Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03BRUSSELS5113
2003-11-06 11:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005113 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA KEVIN WHITAKER, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 5073


B. B) NIGRO-WHITAKER E-MAIL 10/24/03

C. C) STATE 306443

D. D) BRUSSELS 4451

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005113

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA KEVIN WHITAKER, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON CUBA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 5073


B. B) NIGRO-WHITAKER E-MAIL 10/24/03

C. C) STATE 306443

D. D) BRUSSELS 4451

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: On November 5, Poloff discussed EU Cuba
policy with Karl Buck, Latin America Division Chief in the EU
Council Secretariat. He said the EU Latin America Working
Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4 the
punitive measures the EU had announced in June in response to
Cuba's March crackdown. Buck said the EU was unsure of how
to react to Cuba's current restriction of EU diplomats'
access to Cuban officials. Buck said the U.S. ideas of (1)
common U.S.-EU approaches to third countries on Cuba; and (2)
restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe found little
resonance in the EU. Buck reported that a European
Parliament committee had invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya
to Brussels. This conversation and the November 4 EU
Explanation of Vote on the Cuban anti-embargo resolution at
the UNGA strengthen our impression that we must keep pressure
on the EU to remain firm in its condemnation of the Cuban
human rights situation. End Summary.

EU: DISSIDENTS TO NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS
--------------


2. (C) Poloff asked Buck how EU members had reacted to the
decision of the Austrian embassy in Havana not to celebrate
Austria's national day so as not to have to act upon the
agreed EU policy of inviting Cuban dissidents to such
occasions (ref B). Buck reported that the EU Latin America
Working Group (COLAT) had affirmed unanimously on November 4
the punitive measures the EU had announced in June in
response to Cuba's March crackdown, including the policy of
inviting dissidents to national day celebrations of EU
embassies in Havana. Buck said the COLAT agreed that the
measures needed to be implemented by all EU member states so
as not to allow Cuba to render EU policy ineffectual.

EU STYMIED BY CUBAN FREEZE
--------------


3. (C) Continuing his report of the November 4 COLAT

discussion, Buck said the EU was unsure of how to react to
Cuba's restriction of EU diplomats' access to Cuban
officials. He said some member states' Havana embassies were
being granted almost no access at all to Cuban authorities,
and the EU was worried that that would weaken its influence
in Cuba. Here, Buck stressed that EU policy was to work
toward a democratic transition through dialogue not only with
civil society, but also with the Cuban government. Buck said
the COLAT was considering possible "legal or political"
measures in response to the Cuban access restrictions, but
did not specify further. He said there was some disagreement
on this among member states, with some advocating an
escalation of EU measures against Cuba and others
recommending a cautious approach. Buck offered his own view
that the June punitive measures had been announced without
thinking carefully enough about the possible consequences.
Now, he said, the EU found itself between the rock of needing
to react to the Cuban freeze and the hard place of not
wanting to provoke even harsher Cuban measures.

EU WOBBLY ON U.S. SUGGESTIONS
--------------


4. (C) On possible common U.S.-EU measures discussed at the
U.S.-EU Latin America consultations September 19 (ref A),
Buck said the ideas of common U.S.-EU approaches to third
countries on Cuba and of restricting Cuban officials' visits
to Europe found little resonance in the EU. He said that
COLAT members found "no plusses" for the EU in common
approaches to third countries, especially in reference to
Latin American countries. He implied that the EU was worried
that such common approaches would blur the line of
demarcation between the U.S. and the EU that the EU wanted to
maintain in its interaction with Latin American countries.
He added the comment, "And if the Latin Americans say no,
what then?"


5. (C) On restricting Cuban officials' visits to Europe, Buck
said that the COLAT feared such a policy would only lessen
Europe's influence over Cuba and possibly strengthen the
Cuban resolve to freeze access of EU diplomats to GOC
contacts in Havana.

BUCK: GREEKS WON'T KEEP CASTRO FROM OLYMPICS
--------------


6. (C) In the context of Cuban visits to Europe, Buck
volunteered his view on whether Greece was likely to refuse
to invite Castro to visit the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens
(ref C). He said the Greeks saw the spirit of the Games as
being a "global truce," and opined that they, in that spirit,
would not refuse to welcome Castro to Athens.

PARLIAMENT INVITES PAYA
--------------


7. (C) Buck reported that the Chairman of the European
Parliament (EP) Foreign Affairs Committee, Elmar Brok, had
invited Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya Sardinas to attend a
Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in Brussels on December 1.
Buck said that Brok had done this, as far as he knew, without
consulting anyone outside of the EP. Buck went on to say
that helping dissidents, which per se remains a good
possibility for U.S.-EU cooperation, had been rendered more
difficult since the GOC had managed to sew doubt as to
whether those who purported to be dissidents were actually
agents of the GOC (ref D).

BLAND EU EOV ON CUBAN ANTI-EMBARGO RESOLUTION
--------------


8. (C) Buck supplied Poloff a copy of the November 4 EU
Explanation of Vote (EOV) on the Cuban anti-embargo
resolution at the UNGA, saying that all member states had
agreed that the EOV should strongly condemn the human rights
situation in Cuba. (EU member states voted unanimously in
favor of the resolution condemning the U.S. embargo.) The
EOV concentrates its criticism of the Cuban human rights
record in two paragraphs out of the ten-paragraph EOV: "The
European Union strongly condemns the serious deterioration of
the human rights situation in Cuba. The increase in
violations of human rights has raised an international wave
of protests and condemnations and has increased the concern
of the European Union about the political situation in
Cuba....The European Union urges the Cuban authorities to
bring about speedy, lasting and substantial improvements in
the situation, in particular with a view to ensure the full
respect for all human rights. In that connection, the
European Union calls for the immediate release and full
re-integration into society of all prisoners of conscience.
We appeal to the Cuban authorities to cooperate fully with
international human rights bodies and mechanisms. The
European Union reaffirms its declaration made by the
Presidency on 5 June 2003." One paragraph also addresses the
need for economic reform in Cuba, another outlines the
objectives of the EU Common Position on Cuba, and another
paragraph criticizes the GOC restrictions imposed on EU
embassies.

COMMENT: EU WAVERING, WE SHOULD WEIGH IN
--------------


9. (C) It is clear to us that EU Cuba policy is still captive
to differences among member states and somewhat immobilized
by uncertainty about how to react to Cuban measures against
EU diplomats. The EU's natural discomfort about getting
tough with Cuba has been exacerbated by the Cubans' harsh
response to the EU punitive measures announced in June.
Although the injunction to invite dissidents remains in
place, the Austrian decision in Havana not to celebrate its
national day is an indication that EU embassies on the ground
may have different views. It appears also that the EU has
rejected the idea of adding to the punitive measures by, for
example, restricting Cuban official visits to Europe. That
said, the EU has reaffirmed publicly and privately its
intention to continue its retaliatory response to the March
crackdown. We should (1) work with sympathetic member states
such as Spain and Italy to consolidate the little bit of
progress made by the EU since June; and (2) take advantage of
the EU's current uncertainty by offering them specific ideas
on working with us to help dissidents while also continuing
to push them -- carefully -- to increase incrementally their
pressure on Cuba. END COMMENT.

FOSTER