Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA3509
2003-05-30 07:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: CHP TAKES A TACTICAL VIEW OF REFORM

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003509 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHP TAKES A TACTICAL VIEW OF REFORM

(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter. Reason: 1.5
(b,d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003509

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHP TAKES A TACTICAL VIEW OF REFORM

(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter. Reason: 1.5
(b,d).



1. (C) Summary: Opposition CHP has publicly, and privately in
meetings with us, endorsed the AK government's EU reform
package but has rejected AK proposals to sell state-owned
forestry lands and to allow local administrations more
control over health and education services. The CHP stance
reflects in large part a tactical political interest in
weakening AK in the months leading up to the next nation-wide
local elections. End Summary.


--------------
Principled Opposition?
--------------



2. (C) CHP officials at all levels have spoken publicly in
favor of AK's efforts to push through an ambitious sixth EU
reform package. Senior CHP M.P. Bulent Tanla recently
confirmed to us privately that CHP will support the AK
package unconditionally.



3. (C) However, on other key reform proposals, including some
that are crucial to promoting better governance and
democratization, CHP has balked for tactical political
reasons.



4. (C) In recent meetings, senior CHP deputies have argued
with limited conviction that AK's proposals to decentralize
the Turkish state system by giving more power to elected
local authorities, and to sell lands still classified as
forest although have since developed without title, are
deeply flawed. These measures require constitutional
amendments. In separate meetings recently, the CHP M.P.s --
High Administrative Board members Hakki Akalin and Fuat Cay
and senior party economist Kemal Kilicdaroglu -- alleged that
AK is trying to engineer these proposals only to benefit AK
supporters.


-- On local administrative reform, both Akalin and Cay argued
that CHP opposes AK's proposals on the grounds that the GOT
should first tackle parliamentary immunity -- a major CHP
campaign theme in the Nov. 2002 elections. Akalin and Cay
admitted that local reform figures prominently in CHP's
election program, yet Akalin weakly dismissed AK's efforts,
saying, "You need to read the proposed legislation for
yourself to understand our objections."


-- Kemal Kilicdaroglu May 27 offered a more typically Statist
(and tenuous) criticism of AK's proposed legislation.
Kilicdaroglu explained that AK's proposal will give "too much

power" to the mayors of large towns. This would only foster
open disagreement between the elected mayors and governors,
who are assigned by the State. Kilicdaroglu also alleged
that smaller provinces will have a hard time collecting
enough revenue to support themselves, while larger provinces
like Istanbul will have more than enough funds. When asked
if there were other means available to address the potential
imbalance while promoting local control, he demurred.


-- Akalin claimed that some forestry land in Istanbul
province is clearly being earmarked for an unnamed AK
supporter. Cay averred that AK "has no clear plan as to what
will be done with the land after it is sold." However, both
sheepishly acknowledged once again that selling the same land
parcels is part of CHP's own party program. Moreover,
neither could articulate an alternative to AK's proposals.


--------------
Baykal's Permanent Campaign
--------------



5. (C) Some CHP contacts acknowledge to us privately that
party leader Baykal is pursuing this strategy not for any
principled reason but simply to exploit divisions within AK's
parliamentary group and use it as a platform to hammer AK on
the parliamentary immunity issue. Former CHP M.P. Erol
Cevikce -- once very close to Baykal -- explained to us May
16 that the CHP leader believes ultimately AK will split: "in
fact, he's counting on it." CHP's current opposition to some
of AK's reform efforts, Cevikce noted, is due in part to
CHP's inability to garner more public support as a result of
its anti-war, anti-USG policy in the run-up to Operation
Iraqi Freedom.



6. (C) Cevikce added that everything CHP is doing right now
is meant to increase CHP's chances in the local elections,
which must be held by April 2004 but which AK could advance
to autumn 2003. Success in the local elections would help
position Baykal and CHP for the next national elections and
another shot at the prime ministership. "Baykal has seen the
likes of Yilmaz, Ciller and even Erbakan become Prime
Minister," he said, "so why not him?" Former CHP deputy
Sabri Ergul subsequently echoed Cevikce's comments, noting
that Baykal sees local elections as a big test to determine
whether he has solidified his place as CHP leader -- and as a
national leader. Ergul averred that CHP will choose local
candidates who have the best chance of winning regardless of
political background -- a strategy subsequently confirmed by
Kilicdaroglu.


--------------
Politics as Usual
--------------



7. (C) Many in CHP genuinely recognize the need for reform
along EU lines, especially given overwhelming public support
for change -- although it is worth keeping mind that as the
Party of Ataturk, CHP has traditionally indexed its policy to
the Establishment view. On other essential reforms, however,
CHP's stance is that generally adopted by Turkish opposition
parties -- to reject whatever the government puts forward.
As such, it's not surprising that our CHP interlocutors
cannot elucidate alternatives to AK policies, and instead
fall back on the shop-worn Turkish political truism we hear
routinely from M.P.s and others: "we're in the opposition;
what do you expect?" In this context, the idea that Baykal
and his cronies are acting less out of principle and more for
tactical reasons conforms to well set patterns.



8. (C) From CHP's perspective, playing on AK's divisions
offers probably the only chance the party has to make inroads
in the local elections. For example, CHP prospects in Ankara
revolve around whether the conservative vote will split
between current mayor Gokcek -- a former Refah and Fazilet
member who has had run-ins with P.M. Erdogan -- and a new AK
candidate. (Note: there are signs Erdogan and Gokcek are
aware of this and are trying to mend fences. End note.)
Likewise, CHP may be hoping that the most ardent opposition
to AK right now, Motorola deadbeat Cem Uzan's Genc Party,
will hive off a significant share of AK votes.
PEARSON