Engaging the Indians on Sri Lanka

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000184

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SA A/S ROCCA; ALSO PASS D AND SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CE IN LTTE
SUBJECT: Engaging the Indians on Sri Lanka

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. Reasons
1.5 (b,d).


1. (C/NF) While in Washington last week, I discussed
with the Deputy Secretary and with you the possibility
of our engaging with India on the subject of Sri Lanka's
move toward peace. In this connection, I present the
following thoughts for your review.


2. (C/NF) As you know, Sri Lanka's peace process has
made immense progress since it began in December 2001.
There are recent signs, however, that the process may be
slowing down. The LTTE seems to digging in its heels on
such issues as the "high security zones" in Jaffna. In
the meantime, the LTTE's human rights record continues
to be very poor in such areas as the forced recruitment
of children. There is also no indication that the group
has any intention of accepting political pluralism in
the areas under its control or in which it is seeking to
exert influence. Meanwhile, in the south,
"cohabitation" tensions remain high and support for the
government's peace initiative could slide if the economy
does not pick up in 2003.


3. (C/NF) Given this sensitive situation, it is vital
that the international community do what it can to keep
the peace process moving. In this regard, we have been
told by countless interlocutors that the countries that
count to Sri Lankans -- and with the LTTE -- are the
U.S. and India. At this point, we see the U.S. as very
well-positioned in Sri Lanka. We have good relations
with the government and President Kumaratunga,
consistently using these ties to urge them to bridge
their differences. We also have solid links with the
Tamil and Muslim communities. And through our various
public statements and media interviews, we think the
LTTE knows precisely where we stand, especially
regarding our insistence that the group reject violence
and terrorism, and dispense with the idea of an
independent Tamil Eelam.


4. (C/NF) The situation regarding India is a completely
different matter. India's attitude toward the peace
process has been reserved and correct. Every now and
then it issues hortatory statements in support of peace,
but more often than not it is a silent observer and it
seems especially prone to criticizing developments not
to its liking, such as Japan's presumed role in the
process. Overall, its policy toward Sri Lanka appears
extremely conflicted, favoring a stable situation in Sri
Lanka to be sure, but reluctant to do much to accomplish
that goal. We know that this situation is explainable.
The burden of the past is a heavy one in light of the
casualties suffered by the Indian Peacekeeping Force in
1987-90 and the LTTE's brutal assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi in May 1991.


5. (C/NF) That said, as the key regional player, it is
important that India assume a more active role regarding
Sri Lanka, especially in the months ahead. To do this,
we recommend that the U.S. work to draw India into a
dialogue in which we begin to discuss our respective and
largely concordant views on the situation in more depth.
We want to provoke critical thinking in New Delhi, with
the object of getting the GoI to weigh in more
compellingly, thus reinforcing international efforts to
help resolve the Sri Lankan dispute. In doing this, we
could underscore that an activist posture is truly in
India's national interest.


6. (C/NF) We think, for example, that India could play
a key role in convincing the LTTE to take bold steps
toward disarmament and demobilization. We say that
realizing that ties between India and the LTTE are now
seriously strained, and that there are complexities
involving Indian domestic politics, including in Tamil
Nadu and with Sonya Gandhi, that need to be dealt with.
Nonetheless, we sense that India's positioning is
crucial in terms of LTTE decision-making. Put another
way, continued Indian aloofness gives the LTTE reason to
think that it can operate without much concern for the
views of a neighbor that is a stone's throw away over
the Palk Strait. Moreover, in southern Sri Lanka,
Sinhalese extremists take heart from what they see as
India's seeming reluctance to back the peace process
wholeheartedly.


7. (C/NF) In making the recommendation that we move to
activate a dialogue with India on Sri Lanka, we do not
have any specific ideas on what our engagement might
look like. There are others in the USG who are much
better positioned to structure the dialogue. Based on
what we have heard, however, National Security Adviser
Mishra seems to have assumed more of an activist posture
than some other Indian officials, including those in the
Ministry of External Affairs. Given this, an in-depth
Sri Lanka-focused discussion with him might be a good
place to start.

WILLS