Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA3416
2003-05-27 06:19:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

THE TURKS AND THE STABILIZATION FORCE IN IRAQ

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ANKARA 003416 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, PMAT; OSD FOR ISA AND ISP; JCS
FOR J5; EUCOM FOR J5, POLAD; CENTCOM FOR J5 AND POLAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: THE TURKS AND THE STABILIZATION FORCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 2538

B. ANKARA 2553


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reasons:
1.5 (B and D).


S E C R E T ANKARA 003416

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, PMAT; OSD FOR ISA AND ISP; JCS
FOR J5; EUCOM FOR J5, POLAD; CENTCOM FOR J5 AND POLAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: THE TURKS AND THE STABILIZATION FORCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 2538

B. ANKARA 2553


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reasons:
1.5 (B and D).



1. (C) The GOT continues to express an interest in
participating in the stabilization force in Iraq. The Turks
understand the political sensitivity of a neighboring state
putting troops in Iraq. According to MFA DDG for NATO
Affairs Sanivar Kizildeli, Turkey is not looking to use NATO
as a "back door" to get into the force. Rather, Iraq is such
a key national interest for Turkey that the GOT wants to
ensure that a reputable and reliable institution like NATO is
responsible for Iraq's security over the long term. While
Turkey initially made missteps initially regarding financial
aid and the London Conference, there are good reasons for a
Turkish role in the force.



2. (C) It appears that the Poles may have generated adequate
forces for its division for now. But looking down the road,
our experience in Afghanistan tells us that few countries
have the resources or the public support for extended
operations far from home. Allowing the Turks the maximum
possible role now could spare us from encountering Turkish
recalcitrance later when we are looking for countries to
contribute troops. Embassy Ankara advocates this approach
because it serves US long-term interests in Iraqi transition.



3. (C) Per Ref B, Turkey has offered a gamut of capabilities
from a division-level headquarters to a humanitarian
assistance brigade, psyops unit, and air traffic control.
The USG may best be able to exploit these capabilities
without unnecessarily offending sensitivities in Iraq by
accepting non-combat assets such as a medical unit, mobile
surgical hospital, humanitarian assistance unit, firefighting
units, air traffic controllers, ground illumination units,
etc.



4. (C) We understand that Washington is considering offering
Turkey some advisor slots for the Polish division. This type
of minimal role is a good start, but as we look longer term,
we should consider a broader role for Turkey in the short- to
medium-term in order to keep open our options in the future.
PEARSON