Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA7229
2003-11-20 12:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER CICEK'S

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM CASC EFIN IZ TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007229 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CASC EFIN IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER CICEK'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON


(U) Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch; reasons (1.5 b and
d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007229

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CASC EFIN IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER CICEK'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON


(U) Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch; reasons (1.5 b and
d).



1. (C) Summary: Justice Minister Cicek's visit to Washington
allows us to raise high-profile global issues with one of the
Turkish cabinet's most influential and outspoken figures.
Our priorities for his visit should be: 1) to urge continued
GOT progress on EU-related human rights reform, and
underscore U.S. support for Turkey's EU candidacy; 2) to
encourage GOT follow-through on combating trafficking in
persons (TIP); 3) to urge better cooperation on child
abduction cases; 4) to urge the GOT to adopt more effective
laws against terrorist financing; and 5) to brief Cicek on
our latest thinking on Iraq and further U.S.-Turkish
cooperation;. End Summary.



2. (C) Justice Minister and government spokesman, Cemil Cicek
is a mainstream conservative Anatolian who brings ballast and
common sense to PM Erdogan's cabinet. He has Erdogan's ear
on matters of state. For instance, we know he faithfully
passed on to Erdogan our caution against Erdogan's planned
trip to Tehran; Erdogan subsequently put the trip off. Cicek
can sometimes be a difficult interlocutor; he is prone to
complaining to us about what he perceives as U.S. policy
mistakes. Moreover, in the classic mode of those who adhere
to a nationalist-religious line, he will blandly assure his
interlocutors that everything is in order, all problems are
being solved. Once he has vented, however, he can be a
careful listener and appreciates nuts-and-bolts solutions.
The key is to slow down the pace of the meeting; when he
senses he is under pressure or sees that someone is openly
disputing a point with him, he goes deaf.


--------------
Human Rights, Religious Freedom
--------------



3. (U) Cicek has been among the GOT's most outspoken
defenders of the EU-related human rights reform process.
When high-level generals from the TGS and NSC have criticized
pending reform legislation as threats to national security,

Cicek has often issued strong, public rebuttals. He has even
publicly criticized police for abusing their authority. He
also understands the need for wholesale reform of the
sclerotic and ideologically one-sided justice system. We
should applaud Cicek's overall efforts in favor of reform and
make it clear to him that the USG will continue to back
Turkey's EU candidacy.



4. (C) Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has told us that
attorneys for the Ecumenical Patriarchate have found Cicek
willing to discuss new approaches for improving
GOT-Patriarchate relations, though they remain cautious about
how far he will go to back efforts to remove restrictions on
the Patriarchate, especially reopening of Halki Seminary. We
should emphasize to Cicek that reopening of Halki in advance
of the NATO Summit would strongly bolster Turkey's image in
the U.S. It is also important to remind Cicek that having a
healthy Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey rather than having
the Russian Orthodox Church dominate is directly and
materially in Turkey's interests.


--------------
State Security Court Reform
--------------



5. (C) Despite sweeping human rights reforms, the GOT has
made no significant changes to the widely criticized State
Security Court (SSC) system. SSCs have the authority to hold
closed hearings and admit testimony obtained during police
interrogation in the absence of council. A large portion of
defendants in SSC cases face charges in relation to illegal
speech, usually for allegedly "insulting the State" or
advocating "separatism." The EU has repeatedly called on the
GOT to bring the SSCs in line with European standards, and
EU officials have alleged pro-prosecution bias on the part of
the Ankara SSC hearing the high-profile retrial of Leyla
Zana and three other Kurdish former MPs. A few members of
the Turkish Parliament have said the SSCs should be
abolished. SSC reform could help loosen restrictions on
expression, and would bolster Turkey's EU candidacy.
--------------
Human Trafficking
--------------



6. (U) Thanks to a recent series of initiatives, the GOT
earned a last-minute promotion from Tier III to Tier II in
the 2003 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report. However, GOT
officials have been slow to acknowledge the trafficking
problem in Turkey, and slow to provide information on arrests
and prosecutions under anti-TIP legislation, as well as on
anti-TIP programs. We should continually emphasize to Cicek
the need to follow up on anti-TIP initiatives in order for
Turkey to maintain its Tier II status and continue to
progress. We should also encourage greater collection and
sharing of data on TIP-related issues.


--------------
Child Abduction
--------------



7. (C) Turkey became a signatory to the Hague Convention on
Child Abduction (parental kidnapping) in August 2000. Since
that time, no child has been successfully returned from
Turkey to any country without the consent of the abducting
parent. There are several systemic problems. The court
system is very slow and Hague cases last a minimum of 2-3
years. Kidnapping by a parent is not considered a crime in
Turkey, and police therefore have no authority to get
directly involved in locating missing children in abduction
cases. The law only permits police to notify abducting
parents that they have seven days to turn over the child.
Abductors face only a small fine for failing to comply. Most
judges are unfamiliar with the Hague Convention. The Justice
Ministry recently began preparing a new law for implementing
the Convention -- we do not know whether Cicek is aware of
this. Turkish M.P.s with whom we have discussed the issue
seem keen to press for Turkey to adhere to its commitments.
In contrast, in the past, Cicek has made verbal commitments
to assist in abduction cases, but has not followed up. We
have heard from good AK party contacts that Cicek is
prejudiced against the taking of children from a Turkish
(i.e., Muslim) abducting parent because he sees the return of
a child abroad as the loss of a "Muslim child".



8. (U) There are currently 16 cases involving 19 Amcit
children who have been abducted and taken to Turkey. Of
these, six involve applications for return and two involve
applications for visitation under the Hague Convention. The
other eight are pre-Hague cases filed under local Turkish
law. Cicek's visit provides an opportunity to emphasize our
concern about the lack of GOT progress on Hague compliance.
Increasing numbers of children are being abducted and taken
to Turkey because abducting parents know the Hague Convention
is not being enforced. Ultimately, judges in other countries
will deny visitation to Turkey under the Convention out of
fear that the children will not be returned.


--------------
Terrorist Financing
--------------



9. (U) Turkey's efforts to combat terrorism have been
hampered by inadequate laws, insufficient training, and
limited cooperation among agencies. Both the EU and
State/DOJ are planning programs to address these problems;
however, without top-level GOT support, we can expect only
limited results. In particular, the GOT needs to pass laws
that will: 1) criminalize the financing of terrorism; 2)
resolve jurisdictional disputes between courts; 3) make it
easier to seize terrorists' assets; 4) improve the
functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial intelligence
analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the Suspicious Transaction
reporting regime.


--------------
Iraq
--------------



10. (C) In recent meetings, Cicek has clearly had a couple of
axes to grind regarding the war in Iraq and its aftermath.
He has accused the U.S. of siding with "two clan leaders"
(PUK leader Talabani and KDP leader Barzani) over Turkey,
despite 57 years of alliance and friendship. He has said the
GOT appreciates U.S. economic support, but warned that
Washington should not assume that support guarantees Turkey's
unlimited, unconditional loyalty. His public comments have
mirrored this approach. Nevertheless, Cicek has said he
believes Turkey and the U.S. should move beyond their
differences over Iraq. His visit provides an opportunity to
emphasize our desire to forge a cooperative relationship with
the GOT on Iraq, and to encourage Cicek to adopt a more
supportive public line.


--------------
Uzan Case
--------------



11. (C) Cicek may raise the possibility of a GOT extradition
request for members of the Uzan family, if they are located
in the U.S. Several members of the family of Motorola
deadbeat and Genc Party leader Cem Uzan face charges of bank
fraud. The USG is working with the GOT on the issue, however
the Uzans have not been located. We should assure Cicek that
if the Uzans are located in the U.S. the USG will follow
through on an extradition request in accordance with the
extradition treaty.
DEUTSCH