Sri Lanka: Untangling the confusion over the

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001631

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR SA, SA/INS, PM
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
SECDEF FOR OSD: CLILIENFELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09-19-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS PARM CE IS
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Untangling the confusion over the
Bushmaster cannons matter

Refs: Colombo 1529, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In this message, Mission provides a
brief overview of the status of the possible FMS
procurement of Bushmaster cannons for the GSL.
Suggested next steps for Washington to review with
visiting Minister Moragoda and Ambassador Subasinghe are
discussed. Mission would appreciate any additional
information from Washington on this matter. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) POSSIBLE FMS PROCUREMENT: In light of Minister
Moragoda's upcoming visit to Washington, Mission wants
to provide a brief overview of the proposed FMS
procurement of Bushmaster cannons for the Sri Lankan
Navy (SLN) and review possible next steps. As flagged
in Reftel, the possible FMS procurement has been
controversial in Sri Lanka, with the Prime Minister and
others in the GSL, including Moragoda, strongly
supporting it. SLN Commander Admiral Daya Sandagiri,
however, has been fighting a rearguard action against it
(see Paras 3-5). This debate has gone on amid public
charges and counter-charges over specification issues,
and insinuations that the SLN is exploring other options
for corrupt reasons. In a September 17 telephone call
with the Ambassador, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the U.S.
Devinda Subasinghe seemed confused about the whole
matter and we think it is important that the U.S. have
its ducks in a row before Moragoda arrives.


3. (C) KEY FACTS: In our estimation, pertinent facts
regarding this matter follow:

-- The November 2002 PACOM Defense Assessment of the Sri
Lankan military recommended that SLN fast attack craft
(FAC) be outfitted with 30mm cannons to upgrade the
existing 23mm cannons. This upgrade would assist SLN
efforts to interdict and deter Sea Tiger resupply
efforts. The GSL agreed with the recommendation,
settling on the U.S.-made Bushmaster cannon as an
option. DoD proceeded to look into possible procurement
under FMS and determined that the Mark 46 weapons system
(which includes a Bushmaster cannon) might be
appropriate.

-- The SLN, however, announced in June 2003 that it
thought that the Mark 46 weapons system was too heavy
for its 30 FAC. There had been no/no definitive
determination by DoD that this was the case, however.
As mentioned in an August 18 letter from the USN IPO to
the Sri Lankan DATT, the U.S. indicated that it would be
willing to do a technical feasibility study to determine
if the Mark 46 could be modified to fit the FAC, but
that "this would require funding." We are not aware of
a SLN response to this letter.

-- In the meantime, the SLN has looked into other
options, including a possible commercial sale involving
a Mark 44 weapons system (Bushmaster cannons and a
"Typhoon" mount) sponsored through the Israeli company
Rafael. DoD has informed the SLN, however, that the
U.S. could not/not provide this system as a FMS
procurement, as the Mark 44 is not a proven system.

-- The SLN's preferred solution, and one endorsed by the
Ministry of Defense, is to buy an Israeli system based
on the Oerlikon gun for all 30 FAC's.

-- SLN Commander Sandagiri stated in a September 14
newspaper interview that his preferred option was the
Oerlikon system, but that he was being pressured by the
PM to buy 15 Oerlikon systems and 15 from the U.S. for
"political" reasons.

-- In his September 17 conversation with the Ambassador,
Subasinghe added that he was looking at other possible
weapons systems (other than the Mark 46 or Mark 44).
Subasinghe also stated that the U.S. had agreed with the
SLN that the Mark 46 system was too heavy. To our
knowledge, that is not the case.

4. (C) FURTHER BACKGROUND: Regarding some of the other
dynamics swirling around this matter, Mission is not
certain why the SLN seems so opposed to a FMS
procurement of the Mark 46. It is possible that it
honestly believes that the Mark 46 would not meet SLN
needs because it is too heavy. It could also be because
the SLN does not want to start a FMS relationship with
the U.S. At the same time, as mentioned above, there
are many rumors floating around that the SLN is on the
take and believes that it can siphon funds from a
possible Rafael-arranged sale, but not from a FMS
procurement.


5. (C) As for the GSL, we believe that the PM and
Moragoda strongly want to establish a FMS relationship
with the U.S. involving lethal weapons such as the
Bushmaster cannon. At this point, especially given all
of the contentious, politically tinged press coverage,
we believe that the government feels it has a lot
invested in obtaining a FMS procurement involving a U.S.
system. Sandagiri is known to be very close to
President Kumaratunga and, for the GSL, the issue of the
Bushmaster cannons has become linked with chronic
cohabitation strains between the PM and the president.
In the PM's view, giving in on the FMS procurement would
make him look weak and give a victory to its political
opponents.


6. (C) NEXT STEPS: During his meetings in Washington,
Moragoda will almost certainly raise this issue. We
should make clear that we understand that the underlying
issues involved are technical and complex, but stress
that the U.S. wants to assist the GSL in coming to the
best decision on how to proceed. (We should also make
clear that the U.S. has never expressed agreement with
the SLN view that the Bushmasters are too heavy if in
fact that is true.) We suggest that the following
options be considered for discussion:

-- If the GSL wants to proceed with the possible FMS
procurement of the Mark 46 weapons system, it should
request that DoD send a team to assess the technical
feasibility of the system. The question of who would
fund this assessment would need to be reviewed. The GSL
should also understand that this assessment might
indicate that the proposed procurement is not practical.

-- If the GSL wants to proceed with the possible
commercial procurement of the Mark 44 weapons system, it
is free to do so. The U.S. would be happy to discuss
commercial options with the GSL and we would recommend
purchasing a U.S.-made product (like the Bushmaster
cannon),if at all possible.

-- If neither the Mark 46 or Mark 44 are technically
feasible, the GSL should feel free to proceed with any
other option.

We should also offer Moragoda and other GSL officials
follow-up meetings that would provide additional detail
and help clear up any lingering confusion over this
matter. In the meantime, Mission would appreciate any
additional information from Washington.


7. (C) COMMENT: There are at least two sets of related
issues here. The first are technical: the suitability
for the FAC's of the Bushmaster cannon and its
capabilities compared to other available systems such as
those offered by Israel. There also may be cost issues
here. We at Post are not competent to judge the
technical issues. Some, such as the suitability issue,
are probably not resolvable without further study.


8. (C) COMMENT (Continued): The second set comprises
political issues. The PM and Moragoda are not experts
on weapons systems; their desire for the Bushmaster
seems driven at least as much by their political desire
to have an FMS relationship with the U.S. on a lethal
item as by any technical considerations. Cohabitation
stresses with the president are clearly weighing on the
PM and allowing Sandagiri to dictate weapons purchases
would be seen as a political defeat for the PM. From
our perspective, it would be best to: (1) Resolve the
technical issues in a definitive manner so that (2) the
GSL can decide definitively how it wishes to move
forward. From our perspective, while there is political
value for us in an FMS relationship with the GSL, it is
not an overriding imperative. However, to the PM and
his supporters this matter has significant political
resonance domestically. We should therefore be as
helpful as possible in facilitating and possibly funding
the study to determine whether the Mark 46 is feasible.
It would make no sense for anyone to expend significant
political capital if the system is technically not
feasible. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD