TURKISH TROOPS FOR IRAQ: GOT NEEDS TO SHOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004851

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, NEA AND NEA/NGA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH TROOPS FOR IRAQ: GOT NEEDS TO SHOW
PUBLIC/PARLIAMENT BROAD COOPERATION

(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert Deutsch.
Reasons: 1.5 (B and D).


--------------
Summary
--------------



1. (S) In separate meetings July 30 with MFA Deputy U/S Baki
Ilkin and PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, Charge was told that
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister want a Turkish troop
deployment to Iraq, but must take to Parliament any decision
to deploy troops to Iraq. In an effort to get to yes while
limiting political risk of another long public debate, the
GOT hopes to bring the issue to Parliament when the time is
suitable for a speedy discussion of the motion, which will
require creating an environment in which the Turkish public
and Parliament see that the troop deployment as one piece of
a much broader US-Turkey partnership to stabilize Iraq,
including significant political, reconstruction and
anti-PKK/KADEK activity. Both Ilkin and Davutoglu called FM
Gul's Washington trip successful and noted Gul had briefed
the cabinet on his return concerning a possible Turkish troop
deployment. Davutoglu noted that unlike the divisive cabinet
discussions before the war, this briefing was well-received
and did not elicit any negative discussion. Ilkin said that
the TGS would want a green light from the GOT, which they did
not have, before considering even preliminary
military-to-military talks. He noted that trying to rush a
Turkish decision on the troop deployment would be
counter-productive. Ilkin also complained about a Turkish
press story that, following the passage of the reintegration
law, the US planned to send top PKK/KADEK operatives to
Scandinavian countries. He said failure to refute such
misinformation and demonstrate real cooperation against the
PKK/KADEK could color the troop deployment debate. He added
that the GOT was keen for elements of cooperation to begin
asap. End Summary.


-------------- --------------
GOT To Take To TGNA When Broad Partnership More Evident
-------------- --------------



2. (S) In separate July 30 meetings with the Charge, MFA
Deputy Undersecretary Ilkin and PM Advisor Prof. Ahmet
Davutoglu used similar points concerning the need for the GOT
to bring the matter of a possible Turkish troop deployment to
Iraq before the Parliament. They said it would be critical,
in gaining Parliamentary approval and public support, for the
deployment to be viewed by Turks as only one part of a much
broader partnership with the US in the restoration of Iraqi
stability, the development of the Iraqi political system, and
in Davutoglu's words, the normalization of everyday life for
the people of Iraq. It was with this in mind that the Turks
had submitted to the US their list of non-military
assisstance proposals, the response to which, they said, was
generally positively received by the Turkish side. Davutoglu
went further and said the response would be helpful in
demonstrating that the Turkish contribution would not be only
or predominantly military. Ilkin said that as the public saw
that Turkey was working with the US to build a new Iraq
economically and politically, domestic support for a Turkish
troop deployment would increase. If the military deployment
was seen as Turkey's sole or primary contribution, it would
be hard to get through Parliament. Overall, he said, "we are
on course. The FM is aware of the urgency. The AK Party and
the cabinet both need to discuss the matter in detail...What
we need now is a political decision." Davutoglu said that
the FM Gul had briefed the cabinet on a possible Turkish
deployment when he returned from Washington, that unlike
before the war, the cabinet was not divided or negative in
response, but that at this point, the matter was only at the
stage of being discussed in principle by the cabinet.


-------------- --------------
Positive Steps By US on PKK/KADEK Will Help Move Troop Issue
-------------- --------------



3. (S) Davutoglu said that the GOT did not want to risk a
repeat of what happened on March 1, and therefore had crafted
a different approach. Rather than concentrate on northern
Iraq, Turkey now views the country as a whole and underscores
that the US and Turkey share deep common interests in the
territorial integrity and stability of Iraq. In northern
Iraq, he said, the key was the future of the PKK/KADEK. The
GOT would not be able to explain to the Turkish public why
its troops were in Baghdad and the west if the PKK/KADEK
problem remained in the north. Positive steps by the US on
PKK/KADEK issues in the coming days and weeks would help, he
said. Davutoglu also repeated the Turkish request that
Iraq's Governing Council invite Turkey to send troops, as
this would create the impression that the Iraqi people were,
in part, the demandeur and would allow the GOT to argue that
Iraqis want the Turkish military contribution.


-------------- -
TGS Will Wait For GOT OK To Hold Mil-Mil Talks
-------------- -



4. (S) When Charge asked Ilkin if the GOT had considered
entering military-to-military talks on an exploratory basis,
noting that CENTCOM was ready for such discussions, Ilkin
replied that the TGS needs a green light from the GOT, which
it did not now have, before starting such talks. Ilkin
added, "I would wait until I got a signal from the GOT...my
advice is please, do not rush this. The last time you rushed
us and it was counterproductive. We couldn't deliver. There
should be a GOT consensus one way or the other first."


--------------
Rumor of Asylum in Norway Has Turks Concerned
--------------



5. (S) Ilkin raised a story that ran in the July 30 edition
of Hurriyet newspaper, that would be taken up again in a CNN
Turk TV interview the night of July 31, claiming that there
was a secret plan for 100 of the top leaders would be sent to
Scandinavia as political asylum seekers. Ilkin asked that
the Embassy refute this story, as the GOT would be questioned
about it. As long as some were able to create a public
portrayal of the US as soft on the PKK/KADEK, there would be
a negative impact on the possible troop deployment. He said
it would be easier for the GOT to get public support if the
process toward troop deployment started with successful
cooperation on PKK/KADEK.



6. (S) Charge noted that the State Department had made a
public statement welcoming the passage of the reintegration
law, that U/S Grossman had been interviewed on the subject by
CNN Turk and had said that the US would cooperate with Turkey
to eliminate the PKK/KADEK. We would need to work together
with Turkey on information operations in northern Iraq to
inform people of the new law and to have a full information
exchange on PKK/KADEK to move operations to the next step.
Ilkin said that the GOT was told that as soon as the law was
enacted there would be discussions between the MFA and the
State Dept. He was eager for those discussions to be
arranged. Davutoglu also stressed that the PKK/KADEK
operatives were to Turkey like al Qaeda was to the US, and
that the GOT wanted them turned over to Turkey. He called
the State Department statement on the new reintegration law
"very positive." Charge stressed that the GOT had a
commitment from the USG that we would cooperate with Turkey
to eliminate the PKK/KADEK.


--------------
Political Environment Today
--------------



7. (C) Pro-deployment voices are greatly outnumbered in
Turkey, particularly in the aftermath of March 1 and the
increase in anti-US sentiment in Turkey since the war. The
already inhospitable atmosphere took a turn for the worse
after the July 4 Sulaymaniyah incident and a massive anti-US
media campaign. Turkish press commentary now portrays a
damaged US-Turkey relationship heading toward another crisis
over the possible Turkish deployment with both sides making
the same mistakes: alleged USG insensitivity to the political
difficulties involved; and on the Turkish side, an
exaggerated view of Turkey's strategic importance, leading to
inflated expectations of USG "concessions" for Turkey's
support. Two of the negative influences from March 1,
President Sezer, who stressed "international legitimacy," and
Parliamentary speaker Arinc, who emphasized the public's
negative sentiment, have already raised their voices. In
short, the picture is of a Turkey about to overplay its hand
again. MFA spokesman Dirioz told us privately that the huge
pro-establishment Dogan media empire has decided to support a
possible Turkish deployment. Dogan's track record, however,
suggests it will continue to play both sides of the divide.
While the last few days demonstrate the GOT is trying to mold
the public discussion in a more positive direction, the
pressure of domestic issues and sentiment will make it
difficult.


--------------
Comment
--------------



8. (C) Althought the PM, FM, MFA officials and the TGS Chief
have privately expressed their intention to find a way for
Turkey to participate in the stabilization force in Iraq, we
are not yet seeing leadership from the elected politicians,
bureaucrats or military leaders necessary to shape public
opinion and outflank the vocal opponents. We expect that the
GOT will use the upcoming two-month legislative recess to
assess the Iraq stabilization process including the PKK/KADEK
issue, the developments in Iraq's political and economic
reconstruction, as well as Turkey's ability to participate.
(Note: The Parliament could return in extraordinary session
if circumstances warrant. End note.) The AK government will
also want to see whether TGS Chief Ozkok, with whom Erdogan
has a modus vivendi, can promote into key leadership posts in
August more like-minded generals. In short, while the ball
is in Turkey's court, we can help get them to yes on a troop
contribution by creating a broader sense of commitment to the
partnership they seek in non-military sectors and on the
PKK/KADEK issue as a matter of priority.
DEUTSCH