Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA2232
2003-04-07 10:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY'S SOUTHEAST: LEADING MARDIN M.P.S SUPPORT

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002232 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S SOUTHEAST: LEADING MARDIN M.P.S SUPPORT
U.S. -- WHILE HAKKARI DYP BACKS "THE STATE"

REF: A. ANKARA 2018

B. ANKARA 1631

C. ADANA 95


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter.
Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002232

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S SOUTHEAST: LEADING MARDIN M.P.S SUPPORT
U.S. -- WHILE HAKKARI DYP BACKS "THE STATE"

REF: A. ANKARA 2018

B. ANKARA 1631

C. ADANA 95


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter.
Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: Prominent Kurdish M.P.s representing the
border province of Mardin for both ruling AK and opposition
CHP support the U.S.-led war against Saddam. Despite (1)
pressure from elements within AK, (2) outright hostility from
the CHP and the Turkish State, and (3) the ethnically Turkish
public's strong anti-war sentiment, these M.P.s tell us
their own personal and regional political interests, and
those of their constituents, are supported by the USG
approach, not the approach of Ankara. Meanwhile, an M.P.
representing Hakkari for right-of-center DYP -- which is
trying to revive its fortunes by tying itself to the security
forces -- charges that the USG is supporting Turkey's enemies
including the N. Iraqi Kurdish "bandits," the PKK, and
Kurdish Hizbullah. End summary.


--------------
Memo to Baykal: Give It A Rest
--------------



2. (C) CHP deputy Mahmut Duyan, scion of the huge Duyan
Kurdish tribe in the Mardin Turkey-Syria-Iraq area, told us
April 4 he has faced a barrage of criticism from party
colleagues and associated media because he rented property to
the U.S. military in the region. Flipping through a file of
newspaper articles lambasting his business deals with the
U.S., Duyan noted that the reaction against him has only
reinforced his support for U.S. efforts in the region.



3. (C) Indeed, Duyan declared that "I would now be willing to
provide land for free to the U.S. My conscience is clear."
He asserted that in any event he had joined CHP only to
receive financial assistance for the November 2002 national
elections. He also noted that the Duyan tribe is
theoretically large enough to provide enough votes for an
independent seat in the legislature. Duyan, formerly with
right-of-center DYP that long dominated the province, claimed
that CHP "now needs me more than I need them."


-------------- ---
Memo to Tayyip: Listen Up -- Because TGS Doesn't
-------------- ---



4. (C) April 3 an AK Party M.P., a leading conservative

figure in both Mardin and the wider region, gave us a
pro-U.S., decidedly anti-Turkish State view. "The Turkish
state has absolutely no right -- none -- to intervene
unilaterally in northern Iraq" under any conditions, the M.P.
said. If the Turkish military does so, it will have face a
Kurdish uprising in Turkey that will make the PKK pale by
comparison, he stated. The criticism emanating from AK
elements and the Establishment alike regarding alleged USG
"massacres" of civilians in Iraq is simply ridiculous, he
asserted. He then produced a large, framed poster of the
results of Saddam's chemical attack on Halabja in 1988,
noting that Turks remain largely silent about the Baath'ist
regime's ongoing atrocities against civilians.



5. (C) "We (Kurds) have real problems throughout the region"
-- political, economic, and social -- the M.P. explained.
Instead of dealing with these, however, the Turkish State,
"as represented by the military," insists on an approach that
over time has only humiliated the Kurds and made them feel
less tied to Ankara. "Throughout the region you see
mountains with messages carved into them that proclaim that
Turkey is for the Turks. Why don't you see the same in
Kastamonu or Corum" or elsewhere in ethnically Turkish
central Anatolia, he asked rhetorically. The deputy added
that he repeatedly gives the same message to P.M. Erdogan,
who knows he has a problem; meanwhile, the military and other
elements of the Turkish State refuse to listen.



6. (C) The M.P. observed that the various tribes, landlords
(aghas),and tarikat lodges retain considerable influence in
the southeast. The current "feudal structure" in Mardin, he
said, is closely tied to the Turkish State, which uses it to
manipulate politics and keep the region under control. He
expressed hope, however, that the tribes and tarikats would
in the future be able to play a more "positive" role
regarding Kurdish issues. While there are still some
diehards that support the approach of Ankara, "90 percent of
the people now have their eyes open" to the realities on the
ground in Mardin and elsewhere.


--------------
DYP: Remnants of Susurluk
--------------



7. (C) DYP, long in control of the Mardin municipality, has
long been seen by the Turkish State as a political means to
keep the province and the wider region "stable" -- as
evidenced in part by the 1996 Susurluk scandal and the nexus
of security forces, primarily DYP M.P.s, and organized crime
groups that fought the PKK. That nexus still involves some
DYP elements in the southeast, who retain their sizeable
paramilitary "village guard" cadres -- DYP M.P. Mehmet Tatar
from nearby Hakkari being one prominent example. He asserted
to us March 17 that: (1) the USG supports not only the
northern Iraqi Kurds but indirectly the terrorist PKK and
Turkish "Hizbullah" (comment: the latter in fact created by
the security forces to combat Kurdish "separatism." End
comment); (2) he has presented files detailing alleged
nefarious USG activities to both TGS and President Sezer,
"who are very worried about the emergence on an independent
Kurdish state"; (3) Turkey should invade northern Iraq on its
own to protect Turkish interests; and (4) he, personally,
with his "thousands" of village guards, is "the guarantor of
the Turkish State" in his chunk of the southeast.


--------------
Comment
--------------



8. (C) The Iraq question has brought to the fore how little
Ankara has done throughout the life of the Republic of Turkey
to address the political, economic, and social questions of a
significant number of citizens who are ever more aware of
their Kurdishness.
PEARSON