IRAQ: MOU NEGOTIATING TEAM NEEDS TO BE READY START

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000818

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P, EUR/SE, AND PM/LEGAL (CMDR MITCHELL); OSD FOR
ISP CAPT. WILKINS; JCS FOR J3, J5 AND CJCS DEPUTY LEGAL
COUNSEL CMDR BOOCK; EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5, POLAD AND LEGAL;
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD; TREASURY FOR LOEVINGER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ EFIN
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MOU NEGOTIATING TEAM NEEDS TO BE READY START
TALKS IN ANKARA ON FEB 3

REF: A) ANKARA 788 (NODIS) B) ANKARA 673


(u) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reasons:
1.5 (B and D)



1. (U) This is an action request. See para 2.


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SUMMARY/ACTION REQUEST
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2. (C) Agreement with Turkey on a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) on US activities related to a possible Iraq operation
may be the long pole in the tent of our struggle to secure
full Turkish cooperation. Both TGS and the MFA say an MOU is
a prerequisite for seeking parliamentary approval for site
preparations and inflow of forces. The Turks will make this
negotiation only as urgently as we do. They have said they
will mirror our team in composition and level. Embassy
therefore strongly recommends that Washington dispatch an
Assistant Secretary-led team to Ankara to begin negotiations
with the Turks. MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin told the Ambassador
during his January 30 meeting with the PM (ref a) that the
GOT intended to provide the USG its version of the MOU on
February 3. TGS Deputy J5 for Agreements Maj. Gen. Acar
subsequently told ODC January 31 that the PM had approved
Turkey's draft MOU and the PM had authorized GOT officials to
begin negotiations with the US on Monday, February 3.
Therefore, our team needs to be ready to negotiate here in
Ankara by Monday morning. The USG team should be authorized
maximum flexibility on the key issues (i.e. jurisdiction and
liability),and prepared to remain in Ankara as long as it
takes to reach an agreement with the GOT. We also ask that
the Department provide us via front-channel the official US
delegation list, including the head of delegation. End
summary/action request.


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MOU STATE OF PLAY: TURKS READY TO NEGOTIATE
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3. (C) During the Ambassador's January 30 meeting with Prime
Minister Gul (ref a),MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin said the MFA hoped
to be able to "finalize" its review of the MOU on January 31
and be prepared to present its inter-agency approved views on
the MOU to the USG on February 3. TGS Deputy J5 for
Agreements Maj. Gen. Acar subsequently told the Office of
Defense Cooperation (ODC) Turkey that the Prime Minister had
approved Turkey's proposed MOU and the PM authorized the GOT
to begin negotiations with the US on Monday, February 3.


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FEB 3: USG NEGOTIATIONS TEAM NEEDS TO BE IN ANKARA
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4. (C) We understand that Washington currently is considering
having the negotiating team depart Washington Tuesday,
February 4. This is too late. We need to begin face-to-face
discussions with the GOT Monday, February 3. If the team
departs on February 4, negotiations will not commence until
February 5 in the evening at the earliest. Only two working
days would remain before the weekend and the week-long local
Turkish holiday beginning February 10. To give the teams the
time they may need to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement
and put maximum pressure on the Turks, the US negotiating
team needs to be prepared to begin face-to-face negotiations
with the Turks on Monday, February 3.


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TEAM COMPOSITION, FLEXIBILITY AND AUTHORITY KEY TO SUCCESS
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5. (C) Based on our experience negotiating with the Turks
(including the recent negotiations over the site survey MOU
negotiations),we strongly believe that the USG negotiating
team needs to be headed at the Assistant Secretary level and
contain the necessary supporting civilian and military
technical experts to close the deal in-country. The Mission
does not possess the resources or the expertise to negotiate
the MOU, and we believe that the USG delegation must be
headed by a senior policy civilian from Washington in order
to achieve success. From the Turkish perspective, the higher
the level of the USG delegation chairperson, the more serious
they perceive the USG is about the negotiations. Deputy U/S
Ilkin asked the Ambassador January 30 for the USG to provide
an official delegation list ASAP, saying the Turks would put
together a team of equal rank and composition. An Assistant
Secretary-level chairperson from State or DOD should be

SIPDIS
considered, but there is a risk to a DOD-lead: the Turks may
counter with a delegation led by an individual from a similar
but less influential organization (i.e. the Ministry of
National Defense, whose responsibilities encompass defense
procurement more than policy). We understand the Turks
intend to include discussions of financial compensation
(including possibly the assistance package). We believe the
USG team needs to be instructed to deal with that question.
We expect that such instruction would be to keep these issues
on the existing separate tracks.



6. (C) Given our experience in negotiating the site survey
MOU, we believe that the team needs to come to Ankara with
the maximum flexibility possible on the key issues of
jurisdiction and financial liability/compensation in order to
have a chance at concluding an mutually satisfactory
agreement in a reasonable period.
PEARSON