Key GSL Minister sets low expectations for

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000194

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/13
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PINR CE IN LTTE
SUBJECT: Key GSL Minister sets low expectations for
Berlin round and expresses deep concerns about the LTTE

Refs: Colombo 184, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Minister
Milinda Moragoda on February 1. Moragoda set low
expectations for the February 7-8 GSL-LTTE talks in
Berlin and expressed concerns about Tamil Tiger
activities. He also elaborated on his efforts to
convince India to engage more re the peace process. On
the domestic front, he did not think parliamentary
elections were in the immediate offing, but thought it
possible that the president might try for elections in
selected localities to test the GSL. While he was not
hitting the panic button, our sense was that Moragoda
felt the government had its hands full. END SUMMARY.


===========================
Low Expectations for Berlin
===========================


2. (C/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met February 1 with
Milinda Moragoda, the GSL Minister of Economic Reform
and a key player on peace process issues. Moragoda set
low expectations for the GSL talks with the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) slated to take place in
Berlin, February 7-8. (Note: The Berlin talks will
constitute the fifth round of talks held between the two
sides since September 2002.) He said he did not expect
any breakthroughs in Berlin. That was unfortunate
because the peace process could use the additional
momentum, he remarked. (Note: According to most
reports, the Berlin talks are slated to focus mainly on
human rights and humanitarian issues.)

================================
Deepening Worries about the LTTE
================================


3. (C/NF) Moragoda expressed deep concern about LTTE
activities, seeing the group as becoming increasingly
aggressive. In particular, the situation in the multi-
ethnic east was a real problem, as the LTTE worked to
expand its influence there. The pattern of Tiger
activities, in turn, was leading to more extremism among
Muslims, forcing the government to watch the potentially
combustible situation in the east very closely. He
added that LTTE eastern leader Karuna was proving not to
be very cooperative with the GSL. He wondered whether
the LTTE high command in the north had any real control
over its eastern command, given that the LTTE leadership
had repeatedly said it wanted its cadre to work with the
government.


4. (C/NF) As an example of problems with the LTTE in
the east, Moragoda reviewed an incident that received a
lot of local press coverage last week. During a late
January visit to Batticaloa, Moragoda related that he
had come across a large billboard (a "hoarding" as
Moragoda called it) at the entrance to the city. The
sign carried a blatantly pro-LTTE message. Noting that
the sign was on government property, Moragoda told the
police to tear it down, which they did, but the next day
pro-LTTE Tamils put it back up. Acting at Moragoda's
instructions, the police then tore it down again and
destroyed it. Moragoda noted that the police had acted
reluctantly in dealing with the matter.


5. (C/NF) Trying to explain the dynamics of the
situation in the east, Moragoda commented that several
factors seemed to be underlying the pattern of LTTE
misbehavior. First, the Tigers were a "wild bunch" in
general and it would take a long time to "domesticate"
them. Second, the LTTE was clearly taking advantage of
lax law enforcement by the police and military.
Moragoda said he had spoken with security force
officials in the east about this, advising them to
enforce all laws (see Batticaloa sign incident above).
The officials responded that they were worried about
doing this due to the potential ramifications for the
peace process should they come down hard on the LTTE.
Moragoda said he told them just to do their jobs.
Third, Moragoda said the Tigers were clearly "hedging
their bets" out of a deep concern that anti-peace
process elements could gain the upper hand in the south
(see Paras 10-11). All that said, Moragoda stressed
that the government had to let the LTTE know there were
"boundaries" that it could not cross.

6. (C/NF) In other comments re the Tigers, Moragoda
related that the group did not seem to have any
intention of moving to stop its use of child soldiers
(see Reftels). In fact, Moragoda remarked, the LTTE's
positioning on the issue seemed to be getting worse. In
the past, the group denied that it was recruiting
children, but now it was basically admitting that it
did, but saying "so what." Explaining this phenomenon,
Moragoda said he thought that many of the Tigers had
been brought into the group basically as children and
saw no problem with that fact. (Note: UNICEF Executive
Director Carol Bellamy met with the LTTE last week and
pressed the group on the forced child recruitment issue.
As they have in the past, the Tigers essentially
promised to do better, without making any firm
guarantees.)


7. (C/NF) Returning to a theme he has touched on
previously (see Reftels),Moragoda said he was deeply
concerned for the future of the peace process if chief
LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham left the scene. He
said Balasingham was very ill, much more so than many
people thought (see Reftels),and it was questionable
whether he could remain involved in the talks. (Note:
The February talks were recently shifted to Berlin from
Bangkok at the LTTE's request, so they could be held
closer to Balasingham's London home.) If anything
happened to Balasingham, Moragoda said he was not sure
whom in the LTTE had the ability to replace him as chief
LTTE negotiator. S.P. Thamilchelvam, the political
assistant to LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran, did not, nor
did Karuna, the LTTE leader in the east.

========
Re India
========


8. (S/NF) Shifting focus, Moragoda related that he
continued to try to get India more involved in Sri
Lanka's peace process. (Note: Moragoda wanted his
comments on this matter to be kept strictly
confidential.) Re the GoI situation, Moragoda said he

SIPDIS
was convinced that there was a split between the
National Security Adviser's office and RAW on one hand,
and the Ministry of External Affairs on the other, with
the former wanting to assume a more activist posture on
Sri Lanka than the latter.


9. (S/NF) Moragoda said he was urging RAW to get more
involved and he had heard that the agency was thinking
of trying to make contact with the LTTE. In fact, RAW
might try to contact Balasingham during the LTTE
negotiator's planned visit to LTTE-controlled northern
Sri Lanka later this month. Moragoda noted that he
planned to visit India later in February with Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe. On that trip, he (Moragoda)
planned to meet with Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Party
leader, at the request of National Security Adviser
Mishra. The idea was to brief her on the peace process
and try to moderate her strongly anti-LTTE views.
(Note: Mrs. Gandhi's husband, former Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by the LTTE in 1991.)

==================
Domestic Situation
==================


10. (C/NF) In regard to the domestic political
situation, Moragoda said he did not expect President
Kumaratunga to dissolve Parliament and call new
elections soon. (Note: Per Reftels, Kumaratunga and
other politicians from her People's Alliance party have
recently raised the idea of early elections in various
public statements.) Explaining why she might not do so,
Moragoda advised that in his estimation the president
and the PA did not want early elections because they
would probably lose seats, with the United National
Front (UNF) governing coalition at least holding its
own. If elections were held, he also predicted that the
Tamil National Alliance and the radical Janantha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party would gain seats (the JVP
gaining at the expense of the PA). He added that he
thought that early elections would decimate the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC),which was seriously
hobbled by fierce party infighting.


11. (C/NF) Although early parliamentary elections were
probably not in the cards, Moragoda said Kumaratunga
might call provincial elections in order to "test" the
GSL's popularity. (Note: The PA controls most of Sri
Lanka's provincial councils, which are elected bodies.)
In particular, she might try to call an election for the
Southern Province, an area where the PA might be
expected to do well. (Note: The PA has traditionally
been quite strong in the mainly Sinhalese Buddhist south
of the country.) Moragoda noted that he had picked up
some rumblings that Buddhist monks and others were not
happy with the peace process, feeling that the
government was giving too much to the LTTE. If this was
the case, the GSL could be becoming politically exposed
in the south.

=======
COMMENT
=======


12. (C/NF) While he was not hitting the panic button,
our overall sense from the discussion with Moragoda was
that he was worried that the government was drifting a
bit and must work harder to keep the initiative. In
particular, he felt that the Tigers were a big problem,
and the GSL had to find a way to engage the group firmly
and effectively, so that the peace process was not
disrupted. At the same time, the GSL was under pressure
on the domestic front, with the president proving non-
cooperative on the peace process and in regard to
economic reform. Although she might not call elections
soon, Moragoda said she was looking for every
opportunity to slam the government. Given this tricky
confluence of factors, Moragoda was clearly sweating it
out a bit, but was seemingly hopeful that more Indian
involvement could bring pressure on the LTTE and help
the GSL's peace initiative. END COMMENT.


13. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS