Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO1971
2003-11-14 07:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Norwegian DFM Helgesen says Prabhakaran ready

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS PTER PINR KPAO CE NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001971 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-14-13
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER PINR KPAO CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Norwegian DFM Helgesen says Prabhakaran ready
to negotiate when GSL solves its problems

Refs: Colombo 1963, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001971

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-14-13
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER PINR KPAO CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Norwegian DFM Helgesen says Prabhakaran ready
to negotiate when GSL solves its problems

Refs: Colombo 1963, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador attended a November 14
briefing for key local diplomats given by Norwegian
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen regarding his visit to
Sri Lanka. Helgesen said V. Prabhakaran was relaxed
during their November 13 meeting, with the LTTE leader
underscoring support for the peace process, but
expressing concerns about the situation in the south.
In meetings with Helgesen, President Kumaratunga seemed
to want to lower temperatures, stressing support for the
ceasefire and the monitoring mission. Wrapping up,
Helgesen emphasized the need for clarity in the south in
order for real progress in the peace track. We fully
agree with Helgesen on this point. Later on
November 14, the Norwegians issued a statement that has
been misconstrued by some in the press as indicating
that the GoN has pulled out of its facilitation effort.
See Septel regarding Helgesen's plans to call the Deputy
Secretary next week. END SUMMARY.

SIPDIS

--------------
Helgesen briefs Key Local Diplomats
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador attended a November 14 briefing
for key local diplomats given by Norwegian Deputy
Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen regarding his
November 10-14 visit to Sri Lanka. After this briefing,
Helgesen gave another one to a wider selection of
diplomats, which poloff attended. This latter briefing
covered similar themes, but in less detail than that
attended by the Ambassador. Before departing later
today, Helgesen plans to give a press briefing, too (see
Para 9).

--------------
Meeting with Prabhakaran
--------------


3. (C) Helgesen began by reviewing his November 13
meeting with V. Prabhakaran, the reclusive Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader. Helgesen said
Prabhakaran was quite relaxed and upbeat during the
meeting -- "He was acting like a politician." The Tiger
leader underscored the LTTE's continued support for the
peace process. He expressed deep concerns about the
situation in the south, however. In the aftermath of
President Kumaratunga's sudden November 4-5 political
moves (see Reftels),Prabhakaran went on to underline
three specific LTTE concerns: overall security; the
safety of LTTE political cadre in government-controlled
areas; and the situation at sea between the Sri Lanka
Navy (SLN) and the LTTE's Sea Tigers. While not
expressing any explicit favoritism for the President or
the PM, Helgesen noted that the Tiger leader conveyed
the positive experience of the prior two years compared
to earlier experiences and also noted the contradictory
statements given in recent weeks by the President's
People's Alliance (PA) party. Prabhakaran commented,
however, that "political issues in the south are for the
south."


4. (C) Continuing, Helgesen said Prabhakaran stressed
that he was willing to engage in talks with the GSL and
that the Tigers would negotiate based on their recent
proposal. Helgesen continued that he thought
Prabhakaran recognized that both the GSL proposal and
the LTTE counterproposals re power-sharing in a
northeast setup would figure in the talks -- and not the
LTTE ideas alone. The Tiger leader, however, gave no
indication of where he might compromise once
negotiations resumed. Prabhakaran spoke of his
willingness to have a Muslim delegation at future talks,
but did not discuss any specific modalities for this.
Before going ahead with talks, Prabhakaran further said
the LTTE needed to have confidence in who was in charge
on the government side.


5. (C) Helgesen added that he had raised the issue of
the LTTE's killings of opponents and reports of
continued child recruitment. While Prabhakaran had no
comment on the killings, he reiterated his commitment to
refrain from child recruitment. In a separate matter,
Prabhakaran told Helgesen of his concern regarding
recent security and defense cooperation with India, and
to a lesser extent, the U.S. Prabhakaran wondered about
the timing of such military cooperation. The Ambassador
indicated to Helgesen that U.S.-Sri Lanka military
exercises had been scheduled long ago and were not
related to the current political situation in any way.

--------------
Discussions with President, PM
--------------


6. (C) During the course of his visit, Helgesen also
held multiple meetings with cohabitation antagonists,
President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.
Kumaratunga seemed to use her two meetings with Helgesen
to lower temperatures, stressing her support for the
February 2002 ceasefire accord. Helgesen noted
ironically that the President voiced her clear, specific
support, more than at any time in the past two years,
for the ceasefire agreement and the role of the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). She also gave the
Norwegians her assurances on the safety of LTTE cadre in
government-controlled areas. Commenting on the PM's
insistence that she take the lead in the peace process
given her recent actions, the President told Helgesen
she did not want to take the lead. At the same time,
she stuck to her insistence on retaining the Defense
Ministry, a key bone of contention with the PM. She
stated that, while she found the LTTE's October 31
counterproposals acceptable as one of the bases for
negotiations (contrary to some comments made by members
of her party),there was a third proposal on the table:
the draft August 2000 "devolved powers" Constitution
developed by her PA party.


7. (C) Speaking specifically about the role of the
monitors, the President commented to Helgesen that there
was no truth to reports that the SLN chief would no
longer allow SLMM personnel to board SLN ships. The
President did, however, invite further development of
rules of engagement governing the sea in light of the
fact that the issue was not dealt with in the ceasefire
accord. (See Septel report from DATT on Ambassador's
meeting with the Chief of Defense Staff General
Balagalle for further details.)


8. (C) In his briefing, Helgesen did not refer as much
to his three meetings with the Prime Minister. Helgesen
noted that the PM was clearly peeved at the president,
indicating that he continued to offer to hand over
control of the peace process to her. The PM noted to
him, for example, that he was not in a position to offer
assurances to the LTTE on its cadres' safety.

--------------
Norwegian Press Statement
--------------


9. (U) Later on November 14, the Norwegians issued a
press statement that has been sent to SA and SA/INS.
The statement reviewed the Norwegian effort, noting the
problems that have cropped up in the past week with
respect to the southern political scene and the need for
"clarity" in order for the peace process to progress.
The last line of the statement says: "Until such
clarity is re-established, there is no space for further
efforts by the Norwegian government to assist the
parties." Based on some of the media coverage we have
seen, this last line has been misconstrued as indicating
that the GoN has pulled out or suspended its
facilitation efforts, when the GoN is actually only
adopting a "wait-and-see" posture in regard to the
situation per its comments above.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Based on the general thread of his briefing,
Helgesen appeared to have received strong votes of
support for the peace process from all sides. That is a
very positive development -- President Kumaratunga's
sudden moves last week appeared for a time to threaten
to loosen the gains that have been made in almost two
years of hard slogging. In this regard, two points
stand out: (1) Kumaratunga has climbed down rapidly
from her "shock and awe" campaign last week, evidently
realizing that it was self-defeating; and, (2) In a
possible sign of a maturing organization, the Tigers
appear to have decided, at least for the moment, not to
use the instability in the south to edge out of the
process.


11. (C) All that said, Helgesen emphasized that there
needs to be clarity in the south in order for real
progress in the peace track. He is right. Simply put,
if the President and the PM fail to get their act
together, progress will be delayed, raising the risks of
misunderstandings involving the unpredictable, volatile
LTTE. Helgesen noted, correctly in our estimation, that
the Norwegians also need clarity in order to continue
their efforts in an effective manner. He also said the
President needed to realize she could not give the
Norwegians new instructions every week. "Even
Norwegians have some pride," he said. END COMMENT.


12. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD