Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA172
2003-01-08 11:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON TURKISH REFUGEE/IDP CONTINGENCY

Tags:  PREF AORC IZ MOPS PHUM PREL TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000172 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA AND IO
NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA
DEPT PASS USAID FOR OFDA
EUCOM FOR J3 AND J5
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2012
TAGS: PREF AORC IZ MOPS PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TURKISH REFUGEE/IDP CONTINGENCY
PLANNING; RESPONSES ON HUMANITARIAN MAPPING STRATEGY

REF: A. 2002 STATE 264634

B. 2002 ANKARA 7687


(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert Deutsch for
reasons 1.5 B and D.


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000172

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA AND IO
NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA
DEPT PASS USAID FOR OFDA
EUCOM FOR J3 AND J5
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2012
TAGS: PREF AORC IZ MOPS PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TURKISH REFUGEE/IDP CONTINGENCY
PLANNING; RESPONSES ON HUMANITARIAN MAPPING STRATEGY

REF: A. 2002 STATE 264634

B. 2002 ANKARA 7687


(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert Deutsch for
reasons 1.5 B and D.



1. (S) Summary: During the January 3 military-military
talks, the Turkish General Staff provided a map identifying
planned locations for Turkish-run IDP camps to EUCOM and
CENTCOM representatives. MFA Head of Department for
International Political Organizations Feza Ozturk largely
confirmed previously-disclosed information on GOT contingency
planning for a refugee/IDP crisis, including provision for up
to 276,000 persons and siting of some camps in northern Iraq.
He noted that Turkey was short of tents in relation to its
plans. Ozturk and other interlocutors were very cautious
about NGO involvement in humanitarian assistance, but the GOT
is still considering whether and how to involve them in its
planning. Prime Ministry Deputy Undersecretary Mustafa Cetin
told DCM that the GOT had done considerable planning, but did
not go into detail. He did express willingness to work with
foreign humanitarian NGOs, and urged Embassy to discuss this
further with MFA. Turkish Red Crescent's Director General
told us that the organization did not have sufficient
supplies to cover all needs in the contingency plan and said
he would provide details later. He also expressed concern
about conducting relief operations in an environment in which
CBW could be used. Econoff also raised ref A request with
Steven Corliss, UNHCR's Deputy Turkey Representative, who
said he would pass this on to UNSECOORD. End Summary.



2. (C) Emboffs discussed refugee/internally displaced person
(IDP) contingency planning connected with possible military
operations in Iraq as well as ref A's request for
humanitarian mapping information in separate meetings with
Feza Ozturk, MFA Department Head for International Political

Organizations; Mustafa Cetin, Deputy Undersecretary in the
Prime Ministry; Fatih Evren, General Director of the Turkish
Red Crescent; and Steven Corliss, Deputy Turkey
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.


Mapping Information Shared at Mil-Mil Talks
--------------



3. (S) During the January 3 military-military talks in
Ankara, the Turkish General Staff provided a map to EUCOM and
CENTCOM representatives identifying the locations of planned
IDP camps in northern Iraq.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--------------



4. (S) Contingency Planning: Econoff and Polmiloff met with
Feza Ozturk, MFA Department Head for International Political
Organizations, on January 7 to discuss Turkey's contingency
planning for a refugee/IDP crisis and to relay ref A request
on humanitarian mapping. Ozturk largely confirmed and
fleshed out details of planning previously given by UNHCR and
also leaked to the local press (ref B). The GOT has the
capacity to deal with 276,000 refugees/IDPs, but Ozturk
stressed that this was not necessarily the number expected at
Turkey's frontiers in the event of military operations. He
said the number would depend on a number of unknown
variables, including whether there would be a northern front.
The plan calls for up to 18 camps (12 in northern Iraq and 6
on Turkish territory). The camps and supplies are modular
and can be launched and augmented in increments of 3,000
persons. The Turkish military would be responsible only for
external camp security, with six Turkish regional governors
from southeast Turkey and the Turkish Red Crescent
responsible for internal administration. Turkey would set up
camps inside Iraq first and only open the six camps in Turkey
if needed. All camps in Iraq would be within an hour's drive
of the Turkish border. Ozturk said the facilities could be
erected within several days or at most one week. Ozturk said
that the Red Crescent had pre-positioned some of its 30,000
to 35,000 stock of tents and other supplies in Silopi, but
that these stocks were insufficient relative to the plan. He
said that, in the event that the full 276,000 refugees/IDPs
required help, Turkey would have to ask for tents to shelter
up to 120,000 persons. Crisis centers would be established
at the Prime Ministry and MFA. A regional crisis center
would be established in Diyarbakir, with several Turkish
diplomats posted there. Gaziantep would serve as the
logistical hub.



5. (C) Ozturk stated that Turkey's contingency plans had been
shared in part with UNHCR, but not with foreign
governments/donors and he requested that we protect this
information. He noted that UNHCR had made a quiet appeal to
donors for supplemental funding, but that Turkey did not plan
to make a similar appeal at this point. Of course, if the
Red Crescent exhausted its resources, Turkey would approach
donors to replenish its stocks. We asked if the GOT had
shared its plans with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),
which controls the territory in northern Iraq where Turkey
intends to set up the camps. Ozturk responded that the GOT
had not.



6. (C) On the Geneva Convention: Ozturk pointed out that
although Turkey is a party to the Geneva Convention on
Refugees, it has made a geographical reservation accepting
the treaty's obligations only with respect to refugees from
the European continent and does not accept refugees from its
eastern neighbors for resettlement in Turkey. He
acknowledged that Turkey would in the future have to amend
this policy as a condition of EU membership.

7. (C) Role of NGOs: Polmiloff noted that NGOs were an
integral part of USG humanitarian relief planning, both for
Iraq and elsewhere, and asked Ozturk what the GOT's views
were on a role for NGOs in this possible crisis. Ozturk said
the GOT was very cautious about certain (unspecified) NGOs,
contending that some had pursued a political as well as
humanitarian agenda following the Gulf War and had supported
the PKK. He noted the GOT's standing decision to ban border
crossings into northern Iraq of NGO personnel in 1996 (though
some exceptions were granted later). Note: During the
January 3 military-military talks, TGS said that it was GOT
policy not to allow NGOs to enter Iraq via Turkey during the
combat phases of an operation. End Note. He cited the
absence of an official border authority on the Iraqi side as
another reason for the prohibition, saying Turkey would
remain responsible for the activities of NGO representatives
after they crossed into Iraq. Ozturk said that humanitarian
relief was within the mandate of the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International
Committee of the Red Cross in Iraq, and that the GOT wanted
to work closely with UN agencies as well. He said the GOT's
principal concern was to assure centralized and coordinated
humanitarian relief, with the Turkish Red Crescent as the
focal point. However, Ozturk said that the GOT was
considering whether and how to bring NGOs into its
contingency planning and said an interagency meeting on this
subject was to be held later on January 7. There was, he
said, little prospect for resolving the problem of NGO access
to northern Iraq through Turkey even if a decision was made
to let NGOs participate in Turkish relief efforts.



8. (C) Predictions: While acknowledging that there were as
yet too many unknowns to predict humanitarian need connected
with an operation in Iraq, Ozturk opined that a mass movement
towards Turkish borders was not likely unless the threat
facing the population were extreme (e.g chemical/biological
warfare, proximate armed conflict). He said that IDPs were
likely to move just far enough within Iraq to avoid immediate
danger and would probably aim to stay within the country
rather than seek shelter in Turkish camps guarded by Turkish
soldiers.


Prime Ministry
--------------



9. (S) On January 3, DCM and Econoff met with Mustafa Cetin,
the newly-appointed Deputy Undersecretary in the Prime
Ministry, to discuss GOT refugee/internally displaced persons
contingency planning. Adil Ozdemir, General Directorate of
Turkish Emergency Management, and Ilgin Atalay, head of the
Prime Ministry's Foreign Relations Department, also attended.
DCM emphasized that the USG still hopes that military
operations can be avoided through peaceful disarmament of
Iraq, but that it is prudent to plan for the possibility of a
refugee/IDP problem on Turkey's frontier. He also suggested
that any possible crisis will be much easier to handle to the
extent that our two governments can cooperate fully and
coordinate activities. DCM asked for the GOT's thinking in
handling this problem, particularly with respect to
assistance that may become available from private
humanitarian organizations. He also noted that the USG had
begun to collect mapping information on humanitarian
facilities and personnel in Iraq, and asked Cetin if the GOT
had any information to share on this.



10. (S) Noting the strain on Turkey of the influx of
refugees/IDPs in 1988 and 1991, Cetin said that the GOT had
done considerable contingency planning and hoped to be better
prepared if a similar crisis arose in the near future.
However, he suggested that Embassy contact MFA's Multilateral
Political Affairs General Directorate and Kizilay for a more
detailed information, including on humanitarian mapping.
Cetin expressed interest in cooperating with NGOs in
providing assistance, and told us he would discuss this
further with MFA. He suggested that Kizilay should be the
point of contact for those organizations. Cetin thanked DCM
for the United States' interest in raising these issues and
its willingness to cooperate in this area.


Turkish Red Crescent
--------------



11. (C) Econoff and Medical Attache met with Fatih Evren,
General Director of the Turkish Red Crescent, on January 6 on
these issues. Evren stated that there were gaps in the Red
Crescent's supplies relative to expected need in the event of
a crisis, and that he would consult with the Red Crescent's
President on a list of needed items to be shared with the
USG. On the role of NGOs in providing relief, Evren noted
negative experiences with certain NGOs after the Gulf War and
stated that the Red Crescent preferred to work only with
UNHCR and other UN agencies. However, he added that this
decision was up to the GOT and suggested that we raise this
with MFA. On the humanitarian mapping request, Evren
responded that Red Crescent had no presence in northern Iraq
and referred us to MFA on this also. Evren expressed concern
that the Red Crescent was unprepared to provide assistance or
treat refugees/IDPs in the context of use of
chemical/biological weapons. Medical Attache offered to
provide medical information on planning and treating patients
connected with CBW attacks.


UNHCR
--------------



12. (S) Econoff met with Steven Corliss, Deputy Turkey
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on
December 30 to request that UNHCR provide data on the
locations of its operations in Iraq through UNSECOORD
(reftel). Corliss noted that, although UNHCR Turkey did not
have any personnel or sites in Iraq, this could change if
UNHCR staff in Iraq were evacuated in connection with
military operations. He told us that he would report the
demarche to UNSECOORD and would also relay our request to the
Turkish Red Crescent.



13. (C) On contingency planning, Corliss told us that UNHCR
planned to open a regional center in Diyarbakir in the event
of a refugee/internally displaced person crisis, and that it
already had staff in Van and Silopi. On the issue of
preparedness for providing assistance to refugees/IDPs who
may have been exposed to chemical/biological weapons, Corliss
confirmed that UN agencies would evacuate if CBW were used.
He added that he assumed the Turkish and U.S. militaries had
plans for this contingency, but told us that Red Crescent had
not.


Comment
--------------



14. (S) Embassy believes we have reached the stage where it
would be useful to begin sharing further information with the
Turks on USG contingency planning, particularly the roles we
contemplate for NGOs in our response to a crisis and our
ability to address any gaps in Turkish relief supplies.
IDP/refugee issues are and will continue to be an integral
part of the mil-mil talks, but we need soon to begin
integrating our proposals and supply chain with the Turkish
civilian and UN response plans. That would include beginning
to identify for the GOT and establishing a linkage with any
USAID/DART or NGO elements that are part of our proposal.
Please advise.
DEUTSCH