Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03COLOMBO1546
2003-09-05 06:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Peace Process: Indian sticks vs. Norwegian

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR CE IN NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001546 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E.
MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09-05-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR CE IN NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Peace Process: Indian sticks vs. Norwegian
carrots

Refs: Colombo 1533, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001546

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E.
MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09-05-13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR CE IN NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Peace Process: Indian sticks vs. Norwegian
carrots

Refs: Colombo 1533, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) The Ambassador paid introductory calls on Indian
High Commissioner Nirumpam Sen and Norwegian Ambassador
Hans Brattskar on September 4. The two were a study in
contrasts. Sen, not surprisingly, evinced a hardline
towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The LTTE needs to see only sticks, not carrots, he said.
Asked what "sticks" could be used, Sen thought that a
Canadian proscription would hit the LTTE hard. He
thought that US redesignation would also be a useful
signal. Sen also expressed great concern about the
impact of cohabitation on the peace process. In a
rather confusing aside, he predicted that Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe would become President in two years, and
that President Kumaratunga could then become PM, "but
only if she has more power than Ranil has now."
Outsiders, he said, could help by thinking of creative
ways to give CBK a stake in the game.


2. (C) Brattskar, by contrast, emphasized carrots for
the LTTE. Showing his unease with the recent Japanese
proposal for a donors meeting during Special Envoy
Akashi's upcoming visit (see Reftel) he said it would be
counterproductive to attempt to only provide
humanitarian assistance in the North and East for now
and withhold development assistance until the peace
talks resume. Perhaps showing a bit of clientitis, he
said that he had told the Tigers that the assassinations
of their opponents had to stop because "they create a
bad atmosphere for the peace talks." When the
Ambassador noted that they also involved the murder of
people, Brattskar said, of course, that was also a bad
thing. The Ambassador also informed Brattskar of the
highly likely U.S. redesignation of the LTTE and the USG
desire that it not be used as an excuse by the Tigers
for further delays in resumption of peace talks.
Brattskar thought a direct explanation to the Tigers of
what we were doing and why would be helpful. In
particular, he thought the Tigers should learn that the
redesignation did not mean the Tigers would have to wait
three years for another chance at getting off the list.
Interestingly, Sen, who has a totally different
perspective on the LTTE, also thought a "one-off"
US/LTTE contact would be useful.


3. (C) COMMENT: Brattskar's comments raise the
potential for a spirited debate at the Japanese-proposed
Sept 12 meeting over how to proceed with assistance. In
the meantime, it would be useful if the Department could
provide us an update on the redesignation timeline. END
COMMENT.


4. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD