TURKEY TRYING TO SUPPORT THE MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003787

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2013
TAGS: PREL IS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY TRYING TO SUPPORT THE MIDDLE EAST ROADMAP


REF: ANKARA 3507


Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).



1. (C) Since late May, numerous meetings with GOT officials
and press reports suggest Turkey is seeking to develop a
constructive approach on Middle East issues, offering to host
an MEPP (and a separate OIC) conference in Turkey and sending
appropriate, reform-minded messages to Iran and Syria
(reftel). PM Erdogan recently spoke with Israeli PM Sharon
and Palestinian PM Abu Mazen to encourage them to pursue
their peace efforts and to indicate Turkey's willingness to
assist. In response, Israeli PM Sharon indicated an interest
in arranging a Roadmap meeting in Turkey.



2. (C) In recent meetings with us, Erdogan, FM Gul, and TGS
Chief Gen. Ozkok, indicated that Turkey wants to work with
the U.S. in the Middle East. Israeli foreign and defense
ministers recently visited Turkey while President Katzav is
expected here in July. Announcement of a pending visit to
the region by Gul, with a follow-on visit this autumn by
Erdogan currently under discussion, comes as MFA
Undersecretary Ambassador Ugur Ziyal visits Washington to
discuss ways to rebuild the U.S.-Turkey relationship. In a
recent public address, FM Gul stressed the GOT's intention to
continue good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and
contribute to the process toward peace.


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The Roadmap and the Arafat Question
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3. (C) Nevertheless, there are still some discordant notes.
GOT officials balk at freezing out Arafat, whom they still
regard as the democratically elected head of the Palestinian
"state." The immediate effect of this is a Turkish impulse
to consider meetings not only with GOI officials and Abu
Mazen, but Arafat as well. Gul's Special Advisor at the MFA
Gurcan Turkoglu told us it is important to maintain Abu
Mazen's support among Palestinians and not create a separate
pole of support around Arafat through strict isolation.



4. (C) We have let our political and MFA contacts know
clearly a meeting with Arafat would be seen negatively by the
USG. The Turkish response has been ambiguous. Publicly
unraveling the GOT dilemma, Muharrem Sarikaya, a leading
columnist in the establishmentarian "Hurriyet" newspaper,
wrote that Turkey "could not exclude Arafat from the peace
process, but hoped he would withdraw" on his own accord.


-- In a recent meeting with us, MFA Middle East DG Safak
Gokturk replied that Turkey is aware of USG concerns but will
"do what (it) will do."


-- Other conversations suggest the new perspective from above
may not yet have filtered down to others. Ruling AK Party
M.P.s queried whether it would be feasible to meet Abu Mazen
and Arafat simultaneously; Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, the
government's spokesman, expressed surprise to us about that
the U.S. would react negatively if Turkish leaders visited
Arafat.


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Comment
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5. (C) Turkey wants to work with the USG on regional issues.
Nevertheless, the difficulty with changing traditional views
of Arafat reflects Turkey's own calculations about realities
on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza.
PEARSON