Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA3410
2003-05-23 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION FROM TURKEY'S NSC SHARPENS CONFLICT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003410 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION FROM TURKEY'S NSC SHARPENS CONFLICT
OVER EU-RELATED REFORM

REF: A. ANKARA 2909

B. ANKARA 2998

C. ANKARA 1624

D. ANKARA 1636

E. ANKARA 1303

F. ANKARA 1423

G. ANKARA 728

H. 02 ANKARA 8564

I. ANKARA 2521


(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons 1.5 (b and
d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003410

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION FROM TURKEY'S NSC SHARPENS CONFLICT
OVER EU-RELATED REFORM

REF: A. ANKARA 2909

B. ANKARA 2998

C. ANKARA 1624

D. ANKARA 1636

E. ANKARA 1303

F. ANKARA 1423

G. ANKARA 728

H. 02 ANKARA 8564

I. ANKARA 2521


(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons 1.5 (b and
d).



1. (C) Summary: GOT leaders continue to support passage of a
series of reform packages to harmonize Turkey's practices
with EU membership criteria. TGS chief Ozkok and his deputy
Buyukanit also formally support Turkey's EU candidacy. At
the same time the military-dominated National Security
Council (NSC) is striving to dilute the GOT's latest
EU-related reform package, which the NSC asserts could
undermine security. The debate reflects the larger struggle
between the generally pro-reform elected civilian leadership,
and retrograde elements of the military and bureaucracy who
see human rights reform and EU membership as a threat to the
unity and "secular" nature of the State -- and above all to
their dominance over the Turkish State system. As the
conflict sharpens, even our most cautious contacts are
beginning to openly discuss the sensitive issue of internal
resistance to reform. The ruling AK party's handling of this
conflict will determine whether the GOT can satisfy Turkey
skeptics in the EU who question its ability to implement the
legislative reforms required for EU membership. End summary.


--------------
NSC-GOT Tangle Over Package
--------------



2. (C) Public debate about the GOT's latest EU-related draft
reform package (reftel A) has intensified with press reports
of efforts by four-star NSC Secretary General Kilinc to have
key elements of the package withdrawn or revised. Kilinc
reportedly sent a letter to GOT officials objecting to
proposed reforms that would: 1) abolish Article 8 of the
Anti-Terror Law; 2) allow foreign observers during Turkish
elections; and 3) allow Kurdish-language broadcasting on
private TV and radio stations. Justice Minister Cicek and
ruling AK Party deputy chairman for policy Firat took the
rare step of publicly criticizing a senior military figure

and lambasted Kilinc; Cicek rejected Kilinc's argument that
the reforms would threaten security, while Firat asserted
that Kilinc "has no authority" to issue such warnings. The
owner-CEO of a major media conglomerate put it more bluntly
in a private meeting with us: Kilinc, he observed, is
mounting an all-out effort to sabotage the package and the
wider reform effort, which most of the Turkish General Staff
(TGS) fears will eventually end its dominance over the
Turkish State and society. In a May 21 meeting with
Ambassador, Cicek said the GOT would continue to support
Kurdish language reforms. Differences over the package will
likely be debated at the May 28 NSC meeting before the
legislation is introduced in Parliament.


--------------
Package Dispute Part of Larger Conflict
--------------



3. (C) The dispute over the new package reflects a broader
GOT conflict (ref A) between supporters and opponents of
human rights reform and EU membership. EU membership has
long been championed by pro-reform diplomats serving in the
MFA Human Rights and EU departments as well as in the EU
Secretariat, a separate GOT agency established to support the

SIPDIS
EU membership drive. Our contacts in these offices say they
have prepared extensive reform legislation designed to meet
all EU membership criteria. They say they pull together
elements of these drafts to create reform packages when they
sense the political will to adopt certain reforms. The
reform process got a boost when AK came to power in the
November 2002 elections and focused on EU membership as its
immediate priority. Asligul Ugdul, EU Secretariat director
for political affairs, told us the two reform packages
adopted by Parliament in January comprised measures the
previous GOT was not willing to support. At that time, Ugdul
and other EU-membership advocates were optimistic, figuring
AK would use its parliamentary majority to quickly advance
reform.



4. (C) In the face of support for EU-related reforms by AK's
leaders, and the formal support for EU candidacy by TGS chief
Ozkok and his deputy Buyukanit (whom we expect to deliver a
pro-EU membership speech at a TGS-sponsored globalization
conference the week of May 26 in Istanbul) hard-line elements
in the military, judiciary, and offices dealing with
religion, broadcasting, and education continue to try to
undermine the content and implementation of reform packages.
At the same time, opponents of EU-related reforms generally
keep a low profile, unwilling to openly oppose changes that
are overwhelmingly backed by the public. As a staff advisor
to the parliamentary Human Rights Committee put it to us,
"When your enemy faces you, you can fight him, but it's
difficult to fight an enemy that pretends to be on your
side."



5. (C) Ersonmez Yarbay, an AK Party and Human Rights
Committee member, told us reform opponents are forced for
tactical reasons to feign rhetorical support for EU
membership because they have no foreign policy alternative to
put forward; Turkey is not economically strong enough to
stand on its own, and Turkey's southern and eastern neighbors
present no viable alternative to the EU. Yarbay said many
reform opponents genuinely fear that fully meeting EU
membership criteria, particularly in areas such as religious
freedom and Kurdish cultural rights, will threaten the
foundations of the "secular", centralized Turkish State --
and the stature of the institutions to which the reform
opponents belong. Their strategy for the time being, he
said, is to buy time by insisting that the EU must accept
Turkey under special conditions, owing to Turkey's unique
geography and history. Yarbay fears this "haggling" will
cause Turkey to miss the EU train. If the GOT allows the
hard-liners to dictate its EU membership strategy, it will
repeat the mistake it made when it voted down the resolution
to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey into northern Iraq, he
said.



6. (C) Indeed, frustration over reform resistance has reached
the point where even our normally hyper-cautious MFA contacts
are beginning to discuss it openly -- MFA DDG for EU Affairs
Selim Yenel recently conceded that the Turkish bureaucracy
was one of the biggest obstacles to EU membership.


--------------
Military, Kemalist Bureaucrats Fear Reform
--------------



7. (C) And exactly who are the opponents of reform? MPs,
human rights advocates across the spectrum, and the press
point to elements of the military as a major source of
opposition. Our contacts attribute opposition among some
military officers to fear that EU membership criteria require
Turkey to reduce the military's political influence. Our
contacts also blame Kemalists who hold key offices in the
bureaucracy, many of whom were appointed by the Nationalist
Movement Party (MHP) when it was in government. Key among
these are public prosecutors, who, in the Turkish system,
have broad powers to indict "suspicious" individuals or
groups based on anything they deem "evidence." Some
observers, like Human Rights Foundation President Yavuz Onen,
think AK itself is divided. Onen told us he believes the
more Islamist wing of AK opposes reforms related to Kurdish
identity because it fears the rise of Kurdish politics as a
threat to Islamist politics. (Note: AK's ethnically Kurdish
Islamists as a rule are strong supporters of radical
pro-Kurdish reforms. They, and the more Turkish nationalist
elements in AK, agree that by undercutting the military's
political power, the reform process is key to AK's survival
as a party -- and perhaps in government as well. End note.)
Leading columnist and chief editor of center-left "Radikal"
Ismet Berkan has also reported that P.M. Erdogan has issued
instructions that the bureaucracy go slow on consideration of
property claims from minority religions (i.e., Christian and
Jewish foundations).


--------------
Opponents Gnawing Away at EU Candidacy
--------------



7. (C) The fall-out from Kilinc's latest salvo, and other
recent anti-reform steps enumerated below have undermined
Turkey's image in EU capitals:


-- an Ankara State Security Court prosecutor May 6 led police
on another in a continuing series of fishing-expedition raids
of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices (reftel B);


-- contacts and the press continue to report that parents who
wish to give their children "unapproved" (i.e., Kurdish)
names are being thwarted (the new package would remove the
prohibition on such names);


-- Turkey's highest court announced the closure of the
pro-Kurdish HADEP party March 13, the same day a chief
prosecutor opened a case to close a sister party, DEHAP
(reftel C);


-- Jandarma officials prevented lawyers and relatives from
visiting jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for 15 weeks
ending in March (reftels D-E);


-- prosecutors in October 2002 indicted five German
pro-democracy foundations on spurious charges of separatism
and espionage (reftel F),although the case was finally
dismissed in March;


-- although Parliament in August 2002 adopted legislative
reforms allowing Kurdish language broadcasts and courses, the
bureaucracy has drafted highly restrictive implementing
regulations preventing establishment of any such courses or
broadcasts (reftels G-H);


-- the Turkish Establishment continues to promote
inflexibility on Cyprus;


-- the pro-military "Cumhuriyet" daily, well-connected to
senior military, reported May 23 that TGS Chief Ozkok has
endorsed Kilinc's views, implying that he did so to counter
the increasingly intense public reporting and speculation on
divisions within the military leadership (ref I);


-- "Cumhuriyet" also highlighted the growing discomfort of
younger officers with the AK Party and government -- a report
likely to resonate with Turks, who are familiar with the role
junior officers traditionally have played in prompting their
superiors to actively oppose civilian governments they find
troubling (ref I).


--------------
Comment
--------------



8. (C) As the government seeks to meet EU membership
criteria, human rights reforms begin to cut closer to the
foundations of the Kemalist State. We are thus seeing
heightened attempts to blunt and undermine reforms led by
reactionaries in the armed forces, the bureaucracy and other
bastions of Establishment propriety. For Turkey's critics in
the EU, failure by AK's leaders to gain control of the reform
process will provide fresh evidence of the GOT's inability to
fully implement the reforms necessary for EU membership.
P.M. Erdogan, FonMin Gul and others in ruling AK party are
mindful of this danger to Turkey's candidacy from continued
Establishment resistance and appear committed to persevere in
their reform efforts, but their task is a difficult,
step-by-step one.
PEARSON