Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA7446
2003-12-04 14:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN'S FORCE POSTURE

Tags:  OVIP PREL PGOV MARR TU 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007446 

SIPDIS


FOR P:U/S GROSSMAN FROM AMB EDELMAN; ALSO FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X4, X6
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV MARR TU
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN'S FORCE POSTURE
CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reason: 1.5
(a) and (d).


-------
Summary
-------


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007446

SIPDIS


FOR P:U/S GROSSMAN FROM AMB EDELMAN; ALSO FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X4, X6
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV MARR TU
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN'S FORCE POSTURE
CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reason: 1.5
(a) and (d).


--------------
Summary
--------------



1. (S) Welcome back to Turkey. We and the GOT are looking
forward to your December 8-9 visit. You will be seeing TGS
Deputy Chief Basbug (both TGS Chief Ozkok and DefMin Gonul
are traveling),DPM/FM Gul, and MFA U/S Ziyal. You will find
the Turks preoccupied with the investigation into the
Istanbul bombings and with the upcoming elections in northern
Cyprus. Most senior GOT officials are not expecting major
changes to our force posture in Turkey, although some
continue to believe the US military wants to "punish" Turkey
for not supporting our initial military operations against
Iraq. Recent meetings of the High Level Defense Group
(HLDG--Nov. 17-19 in Williamsburg) and the Economic
Partnership Council (EPC--Dec. 1-2 in Washington) helped us
get our broad bilateral relationship back on track. Your
visit, demonstrating a commitment to consultations and
underscoring our continuing commitment to the security of a
Europe that includes Turkey, will further underscore that
while Iraq remains a priority for both our governments, our
relationship is based on broader common interests.
Nonetheless, Turks continue to look to the USG to identify
areas beyond police training where they can contribute to
reconstruction and stabilization. We should also take
advantage of your visit to urge the Turks to make the most of
the opportunity before May to reach a Cyprus settlement, to
reassure them of our commitment to eliminate the
PKK/KADEK/KHK threat to Turkey in northern Iraq, to enlist
greater Turkish political support on Georgia. On
Afghanistan, you should thank the Turks for their continued
support for OEF and ISAF operations (including their recent
offer of helicopters),encourage them to press Dostum to
comply with the ceasefire/heavy weapons cantonment accord,
and explore the possibility of the GOT increasing its
contributions to ISAF and/or PRTs. Finally, you might

compare notes with Ziyal and Gul on our visions for the
Istanbul Summit. End summary.


--------------
The Setting: After Traveling a Bumpy Road
--------------



2. (C) After a year in power, the AK Party government
continues to use its overwhelming Parliamentary majority to
pursue democratic and political reform, and has its sights
firmly set on Turkey's winning eventual accession to the EU.
Many within the secular establishment here continue to be
suspicious of AK, fearing the party intends to change the
role of religion in Turkey; but so far Prime Minister Erdogan
has been skillful at forwarding the party's reform agenda in
ways and at a pace that avoids provoking a strong reaction
from the military or most other conservatives circles.
Turkish General Staff Chief General Ozkok in particular has
demonstrated a degree of tolerance for change, some of which
erode the military's traditional influence, despite
opposition within the officer corps. Two years of sound
fiscal/monitory policy, the rapid and successful conclusion
of the Iraq war, expected US financial assistance, and
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under
an incredibly high public debt burden. However, the
government has done little to implement the structural
reforms that are essential if this positive momentum is to be
maintained, and has hesitated to take advantage of our $8.5
billion financial assistance, which could save it hundreds of
millions of dollars in interest payments. The bombings in
Istanbul temporarily set the stock market back, but it
quickly recovered, and financial markets in general have been
stable. Benefiting from its good performance in government,
its clean image, and its lack of competitors that are
credible with the public, AK remains highly popular. The
party hopes to cash in on this popularity (and refresh its
mandate) during local elections in March. US-Turkish
relations have been stabilized at the official level, but the
public perception of whether our interests coincide or not
and of US purpose in the world have declined considerably.
Turkey's leaders portray the relationship publicly in ways
that are not always helpful in this regard.



3. (S) Iraq, quite naturally, continues to dominated our
bilateral relations. The disappointing March 1 parliamentary
vote that prevented our use of Turkish territory for an OIF
northern front, the July 4 arrest and interrogation of the 11
Turkish special forces personnel in northern Iraq, and
divergent US and Turkish views of Iraqi Kurds strained the
relationship. However, determination to improve the
situation on both sides has resulted in Turkey's positive
contribution to our efforts in Iraq since the war --
humanitarian assistance, participation in reconstruction,
trade, and resupply overland to our forces in Iraq.
Parliament's approval on October 7 for the GOT to offer
troops for Iraq, before passage of UN Security Council
resolution 1511 and in the face of significant public
opposition, was a further demonstration of the GOT's
determination to get our relations back on track and to
contribute to our efforts in Iraq. The Turks are looking for
us to reciprocate by taking action against PKK/KADEK/KHK in
Iraq; S/CT Ambassador Cofer Black's meetings in Ankara on
October 2 and subsequent follow up on related issues, such as
PRM A/S Dewey's talks here with the Turks and UNHCR on how to
deal with the Makhmour refugee camp, are convincing them that
we are serious although they still believe military action
will be necessary to permanently remove this threat to
Turkey, and from Turkey's perspective, the sooner the better.
However, our GOT counterparts continue to stress that any
real concrete action short of military action, e.g., arrest
and rendition of some senior leaders, would have a major
impact on perceptions here.



4. (C) Since the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gul agreed
that it was best that Turkey not contribute troops to Iraq at
this time, we have been focusing on other ways for Turkey to
contribute to Iraq as well as other areas of shared interests
and bilateral cooperation. In the wake of our joint decision
not to pursue Turkey's offer of troops for Iraq, Turkey
continues to look to us to identify areas beyond police
training where Turkey can contribute to reconstruction and
stabilization efforts. Recently, the HLDG, the EPC and the
meetings the Turks had in Washington on the margins, served
to accentuate what we can do together to meet common
objectives not only in Iraq, but Afghanistan, the Caucasus,
and in Europe--including helping Turkey grow its economy,
modernize its military, and advance towards its EU membership
aspirations. Your visit and your message of continued US
commitment to the security of a Europe that includes Turkey
will demonstrate we value Turkey as an ally and strategic
partner, not only regarding Iraq, but also more broadly. Of
course, given your position and history with Turkey, you will
be expected to engage on issues beyond force posture with all
the senior Turks you meet.


--------------
Key Issues
--------------



5. (U) In all your meetings, you will want to touch on the
following:


(S) Istanbul bombings: Investigation into the four
terrorist bombings in Istanbul preoccupies the government,
senior officials and the public. We have provided our former
consulate building in Istanbul for the use of British
investigators, some space in our new facility to UK consular
staff to work on visas, and investigatory and intelligence
assistance to the Turks. You should offer condolences and
ask whether we can do more to help. Your visit to the
synagogue in Istanbul will underscore our interest and
concern. The Turks are livid about travel warnings and
refuse to understand their intent. They are lauding Syrian
and Iranian cooperation despite the fact that several
suspects fled to these countries and have not been "located."


(C) Turkish Force Posture: Although some Turks believe that
the USG--and the US military in particular--wants to "punish"
Turkey for not fully supporting the US in the Iraq War by
drawing down our presence, most are not expecting any big
changes to our base structure in Turkey, and they will be
expecting you to confirm this during your consultations.
Some Turks suspect that the USG, and the US military in
particular, wants to "punish" Turkey for not fully supporting
the US in the Iraq War by drawing down our presence. You
might use your consultations to encourage a prompt and
positive response to EUCOM's recent request to use Incirlik
to rotate up to approximately 1,000 people per day in and out
of Iraq between January and April 2004. You may hear about a
hope that the DODDS school in Izmir could reopen to
accommodate dependents of personnel at AFSOUTH which is to
move there, but we have already told the Turks this isn't in
the cards and that they must take the lead in attracting an
international school to the city. (VCJCS Pace, when
presented with this proposal by TGS Deputy Basbug said he
would get back to him, so you could simply say General Pace
will respond if it is raised with you.) Grumbling about
problems with DECA (Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement) implementation, mainly concerning differing
interpretation of the agreement and diminished assistance
levels, haven't changed much from your time in Turkey, but we
doubt any of the senior people you will meet will raise them.




(C) PKK/KADEK/KHK: TGS Deputy Chief Gen Basbug left
Washington with the expectation that VCJCS Gen Pace would be
prepared to share a military course of action (COA) against
the PKK/KADEK/KHK in Iraq during his December 2-5 visit.
However, CENTCOM's proposed COA have not yet been briefed to
SecDef, so General Pace was not able to provide much detail
on the road ahead. You will need to reaffirm our
determination to "use all instruments of statecraft" to
eliminate this threat to Turkey, beginning by whittling down
the size of the threat through diplomacy, information, and
diligent effort to create success stories that will help
convince Turkish Kurds in Iraq -- both PKK members and
non-members -- that life in Turkey can be better than the
lives they left and better than their possible future in
Iraq. We will need concrete steps for the President to cite
on this when PM Erdogan visits in late January.


(C) Iraq: In the past three weeks, Turkey has signed a
trade agreement with Iraqi leaders, and agreed to improve the
flow of traffic across the Habur Gate border crossing. It
would be useful for you to emphasize the importance of rapid,
successful implementation of the promised improvements at
Habur. While expressing appreciation for the assistance
Turkey has given and continues to provide to the US vis-a-vis
Iraq (including the GOT's most recent offer of police
trainers),you might also underscore the importance of Ankara
resolving Iraq issues directly with the Iraqi leadership.


(C) Cyprus: Ankara understands that the period following
the northern Cypriot elections and prior to Cyprus's May 1
accession to the EU will see intense efforts to reach a
Cyprus settlement. The Turks are preparing a new proposal to
that end, although there are conflicting views within the
GOT. TGS and conservative elements in the bureaucracy remain
loyal to Denktash and opposed to the Annan plan, so we are
skeptical about how helpful the proposal will be. You might
probe for a preview of the initiative while underscoring the
need to reach a settlement for Turkey to realize its EU
ambitions.


(S) Caucasus/Georgia: The AK government has been receiving
some (deserved) criticism for its lack of engagement during
the Georgian transition. We have indications that the Turks
have concluded that the US has no strategy for the region and
that it is in Turkey's interests to cut a deal with the
Russians. Given Turkey's close ties to Ajara, it is
important that Turkey send an unambiguous message of support
for Georgia's territorial integrity. You might want to
reiterate the USG's strong support for continued development
of the East-West Energy Corridor.


(S) Afghanistan: You should express our appreciation for
Turkey's continued support for OEF and ISAF operations,
including their recent offer to provide helicopters for ISAF.
The GOT continues to allow us to conduct OEF-related
refueling missions out of Incirlik, and the base serves as
the main transit hub for moving Al-Qaeda detainees from
Afghanistan to GTMO and back to their countries of origin.
Recently, we have seen fragmentary reports suggesting that
the Turks may be less than helpful in encouraging Dostum to
comply with the cease-fire/heavy weapons cantonment accord.
It would be useful to remind your MFA and TGS interlocutors
that we are working hard to ensure that all of the different
interests in Afghanistan work toward together toward a common
objective, and encourage the Turks to use their special
relationship with Dostum to press the latter to follow
through on his commitments. You should also use your
meetings (particularly with Ziyal and Basbug) to explore the
idea of Turkey increasing its support for stabilization
efforts in Afghanistan. Turkey has already contributed much
to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and the
rebuilding of the country. Still, there is room for Ankara
to do more. MFA already supports Turkey's making a greater
contribution to Afghanistan -- both to ISAF and the PRTs; TGS
is reluctant to send more troops.

7. (C) Finally, with Gul and Ziyal, you could usefully
touch on the Istanbul Summit. We expect Turkey to help make
the summit a success by working with us to convince other
allies of the need to reorient PfP from Eastern Europe to the
Caucasus and Central Asia and to reinvigorate the
Mediterranean Dialogue process. The Summit also provides
Turkey the opportunity to showcase its progress in
democratization, its economic modernization, its western
orientation, and its positive contribution to the various
regions it borders. Significant achievements on
long-standing issues like relations with Armenia, reopening
the Ecumenical Patriarchate's school on Hakki, and a Cyprus
settlement would ensure Turkey is seen in the best possible
light by all.
EDELMAN