TURKEY'S "WHERE ARE THEY NOW" FILE: CHP'S KEMAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002048

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S "WHERE ARE THEY NOW" FILE: CHP'S KEMAL
DERVIS


REF: 02 ANKARA 7606


(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S.
Kass. Reason: 1.5(b)(d).



1. (C) In a March 28 meeting with poloff, opposition CHP
deputy and former State Minster Kemal Dervis offered his
views of USG-GOT relations, Iraq, Cyprus, and his own
political ambitions. Dervis made the following points:


-- He sees himself as leading an effort to modernize CHP, in
part by trying to bring more women into the party fold;


-- CHP, he stated, has always maintained a close political
and ideological relationship with the Turkish military. An
analysis of Nov. 2002 election voting patterns reveals, he
claimed, that CHP won 80% of vote in areas heavily populated
by the military and their dependents;


-- CHP's core is dominated by traditional Kemalism --
"statism, suspicion of foreigners, and nationalism," Dervis
explained. Ataturk had voiced some important truths -- among
these the idea that his own principles were subject to
change. Unfortunately, the hard-core Kemalists in CHP (and
elsewhere) "refuse to modernize." To them, modernization is
simply a Trojan horse for foreign interests that conflict
with Kemalism -- and thus threaten Turkey;


-- On Iraq, Dervis tried to walk both sides of the fence. He
said he supported USG overall goals, but as an
"internationalist" he cannot support "the way you are doing
it." According to Dervis, CHP's opposition to the US-led war
effort is due to a variety of reasons, including: 1) a
primitive oppositionist impulse in CHP; and 2) traditional
leftist anti-war sentiments. He offered the self-serving and
somewhat mystifying rationalization that, had CHP supported
the government on Iraq, anti-American sentiment in Turkey
"would be even more intense than it is now."


-- Regarding Cyprus, Dervis asserted that Turkey is not to
blame for the failure of the UNSYG sponsored settlement
talks. The problem, he noted, "has deep historical roots."
Turkish psychology on this issue is complex; it is important
to avoid feeding the perception among Turks that "something
is being imposed on them."


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Comment
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2. (C) Once seen as CHP's shining political star, Dervis'
luster has faded considerably since the Nov. 2002 elections.
CHP leader Deniz Baykal -- perhaps seeing Dervis as a
potential rival -- excluded him from important committees and
CHP executive organs. Instead, Dervis became head of CHP's
politically impotent science research arm. According to CHP
M.P. and Human Rights Committee member Engin Altay, Dervis is
relegated to "producing reports that no one reads." Many of
our CHP contacts say Dervis rarely even makes an appearance
at Parliament.



3. (C) Dervis' many years in the United States and
familiarity with the wider world insulates him from many of
the xenophobic pathologies of his colleagues in the
Establishment intelligentsia and other circles. His private
criticism of Kemalism -- at odds with his politically
problematic public comments in the days before the elections
(reftel) -- have considerable merit. Nevertheless, he
displays at a minimum a high degree of comfort with the party
line of CHP boss Deniz Baykal. Before the election,
erstwhile Dervis allies began to criticize him for "selling
out" to Baykalism and its principal-free approach to
politics. Dervis' performance to date as a politician has
done nothing to dispel such sentiments.
PEARSON