TGS D/CHOD BASBUG'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON - AN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007114

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ AF CY ASEC OVIP
SUBJECT: TGS D/CHOD BASBUG'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON - AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP RELATIONS

REF: A. ANKARA 7006

B. ANKARA 6992

C. ANKARA 6734


(u) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Turkish General Staff Deputy Chief Basbug will visit
Washington November 16-21 to lead the Turkish delegation to
the US-Turkey High-Level Defense Group (HLDG). He has
requested meetings with National Security Advisor Rice,
DepSecDef Wolfowitz, CJCS Myers and VCJCS Pace. Basbug may
also seek meetings at State with the Deputy Secretary and/or
the Undersecretary for Political Affairs. This is Basbug's
first visit to the US as D/CHOD. Post strongly supports
these meeting requests as a key opportunity to re-build a
relationship with the Turkish military. Basbug's visit is
also an excellent opportunity to discuss with a credible and
important Turkish official issues besides Iraq, including
Afghanistan, Cyprus, ARMENIA, and Turkey's aspirations for EU
accession, and to help the new TGS leadership establish
relations with civilian USG counterparts as well as top US
military officials. Basbug is a thoughtful, direct man with
excellent control of factual information. He has always been
top of his class and is likely to be the TGS Chief someday.
He has excellent credentials with both the Turkish Army in
the field and with defense policy makers in Ankara. In
short, his visit to Washington is an opportunity we should
not miss. End summary.



2. (C) The Turkish General Staff, with the pressure of EU
democracy reforms under CHOD General Ozkok's leadership, has
seen its role in Turkish politics and policy-making reduced.
Nonetheless, there are a number of influential officers who
are uncomfortable with these developments, who are very
suspicious of EU and US intentions and who want to slow or
prevent change in the Turkish system. The military is
broadly opposed to the AK Party, currently in power, because
it comes out of a religious-oriented background and its
ultimate direction is suspect. Basbug was moved into his
current position last August as General Ozkok brought allies
into a number of senior positions. His reputation as a
strategic thinker makes him a key player in the effort to
make Turkey a more modern country. However, the TGS
continues to seek political alternatives to AK that will
garner public cupport and be more clearly committed to
Turkey's political traditions.


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Iraq
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3. (SBU) Iraq and resolution of the PKK/KADEK question remain
a current focus of the US-Turkish security relationship.
Having settled for now the question of potential Turkish
troop deployment for a stabilization force in Iraq (and all
Washington interlocutors could usefully thank Basbug and TGS
for supporting the idea and helping get Parliamentary
approval) Turks are seized with two other Iraq-related
issues: Whether the U.S. will move against PKK/KADEK
terrorists in northern Iraq; and Turkey's perception of US
preferential treatment of Iraqi Kurds. Senior GOT officials
including PM Erdogan, as well as our contacts with ordinary
citizens, have indicated that concrete action by the U.S. to
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat will ease Turkish suspicions
that the U.S. favors the Kurds in northern Iraq over our
relations with Turkey in ways that will eventually harm
Turkey's interests. It will also be the key to securing the
eventual withdrawal of some 1,500 Turkish Special Forces
currently in northern Iraq and to disbanding the Turkish-led
Peace Monitoring Force.



4. (SBU) The Turkish Parliament recently passed a
"re-integration" law allowing non-leadership members of the
PKK/KADEK to return voluntarily to Turkey. Owing to the
restrictive nature of the language and efforts by PKK/KADEK
leaders to prevent those in the camps from gaining access to
accurate information about the law, results have been
disappointing so far. The Turks are looking to the USG to
implement our commitment to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat
from Iraq. State's Counter Terrorism Chief Amb. Black was in
Ankara October 2 to discuss PKK/KADEK and agreed with the
Turks on a plan of action using the full range of statecraft
tools to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat. The Turks also
remain disturbed by what they consider to be Kurdish (vice
U.S. or Iraqi central authority) control of the Iraqi side of
the Turkish-Iraq border. The U.S and GOT are attempting to
put behind us hard feelings from a July 4 incident, in which
U.S. forces arrested Turkish troops believed to be working to
foment instability. That event and the Turks' perception
that we mishandled it (although Chief of the General Staff
Ozkok subsequently transferred the two Turkish generals
responsible for Turkish special forces in Iraq short of tour)
are likely to linger in the background of the relationship.
Basbug will raise the PKK/KADEK threat with his interlocutors.



5. (U) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more
central, Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish
businesses. However, GOT efforts have not found much
traction with the military, the press or the public, which
remain focused on northern Iraq, and suffered when the Turks
withdrew their offer of troops. The Turks have taken a
number of concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction since Secretary Powell's April visit to
Turkey. The World Food Program (WFP) continues to ship
considerable quantities of food through Turkey, and Turkey is
also the world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP.
The GOT also has supported the U.S. military's efforts to
establish a ground line of communications (GLOC) here to
re-supply U.S. forces in Iraq. Turkey recently facilitated a
Turkish company's export of electricity to Iraq, continues to
support fuel barter deals to supply essential energy supplies
to the Iraqi people, and has offered some commercial/aid
deals that Washington and CPA are considering. Ankara 7006
describes Turkey's experience with training that could be
relevant and beneficial in the Iraq context.


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Afghanistan
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6. (C) Turkish support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan has been
a bright spot in US-Turkish relations since September 11,
2001, and likely could be a possible area for future
cooperation as we look to broaden our cooperation outside of
Iraq. Up until now, the Turkish military has been almost
exclusively focused on preparations for a possible deployment
to Iraq, and therefore has declined requests from NATO,
CENTCOM and others to contribute additional military forces
to ISAF or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). That
said, we do not rule out the possibility that the GOT would
be prepared to contribute forces at a later date and
therefore recommend that Washington share our current
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. Specifically, we
recommend that Washington provide Basbug a detailed briefing
on our accomplishments, what we are doing now, and where we
are heading in the future -- while stopping short of
soliciting formal contributions from Turkey for either ISAF
or the PRTs.


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CYPRUS
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7. (SBU) P.M. Erdogan appears committed to finding a
comprehensive solution on Cyprus, but faces continued
resistance from the TGS and other elements of Turkish
society. Erdogan has reaffirmed his intention to use the
Annan III Plan as the basis for finding a solution, both for
domestic political reasons and his interest in promoting
Turkey's EU candidacy. However, the Turkish establishment's
long support for Denktash, his rejection of the Annan plan,
and Denktash supporters in Ankara leave the GOT without an
approach to achieve a comprehensive solution. Much will
depend on the government's willingness to take on this issue
between now and spring 2004, when Cyprus' EU membership
becomes effective. AK owes nothing politically to "TRNC"
leader Denktash and is thus interested in promoting
transparent and fair parliamentary elections in the North in
December. No matter what the outcome, the elections, which
have become a de facto referendum on a comprehensive
solution, will profoundly affect the likelihood of a
settlement before May. Basbug's boss, General Ozkok,
recently went public with a not completely coherent
explanation of why Turkey has a strategic interest in Cyprus
that is not met by EU membership or the UN plan. NSC and
State interlocutors should share the contrary US view.


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CAUCASUS
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8. (C) GOT remains open in principle to improving relations
with ARMENIA, and has inaugurated additional Istanbul-Yerevan
commercial charter flights (twice weekly) but refuses to open
its border with ARMENIA before Yerevan recognizes the border.
However, continued GOT linkage of normalization of relations
with ARMENIA to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh has thwarted
an official breakthrough. MFA Caucasus Deputy DirGen Tezgor
continues to express MFA's concern to us that the U.S. has no
strategic plan for dealing with Russian and Iranian pressure.
Tezgor has hinted that Turkey would be forced to make its
own peace with Russian and Iranian interests absent any
coherent U.S. political strategy beyond completion of BTC and
standard expressions of support for democracy and resolution
of N-K. Erdogan's government is much less wedded than its
predecessors to Azerbaijan's ruling Aliyev family. GOT and
AK party officials tell us they recognize the potential trade
and development benefits to Turkey from opening the border.
The Caucasus Working Group will address specific mil-mil
cooperation in the Caucasus countries, but senior Washington
officials could usefully reaffirm the USG's desire to work
with Turkey in the region and to balance growing Russian and
Iranian influence. We could also commend the Turks for their
cooperation with us in Georgia's security assistance
programs. It will be important for Basbug to come away with
a clear view that the US has a policy and is relevant in this
region.


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EU ACCESSION
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9. (C) The Turkish Parliament has adopted seven EU-related
human rights reform packages over the past two years. The
legal amendments are designed to improve Turkish democracy,
increase individual freedoms, improve the rule of law, crack
down on torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly,
reduce the political influence of the National Security
Council, and expand religious freedom. The EU and other
outside observers have praised the reforms, while criticizing
the slow pace of implementation. Questions remain whether
the AK government will be able to implement these reforms
rapidly, particularly given the resistance from an openly
partisan President Sezer and those in the judiciary, military
and other areas of the state apparatus who are content with
the status quo. Nationalistic and status quo elements of the
military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized
some of the reforms as threats to national security, and have
resisted implementation. In some cases, bureaucratic offices
have drafted highly restrictive implementing legislation.
For example, Parliament lifted restrictions on Kurdish
language broadcasting, but the subsequent Radio and
Television Board regulation set strict time limits and
restricted such broadcasts to state-owned media outlets.
Despite GOT progress on human rights, EU officials have
repeatedly told the GOT that it will be difficult for the EU
at the December 2004 Summit to offer Turkey a date to begin
accession talks without better implementation or if there is
no settlement on Cyprus. We should leave Basbug without any
doubt about our commitment to Turkey's EU accession and to a
Cyprus settlement based on the Annan Plan.


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MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP
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10. (SBU) Turkey supports the Middle East Roadmap and has
exchanged a number of ministerial visits with Israel
recently; Erdogan and FonMin Gul have deferred visits owing
to disagreement over inclusion of a call on Arafat, who
remains the symbol of Palestine among Turks. Turkey prides
itself on its good relations with both Israelis and
Palestinians. While Turkey has close military, intel, and
commercial ties with Israel, the GOT is leery of getting too
far ahead of a Turkish populace that sympathizes with the
plight of the Palestinians.


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SYRIA AND IRAN
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11. (C) Turkey cautiously supports USG policy objectives in
Syria and Iran but worries that we will press for pre-emptive
action against both countries. Both the GOT and core
elements of the State argue that Turkey: 1) lives in a rough
neighborhood and has an interest in minimizing friction with
its neighbors; and 2) shares the same values and goals in the
Middle East as the U.S. (stability, democracy and
prosperity). In the latter regard, FonMin Gul delivered a
call for democracy and reform in the Islamic world at the
June OIC Summit in Tehran and has asserted to us that Turkey
is constantly delivering a message to the Syrians to
cooperate more with the U.S. Gul, heavily influenced by
foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu (who has a deeply
Islamist background),sees Syria as engaged in gradual
democratization, and the GOT thinks this process needs
encouragement. Turkey and Syria appear to be increasing
CBMs, with the GOT announcing in early November that it will
demine its border strip with Syria to increase trade and
human contact. The GOT has no enthusiasm for a policy of
overt pressure against Syria, although Turks remind us of the
value of engaging the Syrians constantly on issues of
concern. Washington officials might want to review our
concerns about Syrian behavior with Basbug.



12. (C) Turkey's relations with Iran bear the weight of
centuries of mutual suspicion, indeed antipathy, but the
current GOT appears intent on maintaining open dialogue with
Tehran. The GOT has declared it shares U.S. concerns about
reported Iranian WMD programs and has expressed support for
the U.S. initiative to bring Iran into conformity with IAEA
safeguards. However, officials also assert that too much
pressure (e.g. referring a finding of NPT non-compliance to
the UNSC) would undermine moderates in Tehran and strengthen
the position of Iranian hardliners, who believe that the West
will not be appeased and therefore should not be
accommodated. Turkish officials argue that Turkey has an
interest in minimizing friction with its neighbor. Intent on
maintaining at least cordial relations and loathe to upset
economic ties, despite Tehran's past record of support and
safe harbor to PKK terrorists, officials have continually
cautioned U.S. interlocutors that Iran is not easily changed
from outside; that the Azeris are well entrenched in Iranian
society, with considerable economic and political influence;
and that attempts to wreak regime change from abroad are
doomed to failure. Basbug should hear about our concerns
regarding Iran's WMD ambitions and support for terrorism.
EDELMAN