Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA6499
2003-10-17 10:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

MFA DEPUTY U/S TUYGAN STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ PTER ASEC AF AR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006499 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, PM


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ PTER ASEC AF AR
SUBJECT: MFA DEPUTY U/S TUYGAN STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF
"GETTING IT RIGHT" ON POSSIBLE TURKISH CONTRIBUTION TO
STABILIZATION FORCE


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman. Reasons: 1.5 (B
and D).


-------
SUMMARY
-------


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006499

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, PM


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ PTER ASEC AF AR
SUBJECT: MFA DEPUTY U/S TUYGAN STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF
"GETTING IT RIGHT" ON POSSIBLE TURKISH CONTRIBUTION TO
STABILIZATION FORCE


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman. Reasons: 1.5 (B
and D).


--------------
SUMMARY
--------------



1. (C) MFA Deputy U/S Tuygan told Ambassador October 16 that
the GOT was grateful for the US assistance before and after
the recent bombing in front of the Turkish embassy in
Baghdad. Tuygan agreed that it was important for the US and
Turkey to manage and "get right" the issue of a possible
Turkish contribution to the stabilization force in Iraq.
Tuygan said that passage of the resolution before the UNSC
enhanced the stature of the IGC and increased the importance
of Turkey obtaining the GC's support before deploying troops
to Iraq. FM Gul's public call for the OIC to play a larger
role in Iraq is in part fueled by private criticism by some
OIC members of Turkey "going at it alone" in Iraq and
designed to press the OIC to take a more supportive role in
Iraq. Tuygan characterized statements by Kurdish leaders
that Turkey would not be permitted to deploy to Iraq through
the north as unhelpful, particularly given Turkey's past
support for the Kurds through Operation Northern Watch.
Turkey will continue to press Iran to cooperate fully with
the IAEA and the wider international community. Turkey would
like to remain engaged in Afghanistan and likely will direct
its limited resources to contributing to existing PRTs and
other areas where it can have an impact. If SYG Robertson
establishes a special representative for Afghanistan, Turkey
may put forward a candidate. Turkey remains open to improved
relations with Armenia but the GOA must make the first move
and recognize turkey's borders. End summary.


--------------
BOMBING IN FRONT OF TU EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD
--------------



2. (C) Ambassador called on MFA Deputy Under Secretary Ali
Tuygan October 16. He opened the meeting by expressing his

regrets for the recent bombing in front of the Turkish
embassy in Baghdad. Tuygan said Turkey was grateful for the
assistance provided by the US before (i.e. intel sharing) and
after the incident. "If the barriers had not been stationed
in front of the embassy, someone certainly would have died."
He personally thanked CPA Chief of Staff Kennedy for his
offer to provide temporary housing for the Turkish Ambassador
in Baghdad, whose residence received far greater damage than
initial reports had indicated.



3. (C) Tuygan said the GOT had decided to send a military
aircraft to Baghdad on Friday, October 18 to assess the
damage and determine a course of action to repair it. The
aircraft may need to remain on the ground in Baghdad longer
than what he understands to be the "maximum" of five hours,
and he requested the Embassy's assistance in securing the
necessary support and permission from US authorities in
Baghdad for the mission. (Comment: ODC/Turkey coordinated
this request with appropriate authorities that day. End
comment.) Tuygan said the aircraft may also transport back
some non-essential personnel stationed at the Turkish embassy
in Baghdad and some valuables (including antique paintings)
that cannot be safeguarded.



4. (C) Tuygan said that the GOT was watching other countries'
reactions to the bombing. In addition to the US, NATO, the
EU and the Greeks already had issued statements condemning
the bombing. Unfortunately, "others" (unspecified) were
using the bombing to stress the dangers associated with
Turkish troops deploying to Iraq, he said. Still others were
using the bombing to suggest that PKK/Kadek will be dealt
with.


--------------
IRAQ AND THE STABILIZATION FORCE
--------------



5. (C) Tuygan said the US and Turkey had been through a lot
during the last year. Mistakes had been made on both sides.
Now we are a critical point in the relationship. Tuygan
thought it was important for the US and Turkey "to get right"
the issue of a possible Turkish contribution to the
stabilization force in Iraq. The Ambassador added that it
was more important to get it right than to do it fast.
Tuygan concurred. Tuygan added that there were a number of
new elements in play, including the likely passage of a new
UNSCR on Iraq later that day (October 16). The new
resolution would elevate the status of the Governing Council
in Iraq and therefore make it more important for Turkey to
have the support of the GC before the Turks deploy troops to
Iraq, Tuygan argued. The Ambassador cautioned Tuygan against
Turkey's expecting a formal invitation from the GC. Tuygan
acknowledged that such a statement might be difficult.
Turning to Turkish-Iraqi relations, Tuygan said that Turkey
had underdone a transformation in the last year on Iraq and
the GOT wanted to help in Iraq in any way it could.



6. (C) Ambassador said that an important part of our combined
effort to manage the issue of a possible Turkish contribution
to Iraq involved the press. Recent press reports circulating
around Ankara that Turkey would have to contribute up to
50,000 troops were unhelpful and could complicate prospects
for a possible Turkish contribution. The Ambassador asked
Tuygan to work with us to manage the press. Tuygan agreed,
describing such press reports as "crazy." Tuygan said there
was one factor that, if left unattended, would complicate
Turkey's efforts on this front: further statements by
Kurdish officials that Turkish troops would not be permitted
to pass through the north en route to their area of operation
will cause the GOT problems with the Turkish public and
others in Turkey. Tuygan said he found the Kurds' position
particularly unhelpful, given Turkey's past support for the
Kurds in the form of more than 12 years of cooperation in
Operation Northern Watch.



7. (C) Tuygan described the recent visit by the CPA's
Greenstock to Turkey as useful. He said that Greenstock
arrived in Ankara with a more "rosy" picture of the overall
situation in Iraq than the prevailing view in Turkey, a
position that Tuygan acknowledged as not surprising given
that he had come from Iraq and therefore was more aware of
the positive developments there and anxious to share them.
Tuygan said that by the end of the visit, Greenstock and
Ziyal agreed there were a number of challenges that lie ahead.



8. (C) The Ambassador asked Tuygan if he could elaborate on
press reports suggesting that FM Gul had called for an
Islamic peacekeeping force for Iraq during the recent OIC
meeting in Malaysia. Tuygan said that he had not seen the
proposals that Gul had reportedly offered during the OIC
meeting. Until now the OIC had not come out in favor of
supporting stabilization efforts in Iraq, and a number of OIC
members were telling Turkish officials that Turkey should not
contribute troops to Iraq. Tuygan then outlined what he
believed was the reasoning behind the FM's public call for
the OIC to play a greater role in Iraq: "If you (the OIC
members) are not happy with Turkey going in alone to Iraq,
then why don't you go in with us?" Tuygan said that he had
heard from the Turkish delegation in Kuala Lumpur that the
OIC resolution may call on OIC members to make greater
contributions to reconstruction and stabilization efforts in
Iraq. If this were to occur, "this would be enough for us."




--------------
IRAN
--------------



9. (C) The Ambassador thanked Tuygan for Turkey's support at
the IAEA on Iran. Tuygan said that the GOI was not happy
with Turkey's position. That said, Turkey will continue to
insist in its discussions with the Iranians that there is
only one way out: full transparency and cooperation with the
IAEA and the wider international community. Tuygan said the
burden is on Iran to prove to the rest of the world that it
is cooperating.


--------------
AFGHANISTAN
--------------



10. (C) Tuygan said that Afghanistan remains important for
Turkey while acknowledging that it has lost some of its
significance as Iraq-related issues increase in importance.
He confirmed that Turkey intends to contribute civilian
personnel to the UK-led PRT in Mazar and that the idea of
Turkey leading its own PRT is still under discussion. In an
internal MFA discussion the previous day (October 15),
however, Tuygan said he recommended that for the time being
Turkey focus its attention and possible contributions in
Afghanistan on a limited number of sectors where it could
have a real and positive impact. Tuygan listed health and
agriculture as two possibilities, and said Turkey was
considering sending a couple of advisors to work with Afghan
authorities in these two areas. Tuygan said that he had
learned that the SYG Robertson was considering establishing
the position of a special representative for Afghanistan, and
that Turkey was considering putting forward a candidate.



11. (C) Tuygan said that in the past, Dostum had been
singled out by Tajik groups as a source of concern in
northern Afghanistan. From the beginning, Turkey has advised
Dostum to transform himself from a warlord into politician.
Tuygan acknowledged that such a transformation would not be
easy, but argued that Dostum was making an effort. Tuygan
said that Dostum is cooperating with Karzai and asked that
the US keep this in mind.


--------------
AZERBAJIAN AND ARMENIA
--------------



12. (C) Tuygan noted that initial reports suggested that PM
Aliyev had obtained a majority of the votes in Azerbajian's
Presidential elections. Tuygan said it was too early to tell
whether an Aliyev victory could have a positive impact on
Turkish-Armenian relations. He reiterated that FM Gul
remained committed to a trilateral meeting with his Azeri and
Armenian counterparts, and would likely continue to support
holding such a meeting in Turkey. Tuygan said he understood
that the Minsk Group had some new proposals for progress and
said Turkey would be interested in learning more about the
ideas. Tuygan insisted that Turkey was prepared to move
forward with Armenia, but the GOA first had to make a gesture
and move on recognizing Turkey's borders. Turkey and Armenia
have made good progress in their bilateral talks and said
that Turkish Airlines soon would begin flying to Yerevan.



13. (U) Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN