NEW AIR FORCE CHIEF TAKES TOUGH TACK ON INCIRLIK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005728

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2013
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: NEW AIR FORCE CHIEF TAKES TOUGH TACK ON INCIRLIK,
F16 EW SUITE


REF: ANKARA 4498


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman. Reasons 1.5 B and

D.



1. (C) SUMMARY: New Air Chief Gen Ibrahim Firtina took a
surprisingly aggressive approach on a range of issues at the
AMB's introductory call 9/8. First, he surprised us by
re-opening the F16 EW suite issue which his predecessor had
agreed to (reftel). Then he implied that the US was lucky
Turkey allows the US to use the "unique" Incirlik. At the
same time, Firtina implored the US to provide the "penniless"
Turkish Air Force with a missile defense system and new
fighter trainer aircraft. Firtina also repeatedly indicated
that he wanted to raise these issues with USAF COS Gen Jumper
(undoubtedly at the 9/11-21 Global Air Chiefs' Conference,
which Firtina will attend). End summary.



2. (C) Also surprisingly, Firtina was alone, without even a
notetaker. He began the meeting with the claim that Turkey
was, and is, providing "full support" to the US on Iraq. He
therefore couldn't understand US criticism. But the
relationship is not a "one-way street." Throughout the
meeting, he repeatedly stated his preference for working
with, and buying from, the US. Space, weapons training at
Konya Range, depot-level aircraft maintenance, (Firtina noted
the number of US-compatible airframes and the capabilities of
the TUAF to provide maintenance for them which would be
mutually beneficial),JSF, and "tri-coordination" with the
Israelis are just some of the potential areas. Arms sales is
another. But the US would have to give Turkey "special
treatment" in order to preserve this relationship.



3. (C) F-16 EW DEAL UNRAVELLING?: While we thought SAF/IA
Deputy Maj Gen Gration had solved this problem in mid-July
(reftel),Firtina again made it clear he did not consider the
tech transfer issue solved. In the aggressive but imploring
tone he took throughout the meeting, Firtina said he was
unhappy with his predecessor Asparuk's agreement to Maj Gen
Gration's terms ("Asparuk is out. I am in.") Saying he
could not explain the US restrictions to the Turkish public
(NOTE: This is far from the public's radar scope. End note).
He implored AMB to go back to the USAF and explain why Turkey
is "special." Firtina repeatedly threatened to take this and
other issues to "his friend" Gen Jumper. But toward the end
of the F-16 discussion, Firtina's tone softened ("If the US
could do this, it would be nice." "We obviously can't start
over from scratch -- it will take four years to install, and
the Block 50's are already halfway through their useful
life.") AMB said he had thought the TUAF had agreed to the
deal arranged with Maj Gen Gration. This turnaround is
surprising. He would ask SAF/IA for its view.



4. (C) WE NEED U.S. HELP ON SPACE AND MD COOPERATION:
Firtina was eager to move ahead in these two areas, but he
again implied Turkey expected the US to foot the bill. He
said he had not yet received the letter from ASD Stenbit
indicating the US is ready to start negotiations with the
TAFC on a space MOU in late October. Firtina is ready to
move forward on this. India had recently visited Turkey to
discuss space cooperation, but "we want to work with the US.
We only talk to others as a courtesy. You must help us build
a program." On MD, AMB mentioned German Patriots which were
available and appeared to be a good buy. When Firtina heard
they were not PAC-3's, he was not interested. One consistent
Firtina theme was Turkey's need for systems that would help
the future of the TUAF, and not older equipment, thus the
desire for the most modern MD and other items (like T-6
trainer aircraft).



5. (C) WE WANT THE RAYTHEON T-6 TRAINER, BUT OUR POCKETS ARE
EMPTY: When AMB mentioned that Raytheon officials had told
him they wanted to sell the TUAF T-6 "Texan" flight training
aircraft to replace Turkey's aging T-37's, Firtina said he
was interested. He even wanted to move up the decision
timeline. But "I checked my pockets, and they're empty."
Nevertheless, he said, Raytheon should "find a way" to
finance the sale. AMB said Raytheon would want to discuss
this with the Turks, if Turkey is serious about buying the
T-6. But obviously Raytheon can't give it away.



6. (C) INCIRLIK IS YOURS: When AMB asked how Firtina saw the
future of Incirlik, he answered, "Incirlik is yours. We hear
rumors you are considering other places, but Incirlik is
unique. It's irreplaceable. We've given you the opportunity
to use it -- you must enjoy it."



7. (C) AIRSOUTH AT IZMIR -- TELL US WHAT YOU NEED: When AMB
mentioned that Turkey would have to cooperate with the US on
schooling and force protection issues if Turkey wanted the US
to change its unaccompanied policy for Izmir after NATO's Air
Component Command moved there under the new command
structure, Firtina said that should be no problem. "Just
tell me what you need."



8. (C) COMMENT: As mentioned above, Firtina indicated he
would take these same issues up with Gen Jumper. While he
didn't mention it specifically, Gen Firtina will be attending
the Global Air Chiefs' Conference 9/11-21 and will
undoubtedly try to use that opportunity. On the F-16 EW
issue, we suspect Firtina is not serious about letting the
Gration deal unravel and is simply trying one last time to
exact the source codes his predecessor couldn't. Firtina
gave the distinct impression the opportunity to bargain still
existed for the EW system. He also opted to take a tougher
line than his predecessor. This could indicate a couple of
things. First, the source code issue is certainly not linked
to this system alone, and any success in "getting more" would
provide a precedent the Turks would then use for a number of
other items on the table (ATAK helicopter, UAV, etc).
Second, there may be linkage to the issue of Turkish troop
deployments to Iraq. With the perceived US need for troops
to support our mission there, the Turkish military may see
any troop contribution to the stabilization force as leverage
on a broader scale for other "strategic partnership" issues,
such as arms sales. Although Iraq was not a topic of
discussion, the Turkish military is inclined to see what, if
any, offer of "special" support they may garner. End
comment.
EDELMAN