Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA7016
2003-11-10 14:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

NOVEMBER 18-19 US-TURKEY HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ AF ASEC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007016 

SIPDIS


OSD/ISA FOR A/ASD RICARDEL, DASD BRZEZINSKI AND L. HEALD;
DSCA FOR LT. GEN. WALTERS, J. FARMER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ AF ASEC
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 18-19 US-TURKEY HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP
(HLDG) MEETING: SCENESETTER


REF: ANKARA 6734


(u) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).


-------
SUMMARY
-------


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007016

SIPDIS


OSD/ISA FOR A/ASD RICARDEL, DASD BRZEZINSKI AND L. HEALD;
DSCA FOR LT. GEN. WALTERS, J. FARMER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ AF ASEC
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 18-19 US-TURKEY HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP
(HLDG) MEETING: SCENESETTER


REF: ANKARA 6734


(u) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).


--------------
SUMMARY
--------------



1. (C) The November 18-19 meeting of the U.S.-Turkey
High-Level Defense Group (HLDG) represents an opportunity to
achieve a number of important objectives: to solidify
dialogue between the US and Turkish militaries; to begin to
reshape our security relationship to the 21st century; and,
to emphasize how our cooperation is much broader than just
Iraq, despite Iraq,s enormous importance to both our
countries. This will not be an easy task, given the current
state of play on Turkey,s offer to contribute troops to the
stabilization force in Iraq. The GOT has expressed a desire
to enhance regional cooperation with the U.S. and sees the
HLDG as a key venue to begin doing so. During the HLDG
meeting and during TGS D/CHOD,s bilateral meetings in
Washington before and after the HLDG (septel),it will be
useful to share our vision of the way ahead in Iraq and
identify possible areas of security/military cooperation with
Turkey to help ensure that Turkey supports our larger policy
objectives. At the same time, we need to offer areas of
cooperation outside of Iraq (i.e., the Caucasus, Central Asia
and Afghanistan) that could serve as a useful basis to
rebuild mil-to-mil relations and help work toward a
successful NATO summit in Istanbul. While the Turks will have
to decide for themselves where and when it is in their
interest to support us, we have an interest in maintaining
strong bilateral ties with this key NATO ally.


--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------



2. (C) Our primary objectives during this year,s HLDG should
be three-fold: (1) renew the strong cooperation between the
U.S. and Turkish militaries and get military relations back
on track; (2) begin to reshape the US-Turkish security
relationship to the realities of the 21st century; and, (3)

to emphasize how our bilateral relationship is much broader
than just Iraq, despite Iraq,s enormous importance to both
our countries.



3. (C) Senior GOT officials across the board -- from FM Gul
and U/S Ziyal to TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok and D/CHOD GEN Basbug --
have expressed a desire to improve US-Turkish military
relations in the wake of military operations in Iraq, and see
the HLDG as a key venue for doing so. This will not be an
easy task. One of the leading advocates behind a Turkish
contribution to the stabilization force before the October 7
Parliamentary vote, the Turkish military saw Turkey,s
participation in Iraq as a way to protect Turkey,s national
interests and get back into the good graces of its key ally,
the United States. Our decision not to accept Turkey,s
offer at this time will be seen by many Turkish officials -)
the Turkish military in particular -) as further evidence
that the US places a greater priority on its relationship
with the Kurdish groups in the north than with a NATO ally of
more than 50 years. Our decision will also be interpreted as
a move by the US (and the Kurds) to keep the Turks out of
Iraq and therefore limit their influence there. Even the
most American-oriented officers regret they will not have the
opportunity to operate with us in the major palliative manner
they envisage in Iraq. Turkish CHOD GEN Ozkok has given
public vent to some of these feelings in an unusual public
interview in the newspaper RADIKAL.



4. (C) In this light, the HLDG can be a useful venue for
dialogue and an exchange of ideas between our two militaries.
We should engage the Turks on their plans for transformation
and help them see the advantages of developing more
deployable forces to participate in peacekeeping and
engagement activities. We should also use the HLDG to
identify future areas of cooperation that will help re-build
the trust and confidence that was shaken by events on March 1
and July 4. While areas where the Turkish military can
support our larger efforts in Iraq will be key to our ability
to mend fences and soften the blow of a &no thanks8 to the
Turkish offer of troops for Iraq, we should also propose
areas for cooperation outside of Iraq, including the
Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan. In the end, it will
be up the TGS and the rest of the GOT to decide where and
when cooperation with the US furthers Turkey,s national
interests. But it is in our interest to be transparent about
our intentions, outline where we are going, follow through on
commitments, and identify areas where Turkey can support our
larger objectives in the region.


--------------
HLDG: AGENDA AND PRESENTATIONS
--------------



5. (C) It is important to the outcome to show that we take
the HLDG seriously. In terms of substance, we offer the
following comments on the main agenda items:


--Turkish Concept Paper on U.S.-Turkish Defense Relationship:
This is one of the most important agenda items for TGS and
GEN Basbug personally has requested that it be included on
the agenda. At an earlier meeting of the HLDG, the U.S.
requested that the GOT provide a concept paper outlining
Turkey's vision of the future of the U.S.-Turkish defense
relationship. One of the main reasons why the U.S. side
requested the paper was to deflect the TGS's repeated
requests to re-negotiate the DECA, which we believe would be
a contentious and fruitless exercise. The paper, which was
presented to the US in January 2001, was drafted by the MFA
and cleared by TGS after almost two years of Turkish
interagency debate. During the 2002 HLDG working group
meetings in Germany, the US side agreed to respond to the
Turkish paper and TGS expects us to do so during this year,s
HLDG. TGS recently advised us that they intend to focus
their presentation on what they perceive to be the
shortcomings of the USG,s adherence to the Defense and
Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). The Turkish concept
paper will play prominently into this discussion.


We recognize the paper is dated and in many ways reflects the
same stale &business as usual8 approach advocated by the
Turks prior to March 1. However, we believe we should
formally respond. It would be useful for us to take the
opportunity to outline for GEN Basbug our vision of where we
want to take our defense relationship. Rather than
responding to the Turkish paper on a point-by-point basis, we
could outline our own vision of where we want the U.S.-Turkey
bilateral defense relationship to go, our expectations of
Turkey as an important ally, and what we are (and are not)
prepared to do in the way of assistance for Turkey. In this
context, we might encourage the Turks to think more deeply
about how to modernize their forces in ways that make them
more capable for peacekeeping and regional engagement
activities. While TGS may not be entirely pleased with our
response, we believe it preferable to be frank and honest
with the Turkish military at this stage of our relationship
and right-size Turkish expectations.


--Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): DASD Brzezinski,s
briefing on this subject during the December 2002 HLDG
working group meetings was well-received by TGS, and TGS is
looking forward to an update at this year,s HLDG. In our
view, the U.S. presentation should focus on our
accomplishments to date, what we are doing now, and where we
are heading in the future in the two key theaters of interest
for Turkey: Afghanistan and Iraq. When discussing
Afghanistan, we recommend that Washington outline where we
are on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),including
what offers we have from other nations. However, we
recommend against soliciting contributions from Turkey for
either ISAF or the PRTs, given TGS,s preoccupation with Iraq
and their September 2003 letter to CENTCOM stating they could
not provide additional forces to Afghanistan at this time.


--Cooperation in Iraq: Given the GOT,s desire to
rehabilitate its relations with us through cooperation in
Iraq and our decision to not accept their most significant
offer to date, we should identify areas where Turkey -- and
the Turkish military in particular )- can play a
constructive and meaningful role in stabilization and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including but not limited to
the training of Iraqi military officers and expansion of
capacity at the Turkish-Iraqi border. Our ability to make
good on the President,s commitment to rid Iraq of the
PKK/Kadek terrorist threat (through concrete actions and a
convincing game-plan that we can share with the Turks) is now
even more important to our efforts to secure Turkish support
for our overall Iraq policy. During the HLDG, TGS may press
for quicker, more concrete action on PKK/Kadek as a sign of
the President,s commitment to ridding the terrorist threat
from northern Iraq. They may also ask when/if they can
review U.S. military courses of action that have been
developed for addressing the PKK/KADEK threat.


--NATO Summit: The Turks have yet to outline a vision for
the Summit. The GOT is also looking to the US to provide our
ideas to help get them started (reftel). Given Turkey,s
current lack of a vision for the Summit and the fact that TGS
is not the lead GOT agency for the issue, we recommend that
we take the lead in discussing the issue and use the HLDG to
outline our vision and goals for the Summit. Such an
approach will help our efforts to shape the Summit,s agenda,
help the Turks with their preparations, and put the GOT on
notice that we are expecting big things to come out of
Istanbul.


--Caucasus Working Group: As part of our larger goal of
reshaping the US-Turkish security relationship outside of
Iraq, the HLDG could be a launching point to develop new
areas for cooperation in the Caucasus along the lines of
Georgia train and equip. This would help Turkey,s military
transform into a more deployable force for peacekeeping and
participation in NATO,s rapid deployment force. In
preparation for the November 17 CWG meeting, we recommend
that Washington identify concrete areas in the Caucasus where
the US and Turkey can work together and try to secure TGS,s
concurrence at the HLDG. Last year,s addition of Kazakstan
to the region covered by the CWG might provide some
opportunities for innovative cooperation that political
problems (e.g., Nagorno-Karabagh) in the Caucasus.


--Missile Defense: The Missile Defense Technical Experts
Group (TGS and MDA) last met in May in Colorado Springs. At
that meeting, Phase III of the joint architectural study was
approved and new areas of research and cooperation were
discussed, such as a sensor study, post attack damage
scenarios, and the NATO study. The GOT appears eager to hear
how the US plans to coordinate its own missile defense, its
efforts to have other countries buy in to a joint system, and
the NATO study. Because of the high cost of a missile
defense system, Turkey is waiting to see how it can reap the
benefits of a joint system before it commits to procuring its
own MD system.


--Technology Transfer: Turkey believes it deserves the same
status that we extend to Israel. Despite our positive track
record, there is a widespread and growing perception within
the GOT that the US places unnecessary restrictions on
technology transfer to Turkey, and that the US can and should
be more forthcoming in its dealings with Turkey. Rightly or
wrongly, the GOT has used what it perceives to be rigid US
policies to justify decisions to look elsewhere to meet their
technology needs. When the Turks raise this issue during the
HLDG, we recommend that Washington defend our record (with
facts),remind the military that there will be times when we
will not release our technology to any other nation
(including the UK and Israel),and illustrate how Turkey as a
NATO ally receives preferential treatment in the area of
technology transfer.


--Third-Country Sales and Training: Turkey does not desire to
be a country that simply purchases defense products from
others. Rather, it wants to supply other countries
(especially in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle
East) with defense-related products and services, including
training. Since the December 2002 HLDG working group
meetings, State,s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, in
conjunction with other agencies, has made progress in
approving some of the outstanding Turkish requests. We
recommend that Washington close out as many of the remaining
cases as possible before the HLDG as a sign of our continued
commitment to facilitating the GOT,s requests in a timely
manner.


Space: OSD/C3I initiated negotiations on a Space Agreement
(vice MOU) on defense-based cooperation with the Turkish Air
Force in Ankara September 23-24. The Turks were expectedly
disappointed that the agreement did not get into details such
as what imagery, equipment and training they were to get, but
eventually came to understand that this is the second step in
a three-step process. The Turks have committed to formally
responding to the agreement negotiated this week by December
1, after which Washington will decide if another round of
negotiations is necessary. The goal is to have a signing
ceremony at the time of the ATC meeting next March. We
understand that OSD/C3I will be prepared to brief on this
topic during the HLDG.


EDELMAN