IRAQ: LETTERS FROM TGS CHOD OZKOK TO CJCS MYERS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002912

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2013
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: LETTERS FROM TGS CHOD OZKOK TO CJCS MYERS,
CINCEUR JONES

REF: ANKARA 2906


(U) Classified by Political-Military Affairs Counselor Stuart
Brown. Reasons: 1.5 (B and D).



1. (C) On May 5, 2003, the Embassy received copies of three
letters from TGS CHOD Gen. Ozkok: (1) an April 30 letter to
CJCS Gen. Myers (see para two for text),(2) a May 1 letter
to CJCS Myers (see para three for text) and (3) a May 1
letter to SACEUR Gen Jones (see para four for text). The
first letter to CJCS Myers in large part focuses on northern
Iraq: it protests the treatment of the TU special forces in
northern Iraq by US forces and seeks to explain and justify
their presence. It also says the US and Turkey together can
discuss the re-deployment of TU forces once PKK/KADEK is
eliminated and the region is secure. The second letter to
Gen. Myers (like the letter to SACEUR Jones) contains
Turkey's offer to contribute to NATO-led operations in Iraq,
and seeks NATO's support for use of a NATO HQs in Turkey for
this purpose. Finally, para five contains the text of a
memorandum of record of an April 28, 2003 meeting between
Commander CJSOTF-N Col. Cleveland and Deputy Commander of TU
SF in Silopi.


--------------
OZKOK-MYERS: TU CONCERNS ON IRAQ
--------------



2. (C) Begin text of letter from TGS CHOD Gen. Ozkok to CJCS
Gen. Myers:


Dear General Myers,


The recent messages from the US Special Forces in northern
Iraq are not encouraging. Hence, I would like to convey my
views to you.


As is known, there have been limited Turkish troops in
northern Iraq since 1997. This action was fully coordinated
with the KDP and PUK. The main purpose of this limited troop
deployment is to prevent any PKK/KADEK terrorist infiltration
into Turkey as well as early warning and intelligence
collection. There are almost 5,000 terrorists in the region,
which pose a serious threat to Turkey.


For these reasons, we, together, can evaluate the Turkish
military presence in northern Iraq after the PKK/KADEK
existence is eliminated and full control is ensured in the
region. As assured, this contingent does not have any
negative impact on overall US operations. It is obvious that
we can reach the desired end-state through bilateral talks on
the basis of mutual understanding and objective criteria.


With this in mind, I think, the recent incident experienced
in Kirkuk was exaggerated. Firstly, Gen. Osman,s HQs was
informed of this activity. Secondly, everybody tends to
carry small arms in the region. The team composed of Turks,
Kurds and Turkomans were not carrying any additional weaponry
other than ones for their own security. When the convoy was
stopped, others came to help settle the dispute. However,
they were misinterpreted and sent back to Turkey for very
well known reasons.


Turkish low profile attitude in this incident should be no
means be taken as Turkish team was mal-practicing. On the
contrary, as stated above, the importance that we attach to
the Turkish-US relations has been the underlying factor in
the Turkish approach. The misinterpretation and wrong
assessments by the lower echelons should not be allowed to
adversely influence our relations. In this context, I
consider this kind of tense and subjective approaches
unacceptable for both sides.


The ultimatum-like demands to be met in short time-frames may
harm our friendly relations. We are not against each other.
Nor are our military contingents in the region. I assume
that such unfortunate statements are due to the sentiments of
some officials who work under difficult conditions for a long
time. The repetition of such statements creates a worrisome
atmosphere.


For instance, the statements made by Col. Cleveland, 10th US
Special Forces Group Com., during the 28 April meeting in
Arbil were unacceptable. Particularly, making any reference
to revenge what was done to Iraq Special Representative Mr.
Khalilzad and Special Forces teams at Habur Gate is
unquestionably beyond the capacity of such an officer.


As is known, some of the bodyguards of Mr. Khalilzad stayed
in Iraq despite their written promises to return. And the
Turkish officials at the border gate needed to consult their
higher authorities, which definitely took time. During this
process, Mr. Khalilzad and his associates were hosted by the
Deputy Governor. Consequently, he and his team were allowed
into Turkey after a short time.


Turning to the Special Forces issue, the authority to send
such a unit to Iraq from Turkey rests with the Turkish Grand
National Assembly. Although I don,t have any power in the
respect, I produced after talking to you some course of
actions, which put the special forces under the scope of
already politically accepted NILE teams. On the issue of
their prolonged stay in N.Iraq, I told that we need to
&think8, which reflects a kind of flexibility.


We previously made clear statements on the locations of our
contingents in northern Iraq. A written notification was
also made to ODC on 23 March 2003 clarifying the coordinates
of the locations. Additionally, I personally informed
Secretary Powell that the total number of Turkish soldiers is

SIPDIS
around 1500. The detailed documentation, which included the
number of soldiers, main weaponry and combat vehicles, was
also provided upon request.


I fear that minor misinterpretations and problems in the
theatre be allowed to harm our overall relations. I believe
that we need to do our best to solve this kind of problems in
a constructive manner.


Our main purpose should be to prevent any deterioration in
our relations. I believe, as soldiers, we still have an
important role to play in this respect. In order to avoid
similar incidents, what we need to do is to come together
with military and civilian delegations and to talk about
essential arrangements in N.Iraq. CENTCOM involvement should
follow such initiative in the theatre.


As we have discussed previously, out activities should be
transparent in order to avoid any misunderstanding. This is
what I also want to reiterate for this moment. I am of the
opinion that, ultimatum-like statements, sudden and
unexpected requests are not constructive at all in promoting
our bilateral relations.


In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere wish that
the recent developments would not create a difficult
environment for our bilateral relations. With this in mind,
I would like to re-emphasize my firm belief that mutual
understanding and cooperation can overcome any possible
hurdles we may face. Hence, we must not let past events
dominate the future relations. We stand ready for any talks
and cooperation in this direction, including possible Turkish
contribution to reconstruction phase of Iraq as well as the
establishment of Stabilization Force.


You may rest assured that I will continue to do my best to
promote our bilateral military relations.


Sincerely,





CC: General James L. Jones.


end text.


--------------
TURKEY OFFERS TO PLAY IN NATO-LED OPS IN IRAQ
--------------



3. (C) Begin text of a letter dated May 1 from TGS CHOD Ozkok
to CJCS MYERS:


Dear General Myers,


We are pleased that the war in Iraq, which is likely to have
far-reaching implications both in political and military
terms on a wider region, did not last long as a result of
rapid progress of the Coalition forces.


It is inevitable, however, that the post-war period in Iraq
would bring new and demanding challenges. This would
certainly necessitate intensified, unified and coordinated
effort by the international community, in which NATO could
and should play a much-needed role, particularly in
re-establishing durable safety, security and stability in
this war-stricken country. Needless to say, NATO, with its
broad experience, is unquestionably capable of undertaking
such a crucial and historic role. As a neighboring country
to Iraq that could serve as a proper line of communication,
Turkey stands ready to take part in such an operation of NATO
Council decides to.


Turkey, while enjoying advantages of its geo-strategically
unique location, inevitably remains exposed to many regional
tensions and crises around its borders. In the face of the
unfolding circumstances in the region, we believe NATO
headquarters in Turkey would gain even more importance in
view of handling these potential crises as well as
safeguarding and consolidating collective peace and stability
throughout the NATO,s expanding area of concern.


I would like to thank you for your firm support and
co-operation in the Operation Display Deterrence, initiated
within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, to deter any possible hostile attempt by Iraq and
reinforce Turkey,s self-defense. We are very pleased that
the operation has been conducted successfully with all its
assigned objectives accomplished.


I believe that the Operation Display Deterrence was also
meaningful in proving and manifesting the solidarity within
the Alliance as well as NATO,s increasing importance, as a
deterrent military organization, both on regional and global
scale.


Taking this opportunity, both personally and on behalf of the
members of the Turkish Armed Forces, I would like to extend
my congtratulations for the "Armed Forces Day" to you and to
the members of the friendly and allied USA Armed Forces. I
wish health and success to you all.


Sincerely,





end text.


--------------
OZKOK-JONES LETTER
--------------



4. (C) Begin text of a letter dated May 1 from TGS CHOD Ozkok
to SACEUR Jones:


Dear General Jones,


The last few weeks have witnessed a new hot crisis in the
Middle East, which is most likely to have far-reaching
implications, both in political and military terms, on a
wider region stretching far beyond the Iraqi borders.
Although it is early to contemplate a fully safe environment,
it is apparent that Iraq is now almost under the military
control of the Coalition troops. This, the level of threat
posed by Iraq against Turkey has diminished to an all-time
low.


It is inevitable, however, that the post-war period in Iraq
would bring new and demanding challenges to be addressed
urgently. This would certainly necessitate intensified,
unified and coordinated effort by the international
community, in which NATO could and should play a much-needed
role, particularly in re-establishing durable safety,
security and stability in this war-stricken country.
Needless to say, NATO, with its broad experience, is
unquestionably capable of undertaking such a crucial and
historic role. As a neighboring country to Iraq that could
serve as a proper line of communication, Turkey stands ready
to take part in such an operation of NATO Council decides to.


Turkey, while enjoying advantages of its geo-strategically
unique location, inevitably remains exposed to many regional
tensions and crises around its borders. Additionally, the
ongoing developments in Iraq have the potential to trigger
off new crises. In the face of the unfolding circumstances
in the region, we believe NATO headquarters in Turkey would
gain even more importance in view of handling these potential
crises as well as safeguarding and consolidating collective
peace and stability throughout the NATO,s expanding area of
concern.


Taking this opportunity, I would like to thank you for your
firm support and co-operation in the Operation Display
Deterrence, initiated within the framework of Article 4 of
the North Atlantic Treaty, to deter any possible hostile
attempt by Iraq and reinforce Turkey,s self-defense. We are
very pleased that the operation has been conducted
successfully with all its assigned objectives accomplished.


I believe that the Operation Display Deterrence was also
meaningful in proving and manifesting the solidarity within
the Alliance as well as NATO,s increasing importance, as a
deterrent military organization, both on regional and global
scale.


Sincerely,





end text.


-------------- --------------
Turkish Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Begin text of the memorandum for the record of a
meeting betwen Col. Cleveland and TU SF Deputy Commander in
Silopi:


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD


SUBJECT: Turkish Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq



1. COL Charles Cleveland, Commander CJSOTF-N, met COL Hasan
Ozdemir, Deputy Commander, Turkish Special Force Operations
Base-Silopi, TU on 280715Z April 2003. Also present were LTC
Paul Skvarka, USSF, MAJ David Young, USSF, LTC Yasar Yildiz,
TUSF, 1LT Murat Taner Karabulut, TUSF. The purpose of the
meeting was to relay instructions from the Commander of the
Combined Forces Command concerning the Turkish military
activities in Northern Iraq to the senior officer responsible
for Turkish Special Forces (TUSF) in Northern Iraq.



2. TUSF representative was informed of the following:


a. Turkish military personnel will immediately terminate all
non Coalition-approved activities in Northern Iraq.


b. Turkish General Staff is required to notify the
Combined Forces Command of the number of personnel, location
and activities, to include intelligence gathering, of all
Turkish military units and organizations in Northern Iraq.
This information will be submitted NLT 300600Z April 2003.


c. No future Turkish military activities in Northern Iraq
will be concluded unless approved by Combined Forces Command
through the JSOTF-N.


d. Turkish military personnel in Northern Iraq will only
carry personal side arms (pistols).


e. Turkish military personnel in Northern Iraq will be in
uniform at all times.


f. TUSF personnel already expelled from Northern Iraq will
not be allowed to return. All violators will be detained.


g. Turkish military personnel will not escort aid convoys
into Iraq. All humanitarian aid emanating from the Republic
of Turkey will be coordinated through the International Red
Cross/Red Crescent.


h. The previously accepted &Green Line8 border is no
longer a recognized boundary and U.S. Forces in Northern Iraq
are responsible for all activities in that region.


i. The above are initial and there may be follow-on
instructions in the future.


j. COL Hasan Ozdemir, by signing this document,
acknowledges receipt of the instructions to be relayed to the
Turkish General Staff.




Charles T. Cleveland Hasan Ozdemir
COL, SF COL, TUSF
Commanding


end text.
PEARSON