Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA2018
2003-03-27 15:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002018 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH
SOUTHEAST

REF: A. ANKARA 1631

B. ANKARA 1740


(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5
(b)(d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002018

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH
SOUTHEAST

REF: A. ANKARA 1631

B. ANKARA 1740


(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5
(b)(d).



1. (C) Summary: Kurdish M.P. from Diyarbakir who is also a
member of opposition CHP's Central Administrative Board has
elaborated on concerns expressed to us recently by other
Kurdish politicians (ref A) regarding fallout in southeastern
Turkey from the war in Iraq. Moreover, he asserted that (1)
there is a growing sense among Kurds that the war in Iraq is
going poorly and (2) a growing number of Kurds in Diyarbakir
view the conflict in increasingly stark, "Islamic" terms.
End summary.



2. (C) A Kurdish M.P. from "secular" CHP -- one of the few
straight shooters we know in that party -- asserted to us
March 27 that the initial positive sentiment about the war in
Iraq has faded among many Kurds in Turkey's Southeast. He
claimed the mood in Diyarbakir, the region's largest city and
our contact's hometown, is one of "controlled panic."
Diyarbakir Kurds, he averred, "are genuinely concerned that
the U.S. will bomb them. Even if Iraq shoots a missile
against Diyarbakir, people will blame the U.S." Our contact
recognizes the absurdity of such a fear but believes it comes
from a growing sense -- fanned by local religious leaders --
that the U.S. is conducting a war against Islam. "You must
take care not to bomb religious sites in Iraq," he warned,
"or you will risk greater opposition in the Southeast."



3. (C) Moreover, the M.P. noted that many in the Southeast
may not support the war because of familial and tribal ties
to the terrorist PKK/KADEK. He noted that his own brother
had joined the PKK in 1988 at the age of 15, though he has
not been seen since. Kurds, he said, fear that whatever
post-Saddam regime emerges in Iraq, it will at a minimum
exclude PKK/KADEK from a place at the table and may even
attempt to destroy it. Consequently, the pro-PKK/KADEK
Kurdish Medya TV, he said, is broadcasting this concern.
(Comment: In one of the ironies of the current political
situation, we note that numerous senior figures in the
pro-Kurdish DEHAP and defunct HADEP parties, both with a
relationship to PKK/KADEK akin to that of Sinn Fein with the
IRA, have eagerly expressed to us privately their support for
USG actions in Iraq. End comment.)


--------------
Comment: The Kurdish Dilemma
--------------



4. (C) Our senior CHP contact's comments emphasize different
aspects of the situation than the views espoused by some of
our other leading (pro-Barzani) Kurdish contacts, including
those in CHP. On the one hand, they reflect diffuse
tolerance of PKK/KADEK, not because it is a terrorist
organization but because "these are our sons." Second, in
previous, more official settings, this particular contact has
been careful to enunciate the CHP line -- even as he
simultaneously expressed hope that the USG war effort will
succeed in improving conditions for Kurds in Iraq. As a
secularist, however, he is also more prone to warn against
rising Islamic sentiment than his more traditional brethren.



5. (C) As a whole, Kurds are more openly religious than
ethnic Turkish citizens. While this helps foster a sense of
the Kurds as distinct from, and victims of, the "Kemalist"
Turks, it also makes many susceptible to pan-Islamic
arguments that the USG is leading a "Crusade" against Muslim
Iraq (ref B). In this contact's view, at least, there is a
growing convergence of interests between some militant
Islamist elements and far-left nationalists in the Kurdish
Southeast.
PEARSON