EU CUBA POLICY: EMPHASIZING THE "CRITICAL" IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003186

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2013
TAGS: PREL EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU CUBA POLICY: EMPHASIZING THE "CRITICAL" IN THE
EU'S "CRITICAL DIALOGUE"

REF: A. A) STATE 163468

B. B) ATHENS 2081

C. C) WARSAW 2299

D. D) VILNIUS 758

E. E) HAVANA 9549

Classified By: USEU Poloff Todd Huizinga,
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action message. See para 10.


2. (C) Summary: On June 18, Poloff delivered reftel
demarche (ref a) and discussed the EU's announced
reevaluation of its common position on Cuba. Karl Buck
(protect) of the EU Council Secretariat, said that the
visit to Cuba of the Austrian Justice Minister
Boehmdorfer (ref a) was in line with the EU's announced
policy of limiting, but not banning, high-level EU visits
to Cuba. Buck said that he was drafting a reevaluation
of EU Cuba policy that was slated to serve as the basis
for a new common position to be approved by EU foreign
ministers at the July 22 General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC). He said his recommendation
would likely be to continue the EU's "critical dialogue"
with Cuba, but with a greater emphasis on the "critical."
With the policy revision just beginning, Department may
want to urge EU member states and institutions via
political-level demarches to formulate a Cuba policy that
foresees real consequences for Cuba's continued flouting
of international norms. End Summary.

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EU Secretariat: Austrian Cuba Visit
Puzzling, But In Line with
Restrictions on High-Level Contacts
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3. (C) Karl Buck (protect),Head of the Latin America
Division in the EU Council Secretariat, told Poloff that,
while he was somewhat puzzled that an EU member-state
minister would visit Cuba at this moment, the EU's
limitation of high-level contacts with Cuba did not
preclude Boehmdorfer's visit. In fact, Buck stressed,
the Austrians had consulted him on that very question to
be sure they would not be breaking with the EU decision.
Buck said that, although he had not been privy to
Boehmdorfer's talking points, he was certain that
Boehmdorfer would deliver a firm message to the GOC
reiterating that the recent crackdown and the June 12
public denigration of Berlusconi and Aznar were
unacceptable. However, Buck allowed that the USG view as
expressed in reftel demarche made sense from our
perspective, and promised to share the USG points with
his counterparts in member-state ministries.

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New Common Position Planned for July 22:
Continued Critical Dialogue Likely
--------------


4. (C) Buck said he would be the principal drafter of a
proposed revised common position on Cuba. His paper is
due for presentation to the EU Latin America Working
Group (COLAT),which coordinates working-level policy
formulation among member states, on July 1. In mid-July,
a COLAT-revised version will then go to the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) to prepare it for final approval
by EU FonMins at the July 22 GAERC.


5. (C) Cautioning that he was just beginning to draft,
Buck said the paper would have two main sections. One
part would examine whether current EU development
assistance activity in Cuba was effectively promoting EU
objectives there (peaceful transition to democracy,
economic reform, respect for human rights). That
section, said Buck, would be drafted by EU member-state
development officials. Buck added that he had "no idea
what each of the member states is doing on development in
Cuba."


6. (C) Buck said the section he is preparing would
propose restructuring the EU's critical dialogue with
Cuba so as to promote more effectively the EU's unchanged
objectives there (see para 4 above). When pressed for
specifics, Buck remained vague. It appears, though, that
Buck is planning to suggest, when all is said and done,
more of what the EU has announced in recent statements:
a tougher line on GOC repression and specific signals of
the EU's disapproval of Cuba's actions within the
framework of a continued EU-Cuba "critical dialogue."
The three measures announced on June 5, limiting high-
level governmental visits, reducing the profile of member
states' participation in cultural events, and inviting
Cuban dissidents at national day celebrations may be
reiterated, but Buck did not share specifics of any new
ideas.
COLAT Consensus: Don't Isolate Cuba
--------------

7. (C) Buck noted his impression that the Cuban attempt
to humiliate Aznar and Berlusconi had brought the member
states closer together in mutual support, regardless of
"opinions you or I may have about Berlusconi." He said
that, while he perceived shades of difference among
member states on how tough they wanted to get with Cuba,
"no one" had advocated cutting off dialogue. He said the
sense remained within the COLAT that isolating Cuba would
only play into the hands of the regime's hardliners.

--------------
EU Approach to Remain Distinct
From That of U.S.
--------------


8. (C) Several times, Buck averred that USINT Havana's
recent tough criticism of the regime had provided Castro
with a cover and a justification for his actions. (Buck
did not specify which actions.) His impression was that
some U.S. "hardliners" thought that the EU might be
coming around to an approach more supportive of the U.S.
embargo. He stressed that that was not the case, and
implied that part of the EU motivation for reevaluating
its Cuba policy was to avoid getting squeezed between
"hardliners in the U.S. and hardliners in Cuba" towards
cutting lines of communication with Cuba.


9. (C) Buck said, however, that he believed that the
statement of the EU's revised common position would avoid
criticism of the U.S. embargo. He said he doubted that
the statement would mention any third parties at all, but
that if the U.S. were mentioned, it would likely not be
in name, but indirectly in an assertion of the EU's
intention to work together with its partners to promote
democracy in Cuba.

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Comment: USG May Want to Push
for Tougher EU Cuba Policy
--------------


10. (C) The EU has repeatedly taken a tough line toward
Cuba recently, culminating in declarations on June 5 and
June 16 limiting contacts with Cuba and declaring Cuban
behavior toward the EU unacceptable. As USINT Havana
points out (ref e),the GOC's recent taunts of the EU
virtually dare it to take a stronger position against the
regime. Nonetheless, it appears that the new common
position on Cuba could well become, for all practical
purposes, more of the same: continuation of EU dialogue
with Cuba interspersed with regular, perhaps harsher but
basically inconsequential, declarations condemning GOC
repression. With the reformulation of EU Cuba policy in
its beginning stages, this may be the time for us to push
the EU to back up its words with actions. To that end,
post asks Department to consider approaching member and
accession states and EU institutions at the political
level to urge them that their common position on Cuba
include real consequences for Cuba's continued failure to
live up to international norms. With the regime's anti-
EU antics, with Italy taking up the EU presidency on July
1, and with many of the Central European EU accession
states expressing strong aversion to GOC actions (refs c
and d),a high-level demarche could carry considerable
weight. End comment.

FOSTER