Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA7020
2003-11-07 21:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

HABUR GATE/IBRAHIM KAHLIL

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS ETRD ETTC TU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

072104Z Nov 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 007020 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS ETRD ETTC TU IZ
SUBJECT: HABUR GATE/IBRAHIM KAHLIL


REF: DTG 072104Z NOV 03


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 007020

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS ETRD ETTC TU IZ
SUBJECT: HABUR GATE/IBRAHIM KAHLIL


REF: DTG 072104Z NOV 03


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(b) and (d).



1. (C) In reftel CPA reacts to proposals for discussions
with Turkey on transit capacity on the Iraqi border. The
message rejects the Turkish proposal for a second gate
because it is "politically" motivated. As we view the issue,
the U.S. has a significant interest in improving the flow of
goods across the Turkish border into Iraq because: we are
using it to supply ourselves, we are using it to supply
necessary humanitarian supplies, and we want trade with Iraq
to grow as a contribution to normality. Furthermore there is
a prospect that we will want to use a line of communication
through Turkey to rotate troops and equipment, that would put
additional strain on this border crossing.



2. (C) It is clear to us that the only way to address this
continuing bottleneck is by engaging with the GOT in Ankara,
including but not uniquely on their preferred solution. A
joint effort among Turkey, Iraq and CPA/U.S. parties could
elaborate other solutions that would be more expeditious or
effective in the near term avoiding a misquided Turkish
political approach to the problem. However, engagement needs
to include the Turkish approach. Furthermore if we don't
push the Iraqi Ministries to engage and participate
aggressively ourselves, we can be sure that this problem will
only fester and limit our options and Iraq's future relations
with its northern neighbors.



3. (C) We therefore reiterate our recommendation that a
CPA/CJTF-7/Iraqi Ministry group engage with Ankara on
operations on the Iraq/Turkish border. We understand the
Iraqi Foreign and Interior Minister will accompany IGC
President Talibani to Turkey on November 19 and suggest that
is an appropriate target to opportunity to initiate a policy
review of this problem by all relevant actors.



4. (U) Baghdad minize considered.
EDELMAN