Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO1963
2003-11-13 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

In readouts of President-PM meeting, key

Tags:  PGOV PINR PINS PHUM CE NO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001963 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-13-13
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: In readouts of President-PM meeting, key
advisers note tentative glint of a possible compromise

Refs: Colombo 1956, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001963

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-13-13
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: In readouts of President-PM meeting, key
advisers note tentative glint of a possible compromise

Refs: Colombo 1956, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The Ambassador met late November 12 with
Minister Moragoda, a key adviser to the PM. Based on
what he had heard from the PM and his secretary,
Moragoda provided a readout of the PM's meeting earlier
that day with the President. The PM urged her to take
over the peace process, but she made no commitments.
The President indicated (according to the PM's
secretary) that she might compromise by allowing the UNF

SIPDIS
government to name a deputy to help run the defense
ministry. Moragoda also thought she might be willing to
give back the interior and mass communications
ministries. The PM is mulling over next steps,
including pressing for elections. On November 13, the
DCM met Presidential Senior Advisor Mano Tittawella, who
sat in on the President-PM meeting, and whose comments
largely paralleled the Ambassador's discussion with
Moragoda. The tentative glint of a possible compromise
over the ministries is a positive development. END
SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Moragoda Provides Readout on President-PM Meeting
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ambassador Lunstead met late November 12 with
Milinda Moragoda, a key adviser to Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe and the Minister of Economic Reform.
Moragoda related that he had received separate briefings
from the PM and his secretary, Bradman Weerakoon,
regarding the PM's meeting earlier that day with
President Kumaratunga. The meeting between the two was
the first since Kumaratunga's sudden November 4 take-
over of three ministries and suspension of Parliament
(see Reftels).


3. (C) Moragoda began by noting that the Prime Minister
had been somewhat annoyed going into the meeting by what
he saw as a snub by President Kumaratunga. The
President, Moragoda noted, had issued invitations to the
meeting to all leaders of parties within the United

National Front (UNF) coalition government. The PM felt
that in doing this Kumaratunga was trying to undercut
his leadership role. In the event, the members of the
UNF coalition agreed that the PM would represent the
group and he was accompanied to the meeting only by
Weerakoon.

--------------
Pressing President to take over Peace Process
--------------


4. (C) Based on a prior understanding reached with his
UNF coalition partners, Moragoda said the major point
the PM had made to the President was that she should run
the peace process. The PM noted that the UNF government
could no longer effectively run the peace process in
light of the President's takeover of the defense
ministry last week, which created "split"
responsibilities. In response, the President made no
commitments on the matter.

--------------
Tentative glint of a Possible Compromise?
--------------


5. (C) Moragoda then highlighted the first tentative
glint of a possible compromise since the cohabitation
crisis began last week. He said Weerakoon had told him
that the President had indicated to Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe that she might compromise by allowing the
UNP government to name a deputy to join in the running
of the defense ministry. She did not provide further
details on how such an arrangement might work, though
there was some vague reference to forming some sort of
defense council or committee (see Para 9 for more on
this matter). Moragoda noted, however, that he only
heard this reference from Weerakoon; the Prime Minister
did not mention it to him. Moragoda said that the
President discussed only the Defense Ministry, and not
the interior and mass communication ministries. He
inferred from this that she might be willing to give the
UNF government back control of the interior and mass
communications ministries.

--------------
The Question of Elections
--------------


6. (C) Moragoda said the President had made clear to
the PM that she did not want to call fresh elections.
On this question, Moragoda noted that the PM seems to be
tentatively leaning toward pressing for elections as a
way to achieve some clarity in the murky political
situation. Some others in the UNF government are also
pushing for elections. Moragoda told the Ambassador
that he did not think that elections would solve much
and should "only be a last resort."

--------------
PM mulling over Next Steps
--------------


7. (C) Moragoda said the PM is mulling over next steps.
He plans to travel out of Colombo over the coming
November 15-16 weekend. He is slated to meet again with
the President on November 17, this time in the company
of other party leaders. Moragoda said the PM is
wrestling with possibly pressing for elections or
perhaps taking a low-key, flexible approach to the
situation. At least some UNP MPs are pushing to impeach
the President, which would require votes the party
currently does not control.

--------------
Readout from Presidential Adviser
--------------


8. (C) In a November 13 discussion with the DCM (which
largely paralleled the Ambassador's discussion with
Moragoda),Presidential Senior Adviser Mano Tittawella,
who sat in on the President-Prime Minister meeting the
day before, described the atmosphere as "lighthearted
and joking" between "two people who've known each other
since they were children." Tittawella described the
first forty-five minutes as "both sides venting" about
how they saw each other's actions. Once the President
and the Prime Minister got down to business, however,
each quickly addressed the other's greatest fear: the
PM assured the President that he had no intention of
trying to impeach her, and the President assured the
Prime Minister that she had no intention of dissolving
Parliament and going for elections. (Tittawella told
the DCM that one factor in this was that Kumaratunga had
"finally gotten some good advice" and now realized she
would probably not improve her position at all in an
election and very likely would lose ground.) The
President, according to Tittawella, made a strong pitch
for a "national unity government." She told the PM that
the LTTE counterproposals, whatever flaws they may
contain, offer an historic opportunity for Sri Lanka
which a national government can best address. She told
the PM that all parties must be brought along in the
process, even the radical JVP (Janantha Vimukthi
Peramuna) party, as all "parties who want peace" figure
out how best to respond to the counterproposals.


9. (C) The President made clear to the Prime Minister
that she would not give up the Defense Ministry, but was
willing to surrender Interior and Mass Communications as
part of a national government. Tittawella told the DCM
that the President (who had met Norwegian Deputy FM
Helgesen the night before and would again after he
returned from seeing the LTTE later today) understood
the Norwegian position that they couldn't facilitate a
peace process "that had two heads in Colombo." To
assuage those concerns, she proposed to the PM that a
"joint defense consultative mechanism" of some sort be
set up, possibly between Tittawella or someone of
similar stature in the presidency and perhaps the PM's
secretary Bradman Weerakoon. This informal mechanism

SIPDIS
would meet whenever a defense issue arose that had
implications for the peace process and the ceasefire,
and quickly work out a common position. The PM had
found the idea interesting. Tittawella said he would
work up a paper on the subject over the weekend that the
PM and President could consider when they meet again on
Monday.


10. (C) Tittawella said the PM told the President that
he would consider the national government possibility
over the weekend in consultation with his alliance
members. In return, she promised him that she would use
the weekend to consider ways to enhance collaboration
and "make this work." Tittawella said he now sees a
"glimmer of hope" where a week ago "it was completely
dark." He cautioned, however, that despite the
constructive nature of the meeting, an agreement between
the President and the PM on how to resolve the current
impasse is far from certain. "Right now, it's fifty-
fifty."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The tentative glint of a possible compromise
over the ministries is a positive development. Giving
the UNF back control of the interior and mass
communications ministries, and a UNF representative
deputy status in the defense ministry, might afford the
two sides a way to climb down from their hard-line
stands and thus ease tensions. That said, Moragoda
noted that he had only heard about the idea re the
defense ministry from Weerakoon, who said he had heard
the President say it. The PM did not mention it to
Moragoda at all, which is interesting. Tittawella's
comments backed up Weerakoon's recollection.


12. (C) Regarding some of the other alternatives being
discussed, we tend to agree with Moragoda that elections
would probably not solve much. Even if the UNF did
well, it would only win several more seats given the
country's complex proportional representation system.
In the meantime, the elections would no doubt be very
violent. The PM, even if the UNF achieved a fresh
"mandate," would still have to find a way to work with a
president who would be in place until late 2005. The
option of impeaching the President is the worst idea of
all. Any such attempt would be based on exceedingly
flimsy abuse of power and corruption charges, and would
roil the political waters for months on end. If
Tittawella is right that he said it, the PM's preclusion
of the impeachment option is a positive development.


13. (C) In the meantime, Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Helgesen is meeting Tamil Tiger leader
Prabhakaran on Thursday, November 13, and we understand
the Tigers will hold a press conference after that
meeting. Tiger comments may well influence which
direction the PM goes.


14. (C) The Ambassador has an appointment with the
President on Monday, November 17 at 1:00 P.M. Moragoda
suggested the Ambassador meet with the PM before that
meeting, and said he would try to set something up for
either Friday or Monday. The Ambassador will also meet
Chief of Defense Staff Balagalle on Friday. END
COMMENT.


15. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD