UN/CYPRUS: DEMARCHE TO TURKEY ON US-UK DRAFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002342

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: UN/CYPRUS: DEMARCHE TO TURKEY ON US-UK DRAFT
RESOLUTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 10


REF: A. SECSTATE 91728

B. ANKARA 2155


(C) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) D/Polcouns delivered ref A talking points April 10 to
Necip Eguz, MFA DDG for Cyprus-Greece-Aegean affairs. Eguz
noted that, as far as he knew (at 1700 local time) the UN was
still negotiating the text and that no consensus had been
reached. Moreover, he took issue with what he saw as the
continuing effort to "point fingers at ("TRNC President")
Denktas," and to make him wear the jacket for the failure of
the talks.


--------------
April 9 with Eguz
--------------



2. (C) In an April 9 meeting with DCM and D/Polcouns, Eguz
noted several GOT concerns. First, the Russians, Chinese,
and French were pushing changes to the resolution that would
include in the revised text a reference to Resolution 1251 --
"essentially an UNFICYP-extending plan" -- and to "reduction
of foreign troops" on Cyprus. "Why should that be in there?"
he asked. "It will only make things worse." Eguz
volunteered that USG is working to improve the draft
resolution, emphasizing that any improvements should "keep
the door open" to the Annan Plan and the UNSYG's good offices
mission. Second, the "beauty contest" by which Denktas would
be explicitly blamed in the draft for the failure of the
talks was "absolutely unacceptable, unnecessary, and without
merit." Eguz reiterated that, in the meantime, the MFA had
worked with Denktas to come up with potential
confidence-building measures, including above all granting
Greek Cypriots direct access to and trade rights in northern
Cyprus.



3. (C) DCM emphasized that: (1) the UN/EU process had been
key to maintaining pressure on the Greek Cypriots; with the
failure of the talks, a key source of leverage against the
Greek Cypriots had been frittered away by the GOT -- "that's
the reality of the situation"; (2) that even while elements
of the MFA are insisting on incorporating the Annan Plan, TGS
officials have, in essence, pressed us to recognize a
sovereign and independent "TRNC" (ref B),which does not
square with Eguz' points (Eguz replied defensively that "I
never said we didn't have problems with the Annan Plan"); 3)
it is important, therefore, that Annan Plan be the basis of
continued negotiations -- and that the GOT accept this as
gospel even after Cyprus on April 16 signs the EU Accession
Protocols, which the Turks regard as problematic in that it
fails to refer to UN-related equities.
PEARSON