TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY: WHAT NOW?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003412

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY: WHAT NOW?


REF: A. NICOSIA 901

B. ANKARA 2155

C. ANKARA 2431


(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson. Reason:1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: Assessments of how Turkey should move on
Cyprus vary in both the GOT and Turkish State. Some (e.g.,
FonMin Gul) are working to overcome what they recognize as
pressure on Turkey's interests following the failure of the
UN-sponsored Cyprus talks and the EU's decision to accept a
divided Cyprus as a member. However, while promoting the
recent series of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
confidence-building initiatives, others in the MFA
bureaucracy and elsewhere remain reluctant to take bold steps
toward a comprehensive solution, even though they recognize
that such moves would help improve Turkish-EU and
U.S.-Turkish relations. These holdouts continue to reject
the UNSYG plan (Annan III) as the basis for further
negotiations. End Summary.


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Pyrrhic Victory for the Establishment?
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2. (C) Turkey (both GOT and elements of the State) put itself
in a bind by insisting it could not handle Iraq and Cyprus
simultaneously, and then failing to take clear and beneficial
decisions on both.



3. (C) On Cyprus policy, The ability of the pro-status-quo
camp in Ankara to prevent Erdogan from embracing Annan III
appeared at first to be a victory for an Establishment that
fears the AK Party and P.M. Erdogan as existential threats to
its dominance.


-- TGS J5 Lt. Gen Turgut told visiting DAS Pascoe May 22 that
the key to a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem was
ensuring that the Turkish and Cypriot communities live on the
island as equal partners. Turgut said that if Turkey had
accepted the Annan III plan, in ten years time, there would
not be any Turkish residing on the island. All of the "rich"
would buy all of the land the "poor" would be left with
nothing, forced to leave. Turgut predicated that in the end,
"you would have another Palestine." He added that Turkish
Cypriots who demonstrated against Denktas and the status quo
are "communists."


-- Erdogan initially strongly criticized Denktas and the
GOT's business-as-usual approach on Cyprus, but ultimately
succumbed to Establishment pressure and backed off.
Erdogan's May 9 visit to Cyprus reflected this retreat as he
called simultaneously for both Annan III and a "sovereign
TRNC" in an attempt to placate both hard liners and those
looking for a new opening. Now, however, the Erdogan
government, with FonMin Gul taking the lead, is once again
looking for room to maneuver.


-- At the same time, as the draftsman of Turkey's Cyprus
diplomacy, the MFA, though charged with damage control and
responding to a barrage of international criticism, is
ultimately hewing to its Establishment line, one that FonMin
Gul criticized as a "non-solution solution" in the beginning
of his short tenure as P.M. MFA officials are trying to
shift blame for the failure of the talks from Turkey and
Denktas, and toward the UN and EU for seeking too high a
price from Ankara. They argue that progress on Cyprus
requires keeping the door open to an Annan Plan -- even as
they reject the plan itself as a basis for negotiations (ref
C).



4. (C) Trying a different tack on May 22, MFA U/S Ziyal
asserted to Ambassador and DAS Pascoe that the principal
reason Turkey ultimately rejected the Annan Plan was its
"unacceptable" requirement that "100 thousand Turkish
Cypriots" -- 50% of the population, according to Ziyal --
would eventually have to leave home. Ambassador Pearson
replied that the figure cited by Ziyal does not coincide with
our understanding, and that Turkish and U.S. diplomats in
Ankara should be willing to conduct a review of the numbers
-- and what was or was not called for under the plan. Cyprus
DG Apakan later reiterated Ziyal's point, adding that it is
also "too much" to expect that Turkey and the "TRNC" would
simultaneously accept the return of "85-90 thousand" Greek
Cypriots to the north.
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GOT Taking Steps -- or Walking in Place?
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5. (C) According to Apakan, Turkey is evaluating its Cyprus
policy in the wake of the failed talks on three "fronts": the
UN, the EU, and the "realities on the ground" on the island.
The GOT is trying to change the environment on Cyprus
through measures that "do not substitute, but will
facilitate" and reinvigorate efforts to find a comprehensive
settlement, he said. Denktas, he stated, has taken the
initiative in recent weeks by opening the "TRNC" border to
Greek Cypriot tourists, allowing them to visit their former
homes for the first time since 1974 and generating good will
on the island. DAS Pascoe responded that the evident good
will on both sides gives the lie to the arguments that Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriots could never get along -- and
demonstrates instead the desire on both sides to cut a deal.
Apakan demurred. Apakan also noted the GOT's decision,
announced by Erdogan May 16, to allow Greek Cypriots to
travel to Turkey.



6. (C) The next step, Apakan argued, should be taken by the
other side -- to end the de facto embargo of the north.
"There is neither an EU nor UN decision imposing a formal
embargo on the 'TRNC,'" he said. An axiom of the methodology
of conflict resolution holds that settlements are reached
between equal sides, Apakan asserted. To redress the
imbalance and as a prerequisite for a solution on Cyprus, the
"TRNC" should be allowed direct access to the wider world.
"End the embargo and the Cyprus problem will be settled," he
opined.


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Implications
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7. (C) At a political level the GOT recognizes it is in a
bind over Cyprus. At the same time, the MFA's impulse is
directed primarily toward damage control, not by any sense
that Turkish policies are a dead end. Opening the "TRNC"
border and allowing Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey,
though laudable, do not signal a sea-change in Turkey's
approach to Cyprus. In fact, the rigidity of the TGS and MFA
approach to Cyprus policy is a manifestation of a wider,
systemic problem of State Establishment (vice civilian
government) dominance of government policymaking, and of the
alignment of political players in Turkey's rough-and-tumble
domestic political theater. Those without strong emotional,
political, or pecuniary ties to Denktas and the current
GOT-"TRNC" machinery, e.g., Erdogan and Gul, have
demonstrated that they want to make a breakthrough. At the
same time, those who rigidly adhere to traditional Turkish
State policy -- and those who recognize the tactical problems
associated with appearing opposed to change but continue
nevertheless to hew to the Establishment line -- have the
upper hand, discouraging the kind of comprehensive
risk-taking that might pave the way for a solution on Cyprus.
Consequently, Turkish flexibility on Cyprus may only be
possible as an outcome of AK's ongoing effort to crack the
Establishment's policymaking dominance.
PEARSON