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2003-08-27 07:57:00
Embassy Ankara
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						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005449 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2013

REF: STATE 245961

(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, reasons 1.5, b/d.

1. (C) Summary: MFA DG for International Security Affairs
Morali gave DCM August 26 a detailed readout of the visit of
Iranian National Security Council Deputy SYG Hussein Mousavin
(spelled Museviyan in the Turkish press) August 25.
According to Morali, Mousavin told his Turkish interlocutors
that the Iranian NSC had fought a difficult, internal battle
over the last two months to legitimize Iran's nuclear program
through increased transparency and cooperation with the IAEA.
In addition, Iran stated its readiness to sign the
Additional Protocol. Mousavin came to Ankara to solicit
Turkey's support at the Sept. 8 IAEA Board of Governors
meeting, claiming that a finding of noncompliance would
bolster hard-liners in Iran who believed cooperation and
transparency were pointless. Morali said the GOT delivered
to Mousavin an "unequivocal" message that Iran must
completely disavow its pursuit of self-sufficient nuclear
capability in order to regain international confidence if it
hoped to access to nuclear technology in the future. DCM
delivered reftel points to Morali, emphasizing that Iran's
recent cooperation with IAEA was due primarily to its having
been caught trying to deceive the IAEA and international
community. Morali noted that Turkey's position at the BOG
would likely follow that of the EU, and he asked what
Russia's position was, speculating that a finding of
noncompliance would spell the end of a huge market for
Russia. End Summary.

2. (C) MFA DG for International Security Affairs Morali met
August 26 with the DCM to provide a detailed readout of the
previous day's visit of Iranian National Security Council
Deputy SYG Hussein Mousavin. Morali said Mousavin, who was a
US- and UK-trained engineer as well as former Iranian
ambassador to Germany, had met with Deputy U/S Sensoy
followed by a short call on FM Gul. Morali found it
interesting that Mousavin had come from Iran alone, "without
watchdogs," although the Iranian charge accompanied him to
meetings. Mousavin had explained that the Iranian NSC had
worked a "miracle" in the last two months pursuing a policy
of transparency and full cooperation with the IAEA on the
basis of NPT obligations and had disavowed any intent to
divert its nuclear program for military purposes. The NSC
had decided that the military nuclear option had no place in
Iranian defense policy, and Mousavin reminded the GOT that a
"fatwa" had been declared against WMD several years ago.
However, a balance must be struck between rights and
obligations -- Iran should not only abide by its NPT
obligations but should also have the right to enjoy nuclear
technology for peaceful uses. Mousavin complained that,
while full compliance was expected from NPT signatories,

there was no reciprocity in allowing NPT signatories full
access to nuclear technologies for peaceful uses. Many in
Iran believed this "one-way street" was discriminatory and
worried that the implementation of the Additional Protocol
would also be discriminatory. Mousavin said if, despite its
recent transparency and cooperation, Iran was found
noncompliant at the Sept. 8 BOG meeting, Iranian hard-liners
would argue that Iran's isolation was inevitable, and Iran
should pursue its own national security goals. In this
environment, Iran's new policy of transparency and
cooperation was a true accomplishment, which Mousavin hoped
would be bolstered by acknowledgment and encouragement from
friends like Turkey at the BOG meeting. Mousavin expressed
concern that the BOG meeting would be politicized by the US,
saying any compromise of the "dignity and security" would be
counterproductive and lead to "all other options being
considered" by Tehran (e.g. withdrawal from the NPT).

3. (C) Mousavin told the Turks the August 10-13 IAEA
inspection team had been extended cooperation beyond that
required by the NPT. He said the Kalaye Electric site had
been inspected, as well as Hashef (NFI). The three sites
identified by the MEK: the "farm," the chocolate factory and
one other site had all been inspected without notice. The
Natanz plant had been fully inspected three times, and spare
parts were allowed to be taken away for testing. According
to Mousavin, the radiation levels at Natanz were
"insignificant" and far from enrichment process levels. He
claimed this radiation was merely contamination from foreign
sources. The Kalaye site had no imported materials that
could be contaminated, but Mousavin was confident the tests
from there would come back negative. He noted that the
chronology of Iran's nuclear program and the acquisition of
centrifuge spare parts had been fully explained to the
inspectors. After the inspection visit, the GOI wrote a
letter to IAEA DG El Baradei informing him of Iran's
readiness to begin official negotiations for signing the
Additional Protocol.

4. (C) Mousavin noted that Iran was prepared to begin with
bilateral confidence building that could be broadened
regionally. He reiterated that because of Iran's internal
difficulties, adopting a negative position on Iran at the
Sept. 8 BOG meeting would be counterproductive, and
everything the moderates had been able to achieve would be
jeopardized. If the BOG took a positive stance, the NSC's
strategy would not be questioned. Morali said Mousavin
seemed to be looking forward to the BOG meeting and was
optimistic that the August 27 report would cast Iran's recent
activities in a very good light. Mousavin added that signing
the Additional Protocol would be easier if there were some
assurances that after signing, ratifying and implementing the
agreement, there would be no discrimination. Furthermore,
joining a regime of intrusive inspections created a "secrecy
problem." These were not preconditions nor delaying tactics,
as Iran was serious in its determination sign the Additional
Protocol, but merely concerns. Mousavin also expressed
concern about US and German indications that
signing/ratifying/implementing the Protocol would not be
enough. He wondered what would be enough. Iran would have
to hold out in negotiations to find out what ALL of the US
expectations were before signing.

5. (C) Morali said Dep U/S Sensoy was "unequivocal" that Iran
needed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, emphasizing that
Iran needed to take concrete steps to overcome the lack of
confidence in Iran's intentions. He welcomed the NSC's
recommendations, but noted that, even if Iran continues on
the road of NPT compliance, Iran should not expect access to
nuclear technologies until trust in Tehran is reestablished.
Sensoy cautioned against withdrawing from the NPT, as such
action would destroy all chances of cooperation and ensure
Iran's isolation. Iran should sign the Additional Protocol
without conditions and ratify and implement it without delay.
Sensoy cited a need for the region to use this transition
period to create an area of stability based on respect for
obligations under international instruments. He noted that
Turkey's policy was not singling out Iran; it had asked
Israel, Pakistan and India many times to accede to the NPT,
noting that even as non-signatories they would not be granted
nuclear state status.

6. (C) Morali encouraged Iran to do something "concrete and
dramatic" to regain international confidence. He said there
was a perception that Iran had a secret program and was
pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in nuclear technology
(i.e. exploiting and enriching its own uranium resources).
Morali recommended that Iran declare the suspension of all
enrichment programs and arrange with Russian for the supply
of fuel as well as the return of spent fuel for Iran's energy
programs. Self-sufficiency was an irreversible situation
that would ensure unending pressure on Iran. He told the
Iranian that Iran needed to help Turkey help Iran. Mousavin
responded that Iran needed strategic nuclear depth because of
the danger that Busher might be "taken out." (sic)

7. (C) The DCM delivered reftel points, noting that our
perception of Iranian cooperation and transparency differed
drastically than Mousavin had described. He noted that in
addition to signing the Additional Protocol, Iran needed to
explain many of the questions that had arisen as its nuclear
program became apparent. DCM added that Iran should be party
to the NPT not because it ensure access to technology but
because we all benefit from the security rendered by the
treaty; there was no inherent guarantee of access to
technology. When asked if Turkey had begun formulating a
position for the BOG in anticipation of the IAEA report due
out August 27 Morali said that Turkey's EU aspirations would
likely compel it to follow the EU lead. But he wondered
aloud what Russia's plans were given the large market it
would likely lose if a finding of noncompliance were reported
to the UNSC.

8. (C) Comment: Morali, who also served as Turkey's
ambassador to Iran, seemed encouraged by Iran's recent
cooperation and transparency efforts. Morali argued that
Iran's MFA and Min. of Interior were often more enlightened
than other GOI elements, implying that they should thus be
supported. The GOT is awaiting the report before it decides
on its stance for the BOG meeting.