Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA7213
2003-11-20 06:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

IRAQ: A/S DEWEY AGREES NEXT STEPS ON REPATRIATING

Tags:  PREF PHUM PTER PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007213 

SIPDIS


DEPT. FOR PRM, S/CT, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA;
GENEVA FOR RMA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2013
TAGS: PREF PHUM PTER PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: A/S DEWEY AGREES NEXT STEPS ON REPATRIATING
TURKISH REFUGEES IN IRAQ WITH GOT AND UNHCR


Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert Deutsch.
Reasons 1.5 b and d. Recommendations at Para 2.


---------------------------
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007213

SIPDIS


DEPT. FOR PRM, S/CT, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA;
GENEVA FOR RMA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2013
TAGS: PREF PHUM PTER PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: A/S DEWEY AGREES NEXT STEPS ON REPATRIATING
TURKISH REFUGEES IN IRAQ WITH GOT AND UNHCR


Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert Deutsch.
Reasons 1.5 b and d. Recommendations at Para 2.


--------------
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------



1. (SBU) On November 19, PRM Assistant Secretary Dewey met
with Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sensoy, UNHCR Assistant High
Commissioner Morjane, CPA rep Bartlett and Khalil Afar from
the Iraqi Embassy on next steps for the voluntary
repatriation of Turkish refugees in Iraq, including those in
the Makhmour camp. All agreed that no later than
mid-December, the UNHCR would share with the participants a
draft tripartite (GOT-CPA/IGC-UNHCR) agreement governing
principles and modalities for voluntary repatriation. They
also agreed to re-convene in early January in Ankara to
complete arrangements for the overall approach. After the
January meeting, UNHCR would visit Makhmour and provide
general information to residents about opportunities for
return. GOT officials would next visit the camp in
cooperation with UNHCR to answer specific questions the
residents might have. After this, UNHCR would oversee the
completion of registration forms/questionnaires by camp
residents. The forms would allow the GOT to begin
preparations for the actual repatriation, which Sensoy
assured would be expedited by the Turks. For now, Sensoy
said he would try to get a public GOT statement welcoming the
refugees to return, and asked the UNHCR to complete work on
the form as soon as possible. Sensoy noted that the
discussion did not only apply to Makhmour residents but to
all Turkish refugees in Iraq, and that some returns for
people outside the camp might be possible in very short order
as a confidence building measure. The sides agreed that the
USG/CPA/IGC would be responsible for ensuring the refugees
were able to take decisions about voluntary repatriation with
the minimum possible intimidation from the PKK/KADEK/KHK.




2. (SBU) RECOMMENDATIONS: We recommend Geneva press UNHCR to
complete the draft agreement as soon as possible to maximize
the chance of closure in advance of the January meeting, so
that meeting can be devoted to operationalizing arrangements.
We also recommend Geneva seek commitment from UNHCR to
complete their information package before the January
meeting, so that it is ready for distribution immediately
following. End summary and recommendations.



3. (SBU) On Nov. 19 in Ankara, PRM A/S Dewey accompanied by
Charge met with GOT MFA U/S Nabi Sensoy, UNHCR Assistant
Commissioner Morjane, CPA Advisor to the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration Larry Bartlett, and Iraqi Embassy
officer Khalil Afar to discuss next steps on return of
Turkish refugees in Iraq. The meeting was constructive and
positive in tone. By the end of the meeting, all
participants were on the same page about next steps, timing
and who was responsible for what. Sensoy noted that the GOT
had provided UNHCR with forms it wished to be used to learn
which refugees wanted to return and where they wanted to
return to. He hoped the UN would finalize the forms as soon
as possible. He also said the GOT is prepared to send
interagency teams to Makhmour camp to provide information
about conditions in Turkey and to answer specific questions
the refugees would likely have, e.g., would young men be
required to complete compulsory military service (yes, but
there may be some flexibility on when they would have to
serve),and whether or not refugees could return to their
places of origin (in principle yes, but if administratively
impossible, they would need to provide a second choice).
Sensoy noted that the current process is slow and that once
the Turks see how many want to return, they will decide how
far they can streamline their system. He guessed that the
repatriations would take longer than a few months but less
than a few years.



4. (SBU) A/S Dewey agreed that it was urgent to maintain
momentum in efforts to provide a durable solution to Turkish
refugees in Iraq, and noted that his presence demonstrated
the importance the USG attaches to reaching a solution. He
said he hoped the "Dohuk 25" could be returned soon, noted
that the US agreed on the need to eliminate the influence of
political elements in the camp from those who might choose to
return, and sought a discussion of how best to go about that.
He suggested the first step should be confidence building by
the UNHCR via a general information campaign about conditions
in Turkey. A/S Dewey then proposed that the UNHCR draft an
agreement for tripartite consideration on principles and
modalities no later than mid-December, and that the group
present have a follow-up meeting in early January. He also
pressed the Turks to facilitate senior-level face-to-face
contact in Ankara between the UNHCR and the Turkish Ministry
of Interior and military as needed. Sensoy agreed to do so.
He said the MFA was and would remain the GOT's coordinating
body for this issue, but that when we got to the
implementation phase, direct contacts with the MOI and
military would be required.



5. (SBU) Morjane noted that UNHCR and the GOT had four months
of good cooperation behind them on this issue and urged a
holistic approach to the question. He said that before
sending teams to Makhmour, the participants must agree on
what Turkey will be offering and what the UN will say and
provide. He sought a comprehensive agreement at the January
meeting on forms, visits, and minimum acceptable conditions
and principles for the repatriations. He accepted the task
of preparing a draft tripartite agreement by mid-December.



6. (SBU) CPA rep Bartlett pointed to ongoing repatriations to
Iraq as examples of CPA/Iraqi commitment to cooperate with
UNHCR and neighboring governments, and said the same
protections and services provided to returning Iraqis would
be made available to Turkish refugees in Iraq seeking
voluntary repatriation. CPA and the Iraqi Ministry, he said,
would continue to provide protection to refugees in Iraq,
including those who may choose not to repatriate. Bartlett
assured that CPA and Iraqi officials would play a role in the
information campaign.



7. (C) Sensoy said the main issue was ensuring the refugees
could express their free will. He noted that we all had an
obligation to ensure this, but wondered how that would be
guaranteed. He admitted that no one really knows how much
influence the PKK/KADEK wields over the refugees, and
stressed that Turkey had all along asserted that for
repatriation forms to be filled out to reflect people's free
will, the shadow of PKK intimidation needed to be removed
from Makhmour. CPA and the Iraqi authorities were, he said,
authorized to rid the camp of its PKK presence, and that this
was related to the larger question of PKK presence in Iraq in
general. He asked what the US was thinking of doing to
remove the PKK from the camp or, if that were not possible,
to ensure that residents were not pressured by the PKK in
making their decisions about repatriation.



8. (C) A/S Dewey thought a surgical removal from the camp
would be difficult if not impossible, and an attempt at one
could be counter-productive in terms of encouraging residents
to repatriate. He suggested taking advantage of the UNHCR
presence in the camp to evaluate the influence the PKK
exerted and propose a series of measures to counter that
influence. UNHCR, Dewey noted, has experience doing this in
other places, and would get assistance from others, including
the USG. He suggested that one step in building confidence
would be to focus first on the 2-3,000 refugees in and around
Dohuk as a sign to those in Makhmour that returns can be
successful and safe. Morjane agreed and suggested drawing up
a CPA/UNHCR/Iraqi plan to free refugees from PKK pressure.
One step in such a plan, he said, should be providing
objective information about improved conditions in Turkey to
counter propaganda to the contrary. He agreed Dohuk would be
a good place to start but noted that the UNHCR would not
begin an information campaign or take other steps inside Iraq
until we had a tripartite agreement on the overall process.
Any misunderstanding or faux pas, he said, could scuttle the
whole effort.



9. (C) Sensoy welcomed the idea of a UNHCR-drafted agreement
and a meeting in early January in Ankara, and agreed that the
full framework should be resolved before steps are taken.
However, that did not exclude the possibility of continuing
talks in the meantime. Sensoy said Turkey was not saying the
PKK needed to be surgically eliminated from Makhmour, but to
succeed, the PKK should get the message that it will not be
permitted to exert pressure on the refugees. How this is
done, he said, was up to CPA and the Iraqi authorities, and
added, "if, at the end of the day, the best you can do is
just distribute the forms, we're OK with that. But, if you
do so prematurely or with the residents under PKK pressure,
there will be many fewer who choose to come home." He said
he hoped the UNHCR would convince many camp residents to
return to their country of origin. Information on conditions
in Turkey would be more credible if it initially came from
the UNHCR as opposed to the GOT, Sensoy noted. Turkey, he
said, agreed that the UN should take the initiative and
provide as much information as possible on the situation and
preparations in Turkey to the refugees. Turkey would then
follow-up by sending a team of GOT officials together with UN
reps to confirm the UNHCR information and answer specific
questions. Sensoy asked that the UN information contain
details of the Reintegration Law, something Turkey did not
want to raise with the residents because the GOT did not want
the residents to feel suspected of being PKK members or
accomplices, but coming from the UN, the information would
not have the same stigma.



10. (SBU) Morjane asked if the GOT would make a public
statement welcoming the return of any refugees who chose to
come back, and noting, as Sensoy had in his remarks, that the
GOT viewed them as innocent victims. This would encourage
them to choose to return by showing goodwill. Sensoy agreed
and said he would talk with his superiors about getting such
a statement made. Morjane also asked that the information
campaign be sequenced to take place in advance of the
distribution of forms.



11. (SBU) Sensoy summarized the agreed points as follows: 1)
by mid-December UNHCR would provide a draft tripartite
agreement; 2) there would be a follow-up meeting in Ankara in
the first half of January (with the forms to be completed
before that meeting); 3) Sensoy would try to get a public GOT
statement along the lines described in para 9; 4) after the
January meeting, UNHCR would go to Makhmour to begin the
information campaign; 5) the GOT team would then visit the
camp to reinforce the UN information and answer questions; 6)
the UN would then conduct the repatriation survey using the
agreed forms; and 7) the UN would share the results with the
GOT which would begin processing for expedited return to
Turkey. Morjane asked for confirmation that the discussion
was about all Turkish refugees in Iraq, not only those in
Makhmour. Sensoy confirmed that was the case.



12. (C) Sensoy said the only piece missing was how to deal
with the PKK influence. He said the issue was a political
headache for Turkey and one the Turks were eager to put
behind them. Turkish public opinion will wonder if the US
cannot remove 200 PKK members from Makhmour, how can they be
trusted to eliminate the threat of 4,500 PKK members in the
mountains. Camp closure, he said, was a top priority for
Turkey. Turkey did not want a transit camp in Dohuk, which
would be seen as a return to the pre-Makhmour Atrush camp
situation, moving the population closer to the Turkish border
without returning them. He repeated, "Our objective is to
dissolve that camp and to maximize the number of Turkish
citizens who return." He said even if half of Makhmour did
not want to return, Turkey hoped they would be distributed
around Iraq and not left as a block in Makhmour.



13. (SBU) Morjane thanked the Turks for deciding to implement
an expedited process for the refugees, and urged them to use
that process now for the "Dohuk 25." This, he said, would be
an important confidence building measure. Sensoy replied
that the GOT hoped to have an answer on the Dohuk 25 within
10 days and that those cases were being viewed favorably.



14. (U) Assistant Secretary Dewey has cleared this message.



15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
DEUTSCH