Japan's Akashi reviews visit to Sri Lanka;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000113

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CE JA NO IN LTTE

SUBJECT: Japan's Akashi reviews visit to Sri Lanka;
India said to be unhappy with emerging GoJ role

Refs: Colombo 101, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Lewis Amselem.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: In a January 17 meeting with the
Ambassador, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi reviewed his
visit to Sri Lanka, noting that President Kumaratunga
had decided not to meet him. He said the donors'
conference in Tokyo was set for June 9-10, and he
invited Deputy Secretary Armitage to attend and for the
U.S. to serve as co-chair. XXXXXXXXXXXX In separate
conversations, however, GSL Minister Moragoda told us
that he was hearing that the XXXXXXXXXXXX on board
with Japan's emerging role. Akashi seems to be hitting
the right notes, but there appears to be a GoI/GoJ
disconnect re his involvement. END SUMMARY.

====================
Akashi Reviews Visit
====================


2. (C/NF) Ambassador Wills and DCM met January 17 with
Yasushi Akashi, Japan's Special Envoy on Sri Lankan
issues. Akashi related that his visit to Sri Lanka was
proceeding relatively well, so far. (Note: Akashi
visited Sri Lanka from January 15-19.) He had had good
meetings with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and
Opposition leader Mahinda Rajapakse of the People's
Alliance. He had also attended a meeting of the ""Sub-
Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs"" in Kilinochchi in Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)-controlled northern Sri Lanka. (Note:
Akashi is officially the ""principal adviser"" to this
joint GSL-LTTE sub-committee.)


3. (C/NF) Akashi noted that President Kumaratunga, at
the last moment, had cancelled her meeting with him,
sending a ""cordial"" letter explaining that she had been
engaged in another meeting. While he was not ""upset""
about it, the fact that the meeting did not take place
was too bad, Akashi said. He had hoped to deliver a
strong message to the president, requesting that she
work to improve strained ""cohabitation"" relations with
the PM. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi had delivered
Kumaratunga such a message during her recent visit to
Sri Lanka (see Reftels),he noted. Japan believed that
if there was one issue that could undermine the peace
process it was political problems in the south. Akashi
noted that he planned to meet with a representative of
the radical, Sinhalese extremist Janantha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) party and would use that meeting to
underscore Japanese support for the peace process.


4. (C/NF) Ambassador Wills agreed that cohabitation and
related problems in the south needed to be worked out in
order for the peace process to continue to move forward.
The issues involved were not intractable, but it would
take a lot of concerted international pressure on actors
in the south to reach the right result.


5. (C/NF) Queried about his recent discussions with
LTTE senior negotiator Anton Balasingham, Akashi replied
that the meeting, which was held in Bangkok after the
recent talks there (see Reftels),had been very
constructive. Balasingham had seemed ""80 percent""
sincere in his desire to see a negotiated end to the
war. He also seemed agreeable to enhancing the priority
given to human rights in the peace process, perhaps by
announcement of a joint GSL-LTTE ""charter"" on the
subject during subsequent peace talks with the GSL. The
Ambassador noted that some of Balasingham's comments
made in the course of the recent GSL-LTTE talks had been
disturbing, including his reference in a BBC TV
interview that the LTTE had no intention of disarming
soon (see Reftels). Akashi said he had had the same
impression. Nonetheless, Akashi allowed, Balasingham
had indicated some give on the issue of the Sri Lankan
military's ""high security zones"" in Jaffna during their
meeting. (Note: The LTTE has demanded a sharp
reduction in the size of these zones. Also see Para 9
below.) The Ambassador noted that he had met with
Defense Minister Marapana recently, who had also
expressed confidence that the security zone issue could
be dealt with. In any case, the Ambassador said, the
presence of the Sri Lankan military in the north and
east was a vital one in underscoring the unity of the
country and as a deterrent to the LTTE.

=======================================
Donors' Conference and U.S. Involvement
=======================================


6. (C/NF) Switching gears, Akashi related that the
international donors' conference for Sri Lanka was now
scheduled to take place in Tokyo from June 9-10. Japan
very much hoped that Deputy Secretary Armitage would be
able to attend. As with the Norwegian government's
efforts during the (November 2002) Oslo conference, the
GoJ promised that it would choreograph the event to
limit any possibility that U.S. participants would come
into contact with the LTTE. Akashi added that the
Japanese government would like the U.S. to serve as a
co-chair of the conference, with the model being the
Afghanistan reconstruction conference and its four co-
chairs. Ambassador Wills replied that he appreciated
this information and would pass it to Washington right
away.


7. (C/NF) Queried for further details re the
conference, Akashi responded that the GoJ was still
developing its proposals and no target levels for
development assistance from donors had yet been settled
upon. The GoJ hoped that the conference would focus on
the whole of Sri Lanka, and not only on the north and
east, which seemed to be the World Bank's areas of
focus. Akashi went on to add that the GoJ was planning
on hosting the March 18-21 round of GSL-LTTE peace
talks.

========
Re India
========


8. (C/NF) On the subject of the donors' conference,
Akashi noted that Japan was hoping that India would also
serve as a co-chair. He had raised this idea with the
GoI during his recent visit to India. His interlocutors
had been non-committal. National Security Adviser
Mishra had noted, for example, that India's Sri Lanka
policy was ""complicated"" by domestic politics, as well
as legal restrictions prohibiting any interaction with
the LTTE.


9. (C/NF) Re his own role, Akashi remarked that he had
""clarified"" to Indian interlocutors that his focus was
on development-related issues. In response, the GoI had
welcomed his efforts, asserting that Japanese
involvement could only help the Sri Lankan situation.
Akashi said he had promised to keep the Indians briefed
on his efforts. While in New Delhi, Akashi commented
that he had also met General (ret'd) Satish Nambiar, an
Indian who was working on a report on the security zones
in Jaffna. Akashi said he knew Nambiar and trusted him
to come up with a fair-minded report. The Ambassador
remarked that India was a critical regional player and
could play a very important role in the Sri Lankan peace
process. So far, the Indian government seemed a bit
passive, although some officials such as Mishra
reportedly wanted the GoI to assume a more activist
stance.

==========================================
Moragoda's Comments re Akashi, Balasingham
==========================================


10. (C/NF) Contradicting Akashi in separate
conversations with the Ambassador and DCM recently, key
Sri Lankan Minister Milinda Moragoda told us that he was
hearing that the GoI was not fully on board with Japan's
expanding role. Moragoda said to the Ambassador that
National Security Adviser Mishra had phoned him up after
Akashi's visit to New Delhi and told him that the Indian
government was not happy that the Japanese were becoming
so heavily involved. Amplifying on these remarks in a
subsequent conversation with the DCM, Moragoda said
Mishra had told him that India did not want to serve as
a ""co-chair"" at the June donors' conference. In
general, the GoI felt that Akashi was too ""pushy"" and
that he was too engaged in political aspects of the
peace process. Moragoda indicated that he (Moragoda)
also felt that the Japanese were a bit clumsy. Citing
an example of this, he related that he been told that
Akashi, in a meeting with Norwegian Embassy
representatives during his visit to Sri Lanka, had
thanked the GoN for ""inviting"" Japan to help in the
peace process. The Norwegians had told Moragoda they
were stunned by this comment inasmuch as the GoN had
never urged Japan to get involved: it had all been the
GoJ's idea.


11. (C/NF) Regarding other aspects of the peace
process, Moragoda said he had received news that
Balasingham was quite ill and might not be able to
participate in the next round of talks scheduled for
February 7-10 in Thailand. Balasingham's health
concerns seemed genuine and not a ruse to get out of the
talks, Moragoda said. As he has on previous occasions
(see Reftels),Moragoda added that he worried that
Balasingham was so ill that he might be out of the
picture soon. If that happened, it was not clear whom
the LTTE might name to replace him as chief negotiator.


12. (C/NF) Re the February talks, Moragoda said they
might take place at a lower-level if Balasingham could
not make it. Other options included the GSL meeting
with Balasingham in London, although this might mean
that other LTTE delegation members might not be able to
attend. (Note: Balasingham lives in London and is a
British citizen. Other members of his LTTE peace talks'
team, however, travel using Sri Lankan passports and
would presumably be subject to British rules proscribing
the LTTE if they tried to travel to London.) Moragoda
said Balasingham might try to travel to the LTTE-
controlled Wanni region at some point in February to
consult with the LTTE leadership if his health, and
health conditions there, allow it. (Note: The Wanni
and Jaffna have been afflicted by an increase in
incidence of dengue and typhoid of late.)

=======
COMMENT
=======


13. (C/NF) Akashi seems very well-informed and to be
hitting the right notes re the peace process. Based on
Moragoda's remarks, however, there seems to be a real
disconnect between the Indians and Japan on his precise
role, with the GoI feeling that Akashi is straying too
far from a purely development-related role into
political aspects of the process. Indeed, based on his
conversation with us, Akashi does appear to be touching
on territory that the Norwegian facilitators have been
dealing with. We would hazard to guess that India could
probably live with the current situation as long as the
GoJ does not try to push the Norwegians out of the way.
To his credit, there is no sign that Akashi wants to do
that. Re Kumaratunga's cancellation of her meeting with
Akashi, we do not want to jump to conclusions, but it
could be another sign that the often cantankerous
president is playing to anti-peace process elements. In
what seemed to be a calculated move, she refused to meet
with Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen during
his last visit to Sri Lanka in late 2001, for example,
and since that time has upped her criticism of the GoN
role. END COMMENT.


14. (U) Minimize considered.

AMSELEM