Norwegian envoy says his government continues

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001853

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10-27-13
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS CE NO KWMM
SUBJECT: Norwegian envoy says his government continues
to review President's demand for ouster of chief monitor

Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 10/27/03 class email

- (B) Colombo 1845, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 24 meeting with Charge',
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar related that the GoN
continues to review President Kumaratunga's demand that
chief monitor Tellefsen be removed from his job.
Despite reports that the president wants to curb
cooperation, the GSL has issued assurances that it will
continue to work with the monitors. This recent
controversy comes against the backdrop of a large -- if
smaller than expected -- Opposition rally in Colombo on
October 24. The President's ignition of this
controversy seems as much aimed at rattling the PM's
government, as at the monitors. Brattskar still plans
to travel to Kilinochchi to receive the LTTE
counterproposals at the end of the week. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) NORWEGIAN READOUT: Charge' met late October 24
with Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar to discuss
President Chandrika Kumaratunga's formal demand (see Ref
B) that Tryggve Tellefsen, the head of the Norwegian-led
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),be removed from his
position. Brattskar passed Charge' a copy of the
President's letter requesting Tellefsen's ouster, which
was sent to SA/INS in Ref A. Brattskar told Charge'
that during his October 23 meeting with the President on
this matter Kumaratunga claimed that her demand was not
meant as a criticism of the Norwegian government
facilitation effort, but was rather based on her
concerns about how Tellefsen was conducting his duties.
According to Brattskar, Kumaratunga then cited several
instances (in skewed fashion) where she was unsatisfied
with Tellefsen's conduct, feeling that he was taking a
pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stance. She
noted, for example, a proposal made by the SLMM in April
that the LTTE's "Sea Tigers" be accepted as a "de facto
naval unit," which had stirred up considerable
controversy at the time. Also of concern to Kumaratunga
was the SLMM's report following the sinking of two
Chinese fishing trawlers in March (see Ref B),which the
monitors ruled had been done by unnamed "armed elements"
despite indications that the Tigers had in fact sunk the
ships.


3. (C) Queried on whether the Norwegian government
would in fact remove Tellefsen, Brattskar said no
decision had yet been taken, and that the matter
continued to be discussed within the Norwegian MFA.
Brattskar emphasized the need to defuse the situation
and not let the incident disrupt the peace process. He
went on to note that Tellefsen was prepared for whatever
decision the Norwegian government might take regarding
his tenure as head of the SLMM. Brattskar related that
he clearly saw this move as part of the ongoing
cohabitation tussle between the President and the Prime
Minister.


4. (C) Charge' asked Brattskar if the controversy over
the President's demand would change Brattskar's plans to
travel to the LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi on
October 31 to receive the response developed by the
Tigers to the GSL's proposal regarding the formation of
an interim administration in the north/east (see Ref B).
Brattskar replied that there had been no change in his
plans. He expressed concerns, however, that the Tigers
might be upset at this latest move by the President,
seeing it as an effort by her to try to upset the
domestic political situation in the south on the eve of
the unveiling of their counterproposals.


5. (C) REPORTS OF A PRESIDENTIAL ORDER: According to
several press reports, President Kumaratunga, following
her formal request to have Tellefsen removed, sent
written orders on October 24 to the commanders of the
Sri Lanka army, navy and air force telling them that
they did not need to take instructions or advice from
Tellefsen. Speaking for the government, however,
Defense Secretary Austin Fernando told the press on
October 26 that the armed forces and police would
continue to cooperate with the monitors fully and that
the GSL would continue to abide by the terms of the
February 2002 ceasefire agreement.


6. (C) BIG OPPOSITION RALLY: President Kumaratunga's
move against the SLMM chief came against a backdrop of
an anti-United National Party (UNP) governing coalition
rally sponsored on October 24 by the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP). The rally, at which the SLFP had
predicted 60-80,000 people, fell far short of
expectations, with 40,000 people in attendance, although
it did clog up the streets of Colombo. In a speech to
the rally, SLFP spokesman Mangala Samaweera, a close
adviser to the President, cited her call for Tellefsen's
removal as being a proper exercise of her executive
powers, adding that she was "prepared to use her
executive powers further if the people rally around her
like today." Commenting on the situation, Jehan Perera,
media director for the National Peace Council, a local
think-tank, told poloff on October 27 that in asking
that Tellefsen be removed, the President was trying to
"whip up" additional support before the rally. Perera
said he believed there was not much public support for
the President's actions, and that she was merely trying
to assert her authority vis-a-vis her cohabitation
rival, the PM.


7. (C) COMMENT: As noted by Brattskar and Perera, the
President's ignition of this controversy seems as much
aimed at rattling the PM's government, as at the
monitors. There is little doubt that she is furious
that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's peace initiative
has been so successful, especially as she sees herself
as the country's natural peacemaker (though her main
effort at peace ended in failure in 1995). In her
anger, she is lashing out and the monitors are an easy
target. So far, by not taking her bait, the PM's
government is acting in a restrained way. Understanding
the tricky situation, it is also positive that the
Norwegians seem intent on not fanning the flames and to
be taking their time in developing a considered
response. Most importantly, it appears that this latest
cohabitation scuffle will have no effect on the
Norwegian Ambassador's trip to Kilinochchi at the end of
this week to receive the LTTE counterproposals, the next
key step in the peace process. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE