IRAQ: TURKISH ENVOY KARAOSMANOGLU SHARES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005930

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH ENVOY KARAOSMANOGLU SHARES
IMPRESSIONS FROM 3 WEEKS IN IRAQ - MIXED MESSAGES FROM
IRAQIS - NO DOUBT TURKISH TROOPS WOULD BE ATTACKED, US
TROOPS IMPRESSIVE


Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons 1.5 b and d.


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Summary
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1. (S) DCM met Sept. 17 with Turkish MFA Envoy Karaosmanoglu,
who spent three weeks in Iraqi in August/Sept. on a fact
finding mission to help the GOT determine whether to support
a Turkish troop contribution to a stabilization force in
Iraq. Karaosmanoglu said most Iraqis he met were opposed to
occupation forces in public and receptive to the idea of
Turkish troops in private. Karaosmaoglu believes that no
matter where and under what mantle the Turks deploy in Iraq,
they would be shot at, leading to tensions between Turkey and
Iraq, and possibly between Turkey and the US. Despite that,
he said he believed Turkey should send troops, but to a
sector far from Kurds, Turkmen and Iranians and one with a
low level of violence. He noted that he had not been asked
to recommend whether or where Turkish troops should deploy
and cautioned that he was regarded as a bete noire on Iraq
within the MFA. He had a number of suggestions for the
coalition (whose troops he praised as extremely professional
and proper) and CPA, including that they give Iraqis more
ownership of the situation, employ more Iraqis, intensify the
coordination between the military and CPA, and emphasize the
coming restoration of full sovereignty and the inviolability
of Iraq's borders. He warned against excluding tribal
leaders from Iraq's new structures and urged the CPA to find
a way to incorporate Ayatollah Sistani and his supporters.
End Summary.



2. (U) DCM called on MFA envoy Amb. Karaosmanoglu Sept. 17
for a readout of his recent three-week fact-finding mission
to Iraq. Karaosmanoglu expressed his gratitude to CPA and
CJTF-7 authorities in Baghdad, especially Amb. Bremer and LTG
Sanchez. He asked that we convey his "heartfelt appreciation
for the assistance and the welcome" extended to him and his
delegation. Karaosmanoglu also said he was struck by the
discipline and professionalism of US forces.


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Sistani is One Key to Iraq
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3. (C) Karaosmanoglu told us he had met more than 100 people
in 25 meetings during his trip, including some who may have
been involved in acts of resistance against the coalition.
He met with a variety of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians,
Sunni, and Shia, mostly in Baghdad, but also in Samarra and
Najaf. He also met with Governing Council member Ahmed
Chalabi and with Ayatollah Sistani. Karaosmanoglu said he
spoke at length with Sistani's son and advisor, Mohammed Reza
Sistani, who told Karaosmanoglu that he did not want a
secular or an Islamic state, "not like France, but more like
a "religious" US." Sistani strongly supported the unity of
Iraq. Karaosmanoglu said he could not overstate the
importance of incorporating Sistani into coalition efforts to
get Iraq back on its feet.


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Even if Welcomed, Turkish Troops Will Get Attacked
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4. (S) Turning to the question of how Turkish troops might be
received (a key point in the GOT's analysis about whether to
send Turkish troops),Karaosmanoglu said that some Iraqi
interlocutors who claimed in group meetings to oppose the
presence of foreign troops, in private were receptive to the
idea of a Turkish troop contribution, provided the Turks came
as peacekeepers, not occupiers, and preferably under a UN
mandate and not as part of a US force. Karaosmanoglu claimed
that 95-98 percent of the Iraqis he met were receptive to the
idea of Turkish troops, including non-KDP and non-PUK Kurds.



5. (S) Karaosmanoglu told us he had come to the conclusion
that even if Turkish troops were widely welcomed, they would
be attacked by someone, somewhere. Inevitable Turkish
casualties would then lead to tensions between Turkey and the
Iraqi people, and perhaps between Turkey and the US.
However, if Turkey decided not to send troops, it would be at
odds with US. Whether Turkey decides to send troops or not,
any US failure in Iraq would become Turkey's failure, he
said. The DCM replied that if Turkey decided not to send
troops, it would be letting others determine Turkey's risks.
Karaosmanoglu then said that he had not been asked for a
recommendation on this, but if asked he would support a
Turkish deployment, but to the right sector - not near Kurds
or Turkmen or Iranians - where there is the least violence.
He also said any Turkish deployment should try to learn from
the coalition forces mistakes (especially regarding issues of
cultural sensitivity). If Turkey were to send troops and
experience failure in Iraq, he said, it would be a disaster
for the GOT.



6. (S) Karaosmanoglu said his delegation noticed there were
Iranians all over, including some who reportedly tailed the
Turkish delegation. He reported that Ba'ath activists he met
said that they did not have a single leader to unite them.
Karaosmanoglu said that it was a mistake to consider all
Ba'athists bad guys, though some no doubt were. He said much
of Iraq's mischief was being made by Wahabbists, including
non-Iraqis. Most Iraqis Karaosmanoglu met, he said, were not
anti-US, although many were opposed to the US Administration.
He urged that the US take measure to retain the support of
Iraq's secular, western-oriented society. If we failed to do
so, it would be a disaster, he said. In this regard, CIMIC
activity was critical.


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Iraqis Fear Civil War, Partition
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7. (C) Karaosmanoglu, who had also visited Iraq in May, said
there was more of a war atmosphere during his August/Sept.
trip (note: in May he was mostly in the more stable north,
while this time he was mainly in Baghdad). However, he noted
that some improvements were readily apparent, especially the
visible presence of Iraqi police. He said that in his
conversations with Iraqis, they told him they felt the
situation was on a razor's edge, and could lead to either
civil war or partition. There was a great contradiction in
the average position between rejection of occupation and
recognition that coalition forces were needed to prevent
chaos. Tribal chiefs he met said they did not think that US
troops would survive the Iraqi summer. When they did, the
chiefs were surprised and admired the Americans' tenacity.


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Karaosmanoglu Suggestions for CPA/CJTF-7
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8. (C) Karaosmanoglu had a number of suggestions for CPA and
CJTF-7 based on his observations. He said that the CPA
should employ more Iraqis, including hiring ex-generals who
had been dissidents and giving them positions of authority.
He recommended that the CPA make more of an effort to give
Iraqis ownership of the situation. He advocated developing
regional CBMs to build bonds across borders with Arab
neighbors whom the Iraqis view with great suspicion. He
stressed the importance of accommodating the tribal system
and enfranchising the tribes in the new Iraq. He opined that
there was a need for more military-CPA coordination. He
suggested that the US start a sister-city/school twinning
program with cities and schools in Iraq. Finally, he noted
(reflecting the national Turkish preoccupation with Iraq)
that the Iraqis' main concern was partition. He said we
should counter that concern by emphasizing the path to full
sovereignty and the non-violability of Iraqi borders.



9. Comment: Karaosmanoglu is thoughtful, pragmatic and
cautiously optimistic. He advocates a Turkish approach to
Iraq that gets away from the past obsession with the north,
the possibility of a Kurdish state and the KDP and PUK.
Perhaps for these reasons, he is viewed by others at the MFA
with some skepticism. By his own account, he was not asked
for his views on whether or not Turkish troops should deploy
to Iraq, and doubts he will be asked to remain involved in
Iraqi affairs at the MFA.



10. (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered.
EDELMAN