would continue its
business, with Parliament meeting to work on the budget.
Negotiations with the LTTE, however, would likely remain
on hold with neither the PM or President in clear
control of the peace process. As noted above, this
poses a danger to the peace process.


7. (C) COMMENT: Mission's position so far has been to
emphasize to all parties the need for the peace process
to be supported, while not becoming embroiled in the
internecine political struggle between the President and
PM. The first test of the changed political landscape
and a marker of the PM's and President's willingness to
resolve this comes on Wednesday, November 19 when
Parliament is set to reconvene and the GSL presents the
budget after the two week prorogation. While fresh
elections are possible, they would likely be expensive
and violent, and result in a situation not that much
different from the current stalemate. Mature
cooperation between the PM and President to take the
peace process forward would be the best possible
outcome, but the two have a long history of rivalry,
which they would have to put behind them. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD