TURKEY: FORMER PRESIDENT DEMIREL TELLS AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002596

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FORMER PRESIDENT DEMIREL TELLS AMBASSADOR
TURKEY MUST MEND FENCES WITH U.S.


REF: ANKARA 2521


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. R. Pearson. Reason:1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: In an April 21 meeting with Ambassador,
former President Suleyman Demirel offered his thinking on the
way ahead in U.S.-Turkey relations. Demirel volunteered that
there is a debate in Ankara power centers about Turkey's
strategic orientation; but that in his view, "the Turkish
Army cannot make war on the Kurds or the people of northern
Iraq." Turkey, he stated, has no alternative but to repair
ties to the U.S. End summary.



2. (C) Demirel observed that Turkey would have been better
served had the GOT been up front with the United States from
the beginning on Iraq: "90% of the public was against the
war. They (GOT) should have told you that they simply could
not open a northern front, but would support you in other
ways. Then they wouldn't have had to push the (failed) March
1 motion in Parliament." In Demirel's view, the result was a
textbook case of "mismanagement, not 'democracy'" in action.
He suggested that Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc, who
opposed the resolution, was among the few who understood
clearly what he was trying to do; before the vote, Arinc
declined to read aloud the rules about how votes would be
counted (in this case, that abstentions could mean -- as they
did -- the failure of the government to obtain the necessary
absolute majority).



3. (C) Demirel also observed that media critics in the United
States had started to criticize "Turkey," vice simply the
government -- which risked fomenting "anti-Americanism" in
the Turkish press and elsewhere. While it would be natural
for Turkish media to try to rebut such charges, Demirel
expressed concern lest it get out of hand. "People will
rally to defend Turkey. I'm worried about provocations" in
the Turkish press.



4. (C) "Coming to the military," Demirel stated, "I don't
know how or why" the military did not push to support the
March 1 resolution. "How come the Pentagon didn't work on
them?" Ambassador replied that USG/DoD had had continuing
and detailed negotiations and consultations with military
leaders on all aspects of the Iraq operation, including
Turkey's potential role in it. However, the USG sense is
that the Turkish military is highly suspicious of USG
intentions in northern Iraq, despite: (1) the fact that the
U.S. is fully in control in the north and throughout Iraq;
and (2) our repeated assertions on the need to maintain
Iraq's territorial integrity and opposition to the emergence
of an independent Kurdish state. Demirel noted that Turkey
is "sensitive" on the Kurdish question and regards it as a
"casus belli." He expressed strong confidence that the USG
would live up to its commitments in this regard, but added,
"I understand that you have to do something for the Kurds --
they helped you." Demirel suggested that a federal state in
n. Iraq would be reasonable so long as it had a regional vice
ethnic name (i.e., no "Kurdish"/"Kurdistan"). To Demirel,
the bottom line is that there is and will be a power vacuum
in Iraq that only the USG can fill; the U.N. he said, would
only make a hash out of the situation, as would the Iraqis,
at least initially.



5. (C) Demirel also raised concerns about problems associated
with delays in the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline and rumors of
its possible "postponement," which he said, would promote an
additional measure of "anti-American sentiment" in both
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Ambassador offered assurances that
the USG continued strongly to support the project. He noted
that the problems, such as they are, revolve around BOTAS'
management, which had led to a two-month delay in the
construction schedule. BOTAS needed to get back on the
timetable.


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Whither Turkey
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6. (C) Ambassador stated that the U.S. is watching Turkey to
determine where it is heading now that the Iraq war is over
and there are new realities on the ground. From the USG
perspective, it is important to rebuild bilateral trust.
Demirel intimated that there is a debate underway in Ankara
now. "Where should Turkey go -- with Iran, Syria, Egypt,
Russia?" In his view, "Turkey's interests in development
dictate that we side with the West, the U.S. and the EU. We
have no other alternative." Returning to Turkish military
suspicions of the U.S., Demirel said that "soldiers should
talk to soldiers." Though the military worries about the
PKK/KADEK presence on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border,
"the Turkish Army cannot make war on the Kurds or the people
of northern Iraq." The USG must adhere to President Bush's
commitment to combat terrorism. Ambassador replied that the
USG is committed to ensuring that Iraq will no longer serve
as a haven for any terrorist groups.


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Comment
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7. (C) Demirel's influence with the civilian political class
is waning -- he has so far been unable to shake the
right-of-center DYP, his political baby, out of the
increasingly deep torpor into which DYP leader Agar appears
to be dragging it. He does, however, have the ear of the
Turkish State; there is no politician to whom the military
will more readily listen than the conciliatory ex-President
-- though as reftel suggests, perhaps fewer and fewer
ultimately share his views on U.S.-Turkish relations.
(Moreover, it is unclear how much influence he has with
Sezer, whose performance in the run-up to the war suggests he
takes little guidance from his predecessor.)
PEARSON