Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA4376
2003-07-11 13:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

(C) DEFENSE MINISTER GONUL SUSPICIOUS OF MILITARY

Tags:  PREL TU IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004376 

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2013
TAGS: PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: (C) DEFENSE MINISTER GONUL SUSPICIOUS OF MILITARY

REF: ANKARA 4355


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reasons 1.5
B and D.


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004376

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2013
TAGS: PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: (C) DEFENSE MINISTER GONUL SUSPICIOUS OF MILITARY

REF: ANKARA 4355


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reasons 1.5
B and D.



1. (C) Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul has consistently been one
of the most responsible members of the ruling AK government.
In the run-up to the failed March 1 vote, he argued within AK
governing circles for cooperation with the US. Throughout
the tense period that followed, he has always placed top
priority on repairing the relationship.



2. (C) In the Ambassador's 7/10 farewell office call, Gonul
was true to form. He did not raise a single objection to the
US operation against Turkish special forces in northern Iraq,
and it was clear that there was no doubt in his mind that
some documents within the Turkish military special forces had
been up to no good. He talked only of the values Turkey and
the US shared and the longstanding friendship between
governments and peoples that could not be ruined by either
March 1 or the detention of Turkish troops. He stressed that
he had worked hard to prevent the former.



3. (C) While admitting that explanations of the failed vote
and its aftermath were unproductive, Gonul did his best to
put the best light on PM Erdogan's behavior. Just after
becoming PM 3/14, Erdogan noticed that no Turkish minister
was slated to attend the American-Turkish Council conference
in Washington starting two days later. He asked Gonul to
attend. During the ATC, Gonul was unexpectedly asked to meet
with SECDEF, who, Gonul said, asked for overflight
permission. Gonul then called Erdogan, who told Gonul to
offer either overflight or another motion for stationing of
US troops. According to Gonul, SECDEF declined the offer of
a further motion. Gonul then explained how he, the PM and
CHOD Ozkok had worked hard to subdue hard-line elements
within the government, Parliament and military who wanted to
deny overflight as long as Turkish troops were under American
pressure not to cross the Turkish border and enter norther
Iraq.



4. (C) In a further effort to ease the most recent tension
with the US, Gonul brought in an usually large press
contingent (after asking the Ambassador's permission) at the
end of the farewell call. Prior to calling them in, Gonul
had asked the Ambassador to speak to the the ongoing mil-mil
joint fact-finding discussions in Ankara, which he did.
Gonul agreed with the Ambassador that the joint team should
ascertain all the facts and find a way to avoid further
incidents.



5. (C) At a small dinner that evening Gonul hosted in honor
of the Ambassador and attended by key AK Party members Cuneyt
Zapsu, Reha Denemec, Yasar Yakis and Vahit Erdem, Gonul
described with some enthusiasm how the AK-dominated
Parliament intended to pass the seventh reform package before
adjourning at the end of the month. In addition to replacing
the four-star secretary general of the NSC with a civilian,
the package would put all defense spending on-budget and thus
under Parliament's control. He appeared to take special
pride in the fact that he had drafted that section of the
package.
PEARSON