ANOTHER STEP TOWARD A "SOFT LANDING": VCJCS GEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007319

SIPDIS


FOR VCJCS GEN PACE


E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT: 1.6 X5, X6
TAGS: MARR PREL PTER OVIP PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ANOTHER STEP TOWARD A "SOFT LANDING": VCJCS GEN
PACE'S DECEMBER 2-7 VISIT

(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, reasons 1.5b/d.


--------------
Summary
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1. (C) You arrive in Turkey at a time when our focus is on
increasing Turkish cooperation on Iraq reconstruction and
minimizing the fallout from the decision to forego Turkey,s
offer to contribute forces to the stabilization efforts in
Iraq. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) saw deploying forces
to Iraq as a tangible way to strengthen our mil-mil
relationship, and many military officers were disappointed by
the decision to not send forces. The Nov 17-20 visit to the
US by DCHOD Gen Basbug was part of our effort to achieve the
&soft landing8 we seek; your visit, by emphasizing close
and continuing mil-mil cooperation, is another step toward
that objective. Iraq and resolution of the PKK/KADEK
question remain the focus of the US-Turkish relationship
which nonetheless is much broader. After Basbug,s
Washington visit, expectations are high that you will be
addressing concrete plans visa vis KADEK with TGS. The GOT
is looking at trade, humanitarian assistance and commercial
opportunities for Turkish businesses as part of an Iraqi
policy aimed at helping achieve stability in a unified Iraq.
The governing Justice and Development (Turkish acronym: AK)
Party, which came to power with an overwhelming Parliamentary
majority, remains highly popular in the heartland, with polls
showing the party five to ten points ahead of the 34.5% vote
it got in November 2002 general elections. The TGS remains
suspicious of AK's Islamic roots. The government has pursued
a comprehensive reform program geared toward gaining EU
accession and continues to assert that it wants close ties to
the U.S. It tells us it is committed to finding a solution
for Cyprus and is open to improving relations with Armenia,
but we have yet to see significant concrete steps in either
area. Despite its policy of good neighborliness, Turkey has
supported USG policy objectives in Syria and Iran. Two years
of sound fiscal/monetary policy and structural reforms, the
rapid and successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected
U.S. financial assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have
combined to bring down inflation and interest rates, restore
modest growth, and create some hope that Turkey can work its
way out from under an incredibly high public debt burden.
End summary.


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Global War on Terror
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2. (S) Turkey has a vested interest in rooting out terrorism
given its long-standing campaign against the PKK/KADEK and
the leftist DHKP-C. The recent bombings in Istanbul will
certainly strengthen Turkish anti-terrorism resolve. As a
new front in the global war on terrorism, the Turkish
security services are having to adapt to countering al
Qaida-type threats in a new way. International cooperation
in these investigations is improving, although slow and
incomplete. It will take some time before the Turks fully
understand the dimensions of the threat they face and how
best to deal with it. Some of the issues get caught up in
domestic politics and bureaucratic rivalries. Turkey has
lent substantial support to the Global War on Terror.
Shortly after September 11, 2001 Turkey responded to the NATO
Article 5 invocation by offering blanket overflight and
landing clearance for transport aircraft, and blanket
overflight clearance in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. After the Taliban had been removed from power,
Turkey provided troops to the International Stabilization
Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and commanded ISAF II from Jun 02
to Feb 03. We are now seeking additional Turkish support
again. Ankara has also been a proactive partner in
intelligence gathering and information sharing, and through
its diplomatic efforts with Middle Eastern governments.


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IRAQ
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3. (S) In Iraq, Turkey,s support to the U.S., despite its
disappointing position at the beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, is making a positive contribution to our efforts
there. The March 1 denial of the use of Turkish territory
for an OIF northern front strained the American-Turkish
relationship. The July 4 arrest and interrogation of 11
Turkish special forces personnel in northern Iraq put further
strain on the relationship. A subsequent parliamentary vote
on Oct 7 that, despite significant public opposition and
before the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1511,
authorized a Turkish troop contribution to the stabilization
force effort was seen by many as an attempt to make up for
the Mar 1 vote. The USG has publicly thanked the GOT for
this offer. Additionally, despite disappointment that
Turkish troops would not be part of the stabilization force
in the near term, TGS DCHOD Gen Basbug reiterated their
interest in providing training (police, border guard, etc. to
the Iraqi government during his Nov 17-20, 2003 visit to the
United States. We understand CPA has agreed to accept
Turkish police trainers in Iraq, but the details need to be
worked out.



4. (U) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more
central, Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish
businesses. However, GOT efforts have not found much
traction with the military, the press or the public, which
remain focused on the north. The Turks have taken a number
of concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction since Secretary Powell's April visit to
Turkey. The World Food Program (WFP) shipped considerable
quantities of food through Turkey, and Turkey was the world's
biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP. The GOT also has
supported the U.S. military's efforts to establish a ground
line of communications (GLOC) here to re-supply U.S. forces
in Iraq (value over $350M to date).



5. (S) USEUCOM currently uses Habur Gate as the only
entry/exit point for all logistical sustainment moving
through Turkey to northern Iraq. This support includes
diesel, JP8, benzene, LPG, bottled water, fresh fruits and
vegetables, construction material, humanitarian support,
AAFES, and DLA items. Approximately 1,400 trucks cross in
each direction daily (total of 2,800 trucks clearing the
gate). Current backlog of trucks heading east into Iraq from
Turkey is 3km (about a 23-hour delay). We are concerned that
we will not be able to get enough traffic through the gate as
fuel needs ramp up for winter. The backlog of trucks heading
west from Iraq into Turkey is about two days, with 1,500 in
the holding area and another 4km waiting on the road. The
GOT wants to renovate Habur Gate soon and, in order to ease
operations there, has proposed a second crossing 10 km west
of Habur. Turkish closure/reduced manning of Habur
operations for up to 5 hours per day contributes to
significant inefficiencies at the crossing. We have pushed
the Turks to operate Habur 24/7. IGC President Talabani
agreed Nov 19 to open discussions with the Turks in January
on additional border crossings, but we need to press for
operational efficiency within the context of these talks.



6. (S) PKK/KADEK: The Turks remain very focused on the
presence of PKK/KADEK terrorists in northern Iraq, and this
is perhaps the most significant issue on the plate of the
Turkish military at present. State Counter Terrorism Chief
Cofer Black's meetings with Turkish officials on Oct. 2
established agreement to work on a plan of action to
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat to Turkey from northern Iraq.
A Turkish Reintegration Law, allowing non-leadership members
of the PKK/KADEK to return voluntarily to Turkey expires Feb
6, 2004. Owing to the restrictive nature of the law and
efforts by PKK/KADEK to misinform its own members about the
law, results have been disappointing so far. The Turks are
looking to the USG to make good on our commitment to
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat from Iraq. CJTF 7 has
concluded that the best strategy to pursue versus the
PKK/KADEK is one of &progressive engagement8 which will
likely be much slower than the GOT desires. The Turks also
remain disturbed by what they consider to be Kurdish (vice
U.S. or Iraqi central authority) control of the Iraqi side of
the Turkish-Iraq border and a perceived U.S. favoritism of
Kurds. There are very real Turkish sensitivities on the
PKK/KADEK, its activities in Iraq (including the recent
congress),and the threat that resurgent Kurdish nationalism
(wherever it manifests itself) as serious threats to Turkey's
security and national integrity.
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CYPRUS
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7. (SBU) Prime Minister Erdogan has reaffirmed his intention
to use the Annan III Plan as the basis for finding a solution
on Cyprus, both for domestic political reasons and his
interest in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy. However,
Denktash, who the Turkish military has long supported, has
rejected the Annan plan, and he and his supporters in Ankara
retard progress towards a comprehensive solution. Basbug was
extremely negative about prospects for a Cyprus settlement in
his discussions with Deputy Secretary Armitage. His view
seemed to correspond with Denktash's position. Much will
depend on the government's willingness to take on this issue
between now and spring 2004, when Cyprus' EU membership
becomes effective.


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CAUCASUS
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8. (C) The GOT continues to express concern to us that the
U.S. has no strategic plan for dealing with Russian and
Iranian pressure in the region. It has hinted that Turkey
would be forced to make its own peace with Russian and
Iranian interests absent any coherent U.S. political strategy
beyond completion of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline and standard
expressions of support for democracy and resolution of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkish concern about the region has
heightened with recent developments in Georgia. Turkey can
have a positive impact on the transition in Georgia by
supporting a peaceful process leading to free elections and
national unity. Both TGS and EUCOM have worked hard to
develop a professional, NATO-compatible brigade in Georgia.
These and other US and Turkish efforts may at least partially
explain why the military chose not to intervene in the
current crisis. The Nov 17 meeting of the bilateral Caucasus
Working Group (CWG) reaffirmed the commitment of both Turkey
and the US to work with Georgia,s and Azerbaijan,s
militaries in joint and complementary projects to further
promote Western values, professionalism and regional
stability.



9. (C) The establishment of de facto relations with Armenia
proceeds step by step; Ankara has allowed a second charter
airline to start twice-weekly scheduled Istanbul-Yerevan
service. However, continued GOT linkage of normalization of
relations with Armenia to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh
has thwarted an official breakthrough. The GOT also
maintains that it cannot establish normal relations until
Armenia recognizes its border with Turkey. GOT and AK party
officials tell us they recognize the potential trade and
development benefits to Turkey from opening the border.
However, passage of any Armenian genocide language, even by
only one chamber of Congress, will set progress back
significantly. The genocide issue is a very sensitive
subject within the Turkish military.


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MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP
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10. (SBU) Turkey prides itself on its good relations with
both Israelis and Palestinians. While Turkey supports the
U.S.-sponsored Road Map and has close military, intel, and
commercial ties with Israel, the GOT is leery of getting too
far ahead of a Turkish populace that sympathizes with the
plight of the Palestinians. Erdogan and FonMin Gul have
deferred a visit until they can figure out how to finesse the
expectations of the Turkish public that such a visit would
include a call on Arafat. A proposed visit to Ankara by
Israeli PM Sharon was also recently shelved due to TU PM
Erdogan,s purportedly busy schedule. However, the mid-Oct
03 visit to Israel by TUAF Chief General Ibrahim Firtina, and
participation by Israel in Nov 03 Anatolian Eagle air
exercise, reaffirm the close ties between the two militaries.


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SYRIA AND IRAN
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11. (C) Both the GOT and core elements of the State argue
that Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an
interest in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2)
shares the same values and goals in the Middle East as the
U.S. (stability, democracy and prosperity). In the latter
regard, the GOT has asserted that Turkey is constantly
delivering a message to the Syrians to cooperate more with
the U.S. and sees Syria as engaged in gradual
democratization, a process the GOT thinks needs
encouragement. Turkey and Syria appear to be increasing
confidence building measures, with the GOT announcing that it
will de-mine its border strip with Syria to increase trade
and human contact as well as increase cultivable land for the
impoverished southeast. The GOT has no enthusiasm for a
policy of pressure against Syria. There is no
military-to-military relationship between Syria and Turkey.



12. (C) Relations with Iran bear the weight of centuries of
mutual suspicion, indeed antipathy, but the current GOT
appears intent on maintaining open dialogue with Tehran. The
GOT shares U.S. concerns about reported Iranian WMD programs
and has expressed support for the U.S. initiative to bring
Iran into conformity with IAEA safeguards. However,
officials also assert that too much pressure (e.g. referring
a finding of NPT non-compliance to the UNSC) would undermine
moderates in Tehran and strengthen the position of Iranian
hard-liners, who believe that the West will not be appeased
and therefore should not be accommodated. Turkish officials
argue that Turkey has an interest in minimizing friction with
its neighbor. Intent on maintaining at least cordial
relations and loathe to upset economic ties, despite Tehran's
past record of support and safe harbor to PKK terrorists,
officials have continually cautioned U.S. interlocutors that
Iran is not easily changed from outside; that the Azeris are
well entrenched in Iranian society, with considerable
economic and political influence; and that attempts to effect
regime change from abroad are doomed to failure.


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EU ACCESSION
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13. (C) The issue of EU accession is one of high importance
for Turkey, and one of the very few virtually all Turks can
agree on. The Turkish Parliament has adopted seven
EU-related human rights reform packages over the past two
years. The legal amendments are designed to crack down on
torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, reduce
the political influence of the National Security Council, and
expand religious freedom. The EU and other outside observers
have praised the reforms, while criticizing the slow pace of
implementation; the EU's latest progress report on Turkey
highlights the need for implementation. Questions remain
whether the AK government will be able to implement these
reforms rapidly, particularly given the resistance from an
openly partisan President Sezer and those in the judiciary,
military and other areas of the state apparatus who are
content with the status quo and suspicious of AK, the EU and
the U.S. Nationalistic and status quo elements of the
military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized
some of the reforms as threats to national security, and have
resisted implementation. Despite GOT progress on human
rights, EU officials have repeatedly told the GOT that it
will be difficult for the EU at the December 2004 Summit to
offer Turkey a date to begin accession talks if there is no
settlement on Cyprus.


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DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE
--------------



14. (C) The governing AK Party, which came to power with an
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002,
continues to pursue democratic and political reform.
Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the opposition CHP
and xenophobic Genc Party -- have lost momentum. AK insists
its substantial and path-breaking democratic reform packages
demonstrate it is wedded to democracy and strong relations
with the EU and U.S. However, many in the Turkish
establishment question AK's sincerity and express suspicion
about AK's agenda, concerned that the party intends to change
the role of religion in Turkey. Turkey's generals are keen
to protect their status as Guardians of the (Kemalist)
Republic and the version of "secularism" that has prevailed
in Turkey since the mid-1920s. They, and much of the status
quo forces in the State, assert AK is a challenge to the
founding ideology of Ataturk's Turkey; AK in turn says that
its "secular" opponents have hijacked Ataturk's intentions
and are responsible for the stagnation in Turkey's political,
economic, and social development.


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THE ECONOMY
--------------



15. (SBU) Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and
structural reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of
the Iraq war, expected U.S. financial assistance, and
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under
a high public debt burden. The GOT is attempting to build on
this momentum and thus push the economy away from the
financial precipice on which it has been perched for the past
three years. This will require the government, which at
first implemented the IMF recovery program with muted
enthusiasm, to obtain quarterly IMF reviews on time, proceed
with scheduled privatizations, keep moving forward on EU
pre-accession requirements, and improve the environment for
foreign direct investment. Failure to take advantage of this
opportunity will not necessarily mean another crisis, but
will leave the economy extremely vulnerable to external or
internal shocks and undermine the potential for prosperity.
In late September, the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement
under which the USG will provide $8.5 billion on low-interest
loans to support Turkey's economic reform efforts. Money
under the agreement could begin flowing once the GOT cabinet
and President have approved the package, however the
agreement has become politically controversial.


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HLDG
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16. (SBU) The US hosted a High-Level Defense Group in
Williamsburg, VA from Nov 17-19, 2003. Deputy TGS Chief
Basbug led the Turkish delegation; Ms. Mira Ricardel
(Overseeing Assistant Secretary of Defense-International
Security Policy) led the US delegation. Discussions focused
on a number of key political-military and security
cooperation issues vital to the US-TU relationship, including
GWOT, cooperation in Iraq, Defense Industrial cooperation,
and Turkish modernization projects such as Joint Strike
Fighter, Turkish AEW&C PEACE EAGLE, SPEWS II electronic suite
for their Block 50 F-16s, and the US-TU Space Cooperation
MOU. Working groups related to the HLDG addressed, inter
alia, continued efforts to identify areas of potential
cooperation in Iraq reconstruction and training opportunities
(police, border guard, etc),the importance of Caucasus
region and Caucasus Working Group initiatives, and the
continuing efforts to develop Space Cooperation (working on
MOU) as a new dimension to the relationship. Basbug, who
professed that TGS wanted to focus on the future and not the
past, was very pleased with the outcome of his visit, noting
in particular that he appreciated the US response with regard
to combating PKK terrorism in northern Iraq that he received
during his meetings in Washington, including with you. In
this regard we expect that the PKK issue will be a topic of
high interest during your visit.


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Missile Defense
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17. (C) The Missile Defense Technical Experts Group (TGS and
MDA) last met in May in Colorado Springs. At that meeting
Phase III of the joint architectural study was approved and
new areas of research and cooperation were discussed, such as
a sensor study, post attack damage scenarios, and the NATO
study. MFA tells us the GOT is eager to hear how the US
plans to coordinate its own missile defense, its efforts to
have other countries buy in to a joint system, and the NATO
study. Because of the high cost of a missile defense system,
Turkey is waiting to see how it can reap the benefits of a
joint system before it commits to providing its own MD
system. The TGS told us during the recent HLDG meeting that
the option to buy used German Patriot missile systems is
still being evaluated by the Turkish Air Force.


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NATO Istanbul Summit
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18. (C) The GOT is determined to make the Summit a success.
The dates have been confirmed for June 28-29, 2004. Turkey
is waiting to hear what Washington has in mind for themes and
is supportive of the US desire to use the Summit to expand
NATO activity in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia.


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Security Cooperation Issues
--------------



19. (C) Incirlik operations: US Air Force operations out of
Incirlik Air Base have operated smoothly, generally without
Turkish Air Force interference as was so often the case
during ONW. The recent surge in Tanker numbers was
accommodated without incident. There is current discussion
at AMC to raise optempo at Incirlik by bringing in C-17
aircraft and support personnel as part of a hub and spoke
operation for sustainment of US forces in Iraq. This concept
(still in initial US planning phase) has not yet been
broached with the TGS, and may require Parliamentary
approval. There is also a plan to use Incirlik for the swap
of forces in Iraq. We expect TGS approval once we formally
submit our request. The plan calls for moving 60K troops (up
to 1000 troops per day) through Incirlik during the 90-day
period from Jan to Mar 04 (this plan could be approved under
an existing government decree). We are expecting State,s
Under Secretary Grossman to visit in mid December to consult
with Turkey about the base,s future as part of the European
force posture exercise.



20. (U) Anatolian Eagle: The Anatolian Eagle exercise in
Konya concluded Nov 13, 2003. This was very successful
exercise that included participation by Israel, Germany, the
US, and Turkey. USAFE was very pleased with the spirit of
cooperation from the Turks, and is looking to use the
agreement framework from this exercise as a springboard to
resume Weapons Training Detachments and other bilateral
exercises.



21. (U) Space Agreement: OSD C3I (Mr. Art Baer) and the
Turkish Air Forces Command (TAFC) recently completed initial
negotiations of a Space Agreement that will support the new
Turkish Space Program, for which the TUAF is the executive
agent. The Turks have committed to responding to the draft
text of the agreement by early December. This was also a
subject of discussion at the recent HLDG. The two sides
recommitted themselves to the goal of signing the Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) umbrella/framework
agreement for defense space cooperation at the
American-Turkish Council annual meeting in March 2004. Also,
the US agreed to approach NASA regarding Turkish interest in
placing an astronaut in space, and to continue to identify
and prioritize appropriate space-related training courses for
the Turkish Air Force.



22. (U) SPEWS II: BAE and TAFC recently signed a direct
commercial contract to upgrade the electronic warfare
capability of Turkey,s Block 50 F-16s.



23. (U) Airsouth and the School in Izmir: It is likely that
military leadership you meet with will ask about the
possibility of bringing a DoDDS school back to Izmir
coincident with the AIRSOUTH move. US position to date is
that this remains a GOT responsibility. DoDDS has no
interest in pursuing this based on fiscal constraints, but
could possibly be approached to provide expertise in the
establishment of an international school there. This issue
remains key in the successful transition of AIRSOUTH.
EDELMAN